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Introduction
Human rights are important. First and foremost they are relevant for
those fighting for respect for their own or others’ human rights and
for the improvement of situations in which fundamental rights are vio-
lated. But human rights are also of interest for politicians, political the-
orists, international lawyers, jurisprudents, NGO activists, civil servants,
and, of course, political and moral philosophers. Obviously, the interest
in human rights is stirred by quite different reasons: some of them pure-
ly practical, some of them purely theoretical, most of them combining
practical and theoretical concerns. Yet all those involved with human
rights should share one fundamental concern: to know what is the na-
ture of the subject they are talking about and in which way it has nor-
mative force. In other words, the clarification of the concept of human
rights and the justification of these rights – the two core challenges of
the contemporary philosophy of human rights – should matter to all
who are interested, in one way or another, in human rights.
In offering such clarification and justification political and moral
philosophy has something relevant to contribute to the general discus-
sion of human rights. Being philosophers, we might be criticized for
making such a strong claim as to the relevance of philosophy. But for-
giveness might be granted in light of our willingness to admit that phil-
osophical insights about human rights are not freestanding, nor do they,
in general, enjoy priority. Rather they depend in turn on the political,
juridical, etc. dimensions of the idea of human rights, that is, on the use
of the concept in practice.
The main function of universal human rights seems to be to set a
minimal standard for institutional and individual conduct on a global
scale and to guarantee human beings protection from mistreatment
through forms of universal legal rights. While an initial agreement
about human rights may cover this general claim, it is disputed how
to determine exactly the underlying moral idea of basic human rights
– and whether it is a moral idea at all that generates the normative
force of human rights. There are two primary ways to approach this
problem. Some argue that human rights, by their very nature, are
held by all human beings either simply because of their common hu-
manity, their human dignity, or because a set of basic needs and interests
of all human beings is sufficiently important that their protection natu-
rally has the status of a fundamental moral right. Others argue that
human rights essentially perform a political function. According to
these philosophers, the concept of a human right is dependent upon
the concept of some political institution or other. In this vein, the vio-
lation of human rights is construed, e. g., as pro tanto justification for
outside interventions on an international level such that the defining
function of human rights is to set limits to state sovereignty.
In both cases – the moral and the political view – further questions
loom. Some of them are concerned with the nature of human rights as
rights. Can human rights be justified? If so, how? And what, if any-
thing, is special about human rights as rights?
Then again, with respect to human rights, it often remains under-
determined what the corresponding duties are. After all, it seems im-
plausible to grant someone a right without offering some idea about
how this right can be honored, that is to determine, who exactly shall
have which obligation to account for the right in question. On one po-
litical conception human rights only obligate official agents such as gov-
ernments or institutions. Others argue, however, that not only official
agents but also individual agents can be said to be holders of human
rights-corresponding duties. Following the debate about identifying
the holder of rights corresponding duties it becomes important to deter-
mine the exact content of these duties.
Human rights are often taken to be essentially universal. But how
can there be universal rights in view of the fact that there is such a va-
riety of different, often competing moralities in the world? Is it plausible
to assume that many moralities just get it wrong? Obviously, the ques-
tion of whether or not human rights are universal is not only important
from a philosophical point of view. It is also one of the most pressing
challenges to the politics of human rights when it comes to promoting
human rights as a standard of conduct in regions dominated by different
moral standards.
The articles collected in this volume examine in detail these important
and much disputed issues in the contemporary philosophical debate
about human rights: (I.) the clarification of the concept of human rights,
(II.) the analysis of human rights as rights along with the question of
rights-corresponding duties, and (III.) the universality of human rights.
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Moreover, the question of a justification of human rights is pertinent to
each of these issues.1
The first part of our volume is mainly concerned with the two con-
ceptions of human rights already mentioned: the moral and the political
conception of human rights. Our authors approach this issue from dif-
ferent angles.
In the first paper, “Human rights: questions of aim and approach”,
James Griffin does two things: He argues that to determine its approach
in a principled way, every theory of human rights needs to have a clear
aim, and he bases his own approach on the aim of giving more deter-
minateness to the concept of human rights as it figures in our on-
going public human rights discourse. The concept of human rights
must be better specified, according to Griffin, as a precondition for ra-
tional debate about existence conditions of human rights, the content of
particular human rights, and potential conflicts of rights. The theory this
aim leads to is characterized and defended as piecemeal (as opposed to
systematic like Kant’s, Mill’s or Wellman’s approach to human rights),
monist (not pluralist) concerning the basic values human rights are
grounded in, and evaluative (not functional, as e. g., the approaches of
Dworkin, Nozick, Rawls, Raz and Beitz). The basic evaluative concept
in Griffin’s approach is the concept of normative agency. But since Grif-
fin wants to determine a concept of human rights that meets the prac-
tical constraints of uptake (it should actually be used in public discourse)
and durability (it should be stable in this use) he also takes these “prac-
ticalities” into account.
In “On the nature of human rights” John Tasioulas sketches three
broad families of answers to the question of what is the essential nature
of a human right: (1) the Reductive View, according to which human
rights are best understood without essential reference to the notion of a
(moral) right, e. g. as universal human interests, (2) the Orthodox View,
according to which human rights are universal moral rights possessed by
all human beings simply in virtue of their humanity, and (3) the Political
View, which makes some political role, or set of roles, an essential aspect
of the nature of human rights. Tasioulas argues that a suitably interpret-
ed version of the Orthodox View is preferable to both of its rivals: un-
like the Reductive View, it is able to capture the distinctive moral sig-
nificance of human rights as normative standards, whereas unlike the
1 The following summaries are in many cases based on abstracts provided by the
authors.
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Political View it does not make the discourse of human rights beholden
to extraneous institutional considerations.
In opposition to the moral conception of human rights held by Grif-
fin, Tasioulas and others, different authors argue in favor of what is
sometimes called a political conception of human rights. They think
that the essence of human rights is determined by their having a specific
political function, e. g. to limit the sovereignty of states. This political
conception, it is often argued, is closer to the contemporary human
rights practice than the traditional view of human rights, and this is
seen as a reason to accept it. However, Peter Schaber argues in his
paper “Human rights without foundations” that the political view of
human rights should not be accepted. He attempts to show that this
conception does not pass the adequacy test that the political view itself
proposes for a satisfactory theory of human rights, nor does this view
give us the justification of human rights that is needed. Instead, Schaber
provides his own defense of a moral view of human rights in which the
concept of human dignity plays a pivotal role.
In “The moral and political conception of human rights – a mixed
account” Erasmus Mayr also focuses on the dispute between adherents of
the political and moral conceptions of human rights, which turns on the
question of whether human rights are essentially distinguished as such
by their specific political function. Some adherents of the political con-
ception, like Joseph Raz, combine the view that human rights have an
essentially political role with the claim that they are a sub-class of moral
rights. This, according to Mayr, makes a combination of both ap-
proaches appear attractive, where, so it seems, the political conception
of human rights answers the conceptual question of what human rights
essentially are, while the moral conception offers the most attractive an-
swer to the question of how human rights claims are justified. However,
Mayr argues that we cannot expect both conceptions to be capable of
the sort of “convergence” that this combination would require. Instead,
one should follow a moderate version of the political conception, re-
garding both the question of what distinguishes human rights from
other individual rights and the question how human right-claims can
be justified. It turns out, however, that this does not make human rights
dependent on the actual existence of states, and that a convincing polit-
ical account of human rights even requires that human rights are, by and
large, universal rights that human beings possess qua human beings – just
as the moral conception claims. The resulting account of human rights
which Mayr advocates can therefore aptly be called a “mixed” account.
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The second part of this volume focuses on issues related to the notion of
“rights” in the term “human rights”. Is it possible to justify rights on a
consequentialist basis? What’s special about human rights as rights?
What are the duties corresponding to human rights and what is their
scope?
Utilitarianism and other forms of consequentialism are frequently
criticized on grounds that the impersonal pursuit of maximum aggregate
goodness fails to provide adequate room for fair distributions and indi-
vidual rights. In his paper “Problems with some consequentialist argu-
ments for basic rights” Samuel Freeman examines three kinds of argu-
ments consequentialists have made for moral, human, or basic individual
rights that respond to these criticisms. First, there is the indirect conse-
quentialist framework provided by J.S. Mill ; second, there are distribu-
tion sensitive accounts of well-being and other goods; and third, there
are accounts that directly incorporate rights and other moral concepts
into the good that is to be maximized. In response to Mill, even grant-
ing he has shown that basic rights and liberties are necessary for individ-
ual well-being, Freeman argues that this does not warrant the conclu-
sion that equal rights and equal freedoms are always or even ever neces-
sary to maximizing the sum total of individual well-being. He thinks that
similar problems apply to the second position, which incorporates
equality of goods (of welfare, autonomy, etc.) or other distribution-sen-
sitive values into the consequentialist maximand (argued for by T.M
Scanlon, Larry Temkin, Bill Talbott, and Philip Pettit). According to
Freeman, equal distribution of one or more goods does not imply
equal rights of the kinds advocated by liberal and social democrats or
human rights advocates. Finally, the third position, best represented
by Amaryta Sen, argues that equal rights and fair distributions are them-
selves intrinsic goods to be promoted for their own sake. Freeman con-
tends that this position is not really consequentialist but rather is a plu-
ralist intuitionist conception that requires balancing aggregate goodness
against antecedent moral principles of fairness and individual rights.
Rowan Cruft’s essay “Human rights as rights” defends the thesis that
individualistic justification is one of the hallmarks of human rights.
Combining this conception of human rights with standard worries
about socioeconomic and other “expensive” rights can tempt one to
take the phrase “human rights” to refer to any individualistically justi-
fied weighty normative consideration – including considerations that
are not rights in Hohfeld’s sense. Cruft maintains that abandoning a
Hohfeldian conception of rights is problematic in several ways: for in-
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stance, it makes it difficult to distinguish rights from their grounding
values, and can make it unclear in what sense rights-violations genuinely
wrong right-holders. But the essay ends with the suggestion that – due
to the nature of individualistic justification – these problems are less
worrying for human rights than for other rights.
The aim of Corinna Mieth’s paper “On human rights and the
strength of corresponding duties” is to determine the strength of indi-
vidual duties corresponding to human rights. While Onora O’Neill
claimed that the existence of social human rights depends on the alloca-
tion of corresponding duties, Elizabeth Ashford holds that it is not the
existence but the realization of social human rights that depends on
their institutionalization. From this she concludes that there are individ-
ual duties to institutionalize human rights under non-ideal circumstan-
ces. Mieth focuses on the strength of these duties. She suggests a recon-
struction of the strength of duties according to three criteria. The first
criterion is the significance of the good that is protected by a right
and the corresponding duty. This leads to a differentiation of the
strength of duties according to the theory of goods that diverges from
the differentiation of negative and positive duties found in the theory
of action. Furthermore, Mieth defends the idea that reasonable demand-
ingness can be considered a second criterion for the strength of duties.
Thirdly, the specificity of the content of the duty has relevance for its
strength. If this is correct, then the duties of an average person to insti-
tutionalize human rights are only weak. Therefore, Mieth proposes a
shift from duties to responsibilities. Even if duties of institutionalization
are underdetermined in general and therefore only weak, it may be pos-
sible to assign responsibilities to improve human rights standards.
The last contribution to the second part of this volume also address-
es the question of the demandingness of rights-corresponding duties but
focuses on individuals as duty bearers. In his paper “The moral demand-
ingness of socioeconomic human rights”, Jan-Christoph Heilinger asks
whether excessive demands for moral agents speak against a moral
framework such as socioeconomic human rights. In other words, is an
account of human rights that embraces welfare rights unsound if it
turns out to be extremely burdensome for moral agents? After an anal-
ysis of the relationship between human rights and the corresponding,
potentially overdemanding duties, Heilinger argues that not only insti-
tutions but also individual agents are addressed by these duties. Next, he
introduces the “moral demandingness objection” as a meta-theoretical
criterion to judge the soundness of a moral theory and shows different
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ways in which a moral theory might demand more than agents can do
or can be reasonably expected to do, particularly in the context of
human rights. His paradigm case is the alleged human right to adequate
food and its corresponding duties. Heilinger argues that excessive de-
mands mirror the current circumstances of extreme but in principle pre-
ventable world poverty. Hence, extremely burdensome demands should
be taken neither as an argument against the moral theory of human wel-
fare rights nor as a pre-emptive exculpation of agents failing to live up to
the duties corresponding to these rights. However, obligations corre-
sponding to welfare rights are not the only type of obligations for
moral agents; therefore, they should not always and exclusively strive
to fulfill these obligations.
Whatever the nature of human rights might be, and whatever their sta-
tus as rights exactly involves, one feature seems to be essential in any
case: Human rights are universal rights. Nevertheless, anyone claiming
that human rights are universal is confronted with the fact that there are
quite different moralities to be found in the world – present and past.
So, are human rights really universal? Is there enough common ground
between all moralities for a justification of human rights? Do we even
need such a common ground? The papers of the third part of this vol-
ume try to answer questions like these.
In his paper “Common humanity as a justification for human rights
claims” Simon Hope argues for two related conclusions. His primary
concern is to investigate the standard justification for human rights in
the modern human rights culture: That human rights are held in virtue
of our common humanity. Hope argues that the depth and breadth of
moral diversity raises serious questions about whether the features of
common humanity standardly appealed to can stand as intelligible
moral reasons to the bearers of different forms of life. At the same
time, he does not think a retreat to a Rawlsian-inspired “political” con-
ception of human rights is justified. Ordinary moral reasoning does not
break down completely when addressed to an unbounded domain of
agents. Although necessarily constrained, ordinary moral reasoning
about the human condition can justify human rights claims. But that
reasoning must appeal to vulnerabilities inherent in the human condi-
tion, rather than features of personhood, if intelligible reasons are to
be advanced.
On the one hand, the universality of human rights is, as it seems,
part of their very nature. On the other hand, when we look at the mor-
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alities actually endorsed by different persons/cultures etc., we find a
great variety, including quite different views on the nature and impor-
tance of human rights. From a philosophical point of view, there seem
to be two different options, one as unsatisfactory as the other: Either we
must assume that many people/cultures etc. are deeply wrong about
fundamental moral matters, or we have to admit that human rights
are not universal after all. In his paper “Human rights and moral diver-
sity” Gerhard Ernst tries to find a solution to this problem by outlining a
morally decent form of moral relativism. He is convinced that there is a
deeply contingent element in morality as such which allows for some
variation concerning a morally acceptable stance towards human rights.
The present volume presents new philosophical papers, written by lead-
ing philosophers in the field, inquiring into crucial aspects of the current
philosophical debate about human rights. It includes selected papers
from a workshop on the philosophy of human rights held in 2009 at
the Venice International University as well as invited papers. The Ven-
ice workshop was part of a project on human rights established by the
Junge Akademie and the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Hu-
manities. First and foremost we thank the authors for their contributions
to this volume. We also owe our gratitude for generous financial sup-
port to the Udo Keller Stiftung–Forum Humanum. Furthermore, spe-
cial thanks go to Erich Ammereller for pulling most of the weight in
organizing the workshop just mentioned, and to him, Konrad Petrovsz-
ky, Tobias Pulver, and Karsten Schoellner for their help in preparing
this volume.
Stuttgart and Zurich, August 2011 The editors
IntroductionXIV
I.
Human Rights: Moral or Political?

Human rights: questions of aim and approach
James Griffin
1. The question of aim and approach
I shall step back from the discussion of human rights going on now in
philosophy, political theory, and jurisprudence and ask a question about
it – the discussion. What are we philosophers, political theorists, and ju-
risprudents trying to do? One might think that the answer is obvious:
we are trying to understand better what human rights are. But that an-
swer is most unclear. ‘Human rights’ as used in ethics? Or in the law?
Or in political life? If in ethics, rights derived from over-arching ethical
principles, as Kant derives his account of ‘natural rights’ from his Doc-
trine of the Right, or John Stuart Mill derives his account of ‘rights’
from the Principle of Utility? Or ‘rights’ as used now in evaluating par-
ticular societies? If in the law, the law as it is? Or as it should be? And
the law where? If in politics, in its history? Or in an empirical account
of political institutions? Or in setting standards? All of these different
aims themselves require different approaches.1
2. Systematic and piecemeal approaches
One might think that the most rational approach is what I shall call ‘sys-
tematic’. One starts, ideally, by developing a general theory of value,
then one develops a theory of ethics in general, then a theory of rights
in general, followed by theories of legal rights and moral rights, and final-
ly by a theory of human rights, either moral or legal. In our day, Carl
Wellman provides a distinguished example of this approach (Wellmann
1985, ch. 1 and 1997, ch. 1).
A different approach is what I shall call ‘piecemeal’. One starts with
a particular notion of human rights, say, the notion that emerged from
the long natural rights/human rights tradition starting in the Late Mid-
1 This paper is a substantially revised version of Griffin 2010.
dle Ages, modified substantially in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, and greatly articulated and mobilized in national and international
life by the United Nations following the Second World War. This no-
tion of ‘human rights’ is now used widely – in law and political life and
ethics. Then one must further focus one’s concern: one is interested,
one may decide, in how this notion of human rights figures in the
most plausible ethics that one can find. Its role in ethics would make de-
mands on the notion that would lead to the filling out of its sense, in
particular to the provision of much needed existence conditions for a
human right. This filling out would invariably involve appeal to more
abstract ethical considerations, but perhaps nothing as abstract as Well-
man’s ‘general theory of value’ or Kant’s Doctrine of the Right or Mill’s
Principle of Utility. One could wait to see how abstract one’s explan-
ation has to get. One would start, piecemeal fashion, to make the ethical
notion of a ‘human right’ clearer. An example of this approach would
be a book I recently published (Griffin 2008, ch. 2).
Why not adopt the systematic – and apparently much more rational
– approach to human rights? For two reasons. First, the few explana-
tions of the term ‘rights’, on its own, that we have been given so far
seem to me failures. The most influential one in the last few decades
is that of Joseph Raz, and I have explained in my book why I think
it fails (ibid., 54–56; 261–5). In addition to that, there is Wittgenstein’s
case for the impossibility of a verbal definition of many terms (Wittgen-
stein 1953, sects. 64 ff). The example he uses is the noun ‘game’, but the
noun ‘right’ is no more promising a subject for verbal definition than
the noun ‘game’. I know that a definition and an explanation are different
things (Raz, for example, was not attempting a verbal definition), but
they are still close enough for Wittgenstein’s skepticism about verbal
definitions to be a worry about certain attempts at a quite full explana-
tion. And think of the extraordinarily varied ground now covered by
the noun ‘right’: ‘the right has triumphed’, ‘by rights she should have
it’, ‘he upholds the right’ (i. e. righteousness), ‘put it to rights’, ‘the rights
of customers/patients/depositors’ (as announced by a shop/a hospital/a
bank), and so on. The lexicography of the English noun ‘right’, for ex-
ample as one finds it in the Oxford English Dictionary, leaves one a long
way short of identifying the sort of ‘right’ that we are after.
My second reason for not choosing the systematic approach is that it
is not needed. When the Glossators in Bologna in the twelfth or thir-
teenth centuries first used the noun ‘right’ (‘ius’) in our modern
sense, it was already understood as a natural right and was later explicitly
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called that. And, as we know, the adjective ‘natural’ later gave way to
the adjective ‘human’. The Glossators did not first have the notion of
the genus ‘right’ and afterwards introduce a differentia to produce the spe-
cies ‘natural right’. They started with the class ‘natural right’. What is
faulty with the meaning of the term ‘natural right’ as they used it? It
is true that there were several vaguenesses in it : ‘natural laws’, which
were seen as the grounds of natural rights, were not at all easy to iden-
tify. And there was even greater indeterminacy in the sense of the suc-
cessor term ‘human right’, after the philosophers of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries got finished secularizing it – secularizing it because
of their enhanced views of the powers of human reason. But what more
would we need to make the term ‘human right’ satisfactorily determi-
nate in sense (merely ‘satisfactorily’, not ‘fully’)? Nothing, I should
say. So why not be content with the piecemeal approach?
So my two thoughts come down to this: (1) I doubt that we can
make a success of the systematic approach, and (2) in any case, I
doubt that we need it to understand human rights.
There is also the danger that the systematic approach will carry one
off in a direction in which one does not want to go. My aim is to under-
stand the notion of ‘human rights’ that comes out of the tradition that I
sketched a moment ago. It is at the center of an on-going public dis-
course of human rights now used in ethics, law, and politics. Kant
and Mill have theories of value in general and single highest-level
moral principles – Kant has his Doctrine of the Right and Mill his Prin-
ciple of Utility. But in these two philosophers’ hands the terms ‘natural
right’ (Kant) and ‘right’ simpliciter (Mill) come to have markedly larger
extensions than the term out of the tradition has – substantially larger in
Kant’s case and even larger in Mill’s. Indeed, the extensions are so much
larger that Kant’s and Mills’ notions of a ‘right’ turn out to be different
from the notion that emerged from the tradition. Kant and Mill have, in
effect, changed the subject. What they have done is to commandeer the
language of ‘rights’ and put it to use in spelling out their own accounts
of morality. There is nothing wrong with that, though it may cause
confusion. But anyone who adopts the systematic approach is at risk
of finding that this approach, like Kant’s and Mill’s, produces a markedly
different-sized extension than the extension yielded by the tradition. To
which, then, would the systematizer concede greater authority: to the
implications of this systematic approach or to the outcome of the tradi-
tion? Would the systematizer react by revising this approach or by mak-
ing major revisions to the extension that emerges from the tradition?
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This question, of course, takes us back to that series of questions about
the particular aim of an account of human rights. What is the systemat-
izer’s aim? It is not yet clear.
3. How problems can determine approaches
Nearly everyone who thinks deeply about human rights acknowledges
that there is a problem with the notion: we need to understand better
what human rights are. We differ about the nature of the problem
and about its solution. So let me explain how I diagnose the problem.
I believe that the sense of the term ‘human right’ suffers from a high
degree of indeterminateness. It may not be uniquely indeterminate
among ethical terms, but it is considerably more indeterminate than
most of them. We have too few agreed criteria for determining when
the term is used correctly and when incorrectly for the discourse of
human rights to be satisfactorily reason-guided. When the term ‘natural
right’ was secularized in stages, the background notion of ‘natural law’
along with its context in Christian metaphysics was dropped as unnec-
essary, and nothing was put in its place. The term ‘natural law’ contin-
ued in fairly wide use, but by then it usually meant no more than a
moral principle independent of law, custom, or convention. It is not
that there were no criteria for correct and incorrect use; the idea of a
right still had some intension: a human right was a right that we had
simply in virtue of being human. And we do not need to have a fully
determinate sense of the term; practically all terms have some indeter-
minateness, if only at the edges. What we need is, rather, a sense that
will at least give us existence conditions for a ‘human right’, and will
supply grounds for deciding the content of particular ‘human rights’,
and will indicate how in general to go about trying to resolve conflicts
of human rights. In short, we need a sense determinate enough to allow
us to make these quite basic rational moves with the term – moves that
we are unable to make at present.
But the term ‘human right’ used where? I think that the most im-
portant use of the term is that in the on-going public discourse of
human rights that emerged from the tradition that l sketched. It is the
term ‘human right’ used today by most philosophers, political theorists,
international lawyers, jurisprudents, civil servants, politicians, and
human rights activists. In any case, that is the use that I am concerned
about. It is a use in which ethics plays a basic role, as it did in the tra-
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dition, though nowadays, as I shall come to, that basic role for ethics is
sometimes denied by international lawyers. And it is a use of the term in
a fairly wide and diverse community, at the heart of which are those es-
pecially concerned with human rights, whom I listed a moment ago:
philosophers, political theorists, international lawyers, and so on.
My point here is that one’s particular aim in clarifying the term
‘human right’ can determine how one is to approach the subject. It
can determine the constraints on what one tries to do. Given what I
want to do, one major constraint clearly is ethical. I want to clarify
the idea of a human right that would appear in the most plausible ethics
that one can find. So there are the constraints imposed by its having to
fit into that demanding context. But the idea that I am interested in also
appears in an on-going public discourse used by a certain heterogeneous
linguistic community, and that role generates certain practical constraints.
These practical constraints are less well-known than the ethical con-
straints that I just mentioned, so let me briefly explain them.
My ultimate aim is to make the sense of the term ‘human right’ sat-
isfactorily determinate. There have been strong inflationary pressures on
the term in the past, and they are still at work. The belief is widespread,
but mistaken, that human rights mark what is most important in mor-
ality; so whatever any group in society regards as most important, it
will be strongly tempted to declare to be a human right. The group
will be out to annex the rhetorical force of the term ‘human right’
for its own keenest concerns. It is now also a common, and not unjus-
tified, belief that getting something widely accepted as a human right is
a good first step to getting it made a legal right; so there is a great temp-
tation to assert that anything to which one wants to have a legal guar-
antee is a human right. And getting something accepted as a human
right transforms one’s case. One is transformed from beggar (‘you
ought to help me’) to chooser (‘it is mine by right’). If one can claim
by right, one is not dependent upon the grace or kindness or charity
of others. These features of the discourse of human rights are responsible
both for great good and great bad, the bad being the ballooning of the
discourse itself during the second half of the twentieth century.
My belief is that we have a better chance of improving the discourse
of human rights if we stipulate that only normative agents bear human
rights – no exceptions: not infants, not the seriously mentally disabled, not
those in a permanent vegetative state, and so on – though we have
weighty moral obligations to all of them of a different kind. For the dis-
course to be improved, the criteria for correct and incorrect use of the
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term must be fairly widely agreed upon. They would not have to be
anything like universally agreed upon, but there would have to be fairly
wide agreement among those central to the discourse: philosophers, in-
ternational lawyers, etc. If a good number of the members of those
groups came to agree on the criteria, the rest of the members would
be likely in time to follow, and the general public would themselves
to some extent eventually fall in line.
That sequence of events is what we should need for an appreciable
improvement in the discourse. What, then, should we need to set off
that favorable sequence of events? The start would be the appearance
of a substantive account of human rights – some not too complicated,
fairly sharp-edged normative intension for the term – which commend-
ed itself to a growing number of those central to the discourse. There is
no mechanism available that would be likely to lead us to agree to a very
few, but not more, exceptions to the proposed new intension. Even if
there were, the inflationary pressures are all still with us and all still very
strong; there would soon be too many exceptions for the criteria for
correct and incorrect use to remain sharp-edged enough to produce
the needed improvement.
I should stress that what moves me is not the wish to reverse what is
called the ‘proliferation’ of rights. I have no views about how many
human rights there are. Nor, given the different levels of abstraction
in their formulation, do I know how to enumerate them. We speak
of ‘proliferation’, in a pejorative sense, only because we suspect that
some of the declared rights are not true rights. What moves me is the
wish to end the damaging indeterminateness of sense of the term
‘human right’.
Once one thus admits elements of stipulation into the grounds of
human rights, does one not then abandon a central claim of the natural
rights/human rights tradition: namely, that human rights are grounded
in human nature? I think not. On the contrary, the decision embodied
in the stipulation is the decision to derive human rights solely from cer-
tain values constitutive of human nature. That element of stipulation
does not make the constituent values of normative agency, namely au-
tonomy and liberty, any less able to be considered ‘objective’ or ‘natural’
or even in a sense ‘real’. Still, one cannot deny that there are several fea-
sible alternatives to adopting the restriction to normative agency that I
recommend. For example, there is the personhood account expanded
to include certain potential persons such as infants; there is the basic
need account; there is a more pluralist account than mine that includes
James Griffin8
other goods in addition to the goods of normative agency; and so on.
Any of these competing accounts could be adopted, though, I am
claiming, with less benefit. I may not simply insist that human rights
are derived solely from normative agency; that belief would need a
great deal in the way of justification, which I have not given. Although
some of the alternative accounts (e. g. the need account) can be faulted
for not adequately explaining human rights, others of them (the account
that includes certain potential persons or the more pluralist account)
cannot be. The objection to them is practical: they do not give us
the beneficial determinateness of sense we need. That is why the sort
of stipulation I am making is not arbitrary. It has to be justified.
There are different kinds of stipulation. Many, of course, are arbitra-
ry, but some are part of a disciplined project. My project is to make
‘human right’ – this very widely used term, this term used by many dif-
ferent sorts of people – more determinate in sense. So my aim is, in part,
a certain practical outcome: change in a public discourse. One, but only
one, of the practical constraints on my project is that my proposed more
determinate sense for the term ‘human right’ have a fighting chance of
being adopted by the members of the many groups who make up its
central linguistic community. Another constraint is that the proposed
more determinate sense have a reasonable chance of enduring, that
any proposed more determinate sense not be so complicated that the
criteria for correct and incorrect use would in time become muddled
and confused and eventually slack and the greater determinateness of
sense would thereby be undone.
And that is not a far-fetched fear: the inflationary pressures on the
term are all with us still. Call these, respectively, the constraints of up-
take and of durability. Not all who write about human rights share my
project, so their work may well not be subject to these constraints. But
very many writers do share my project.
Suppose a writer who shares exactly my project adopts a much more
systematic approach to it than I do. The writer starts, let us say, not with
anything quite so abstract as a general theory of value, but with a general
account of ethics. The writer, let us say, explains what a human right is
by explaining what moral obligations are, especially the categorical
moral obligations correlative to rights simpliciter and to moral rights
in particular, then by using those resources to explain the special per-
emptory obligation characteristic of human rights.2 But this approach
2 For an example, see Tasioulas 2002 and 2010.
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would require working out a general account of the nature of moral ob-
ligation. That is no small job; it is not even clear that it is possible. What
is more, we know that the account that the writer would eventually de-
velop would come nowhere near commanding widespread agreement;
the history of philosophy, alas, shows that. The account would be too
teleological for some, or too deontological, or would make the virtues
too basic in the ethical structure, or not basic enough, and so on. I am
not saying that no one particular account of obligation would have more
rational support than another, or that a person could never decide which
account the most rational one was. My claim is, rather, that there would
not be general agreement on what the most rational account is, and that a
term with a satisfactorily determinate sense, which is my aim, requires
fairly general agreement. The proposed more determinate sense must
be graspable by and acceptable to members of the various groups central
to the public discourse of human rights: that is, certain national and in-
ternational civil servants, legislators, international lawyers, human rights
activists, as well as philosophers, political theorists, and other academics.
To arrive at a satisfactorily determinate sense there must be fairly wide
convergence on criteria for correct and incorrect use of the term. The
more systematic approach that I just sketched would fail to meet the
constraint of uptake.
4. Monist and pluralist approaches
Let me quickly give one more example of practical constraints at work.
The most promising accounts of human rights ground human rights
partly in certain basic human interests. An interest account suggests
that we make the sense of the term ‘human right’ more determinate
by spelling out the particular interests that we should see human rights
as protecting. Although the theological content of the term ‘human
rights’ was gradually abandoned over the span of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, the ethical content was not. From time to time
in the course of the human rights tradition one encounters the idea
that human rights are protections of our human status and that the
human status in question is our rational or, more specifically, normative
agency. The two basic human interests grounding human rights, I have
proposed in my book, are the two constituents of normative agency:
autonomy and liberty. My proposal is not a derivation of human rights
from normative agency; it is a suggestion based on a hunch that this par-
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ticular way of remedying the indeterminateness of the term will turn out
to suit best its role in ethics and society. I try to bolster this suggestion in
my book by looking at how it works out when applied to several im-
portant cases.
The most plausible alternative to my account, I should say, incorpo-
rates my interest account, but maintains that further, perhaps many fur-
ther, human interests can ground human rights, not just the two that I
propose, and perhaps also moral considerations that are not entirely
human interests, namely justice, fairness, and equality. For example,
on this view our keen interest in avoiding great pain can ground a
human right not to be tortured; the ground for that right does not
have to be limited, as I propose, to torture’s assault on our autonomy
or liberty. And our keen interest in understanding human life and its du-
ties and rewards can ground a human right to basic education; the
ground for that right does not have to be limited, as I propose, to edu-
cation’s promotion of autonomy and liberty. And the ground of a
human right against certain forms of discrimination may not be
human interests at all, but fairness and equality. I shall call these two
competing accounts ‘monist’ and ‘pluralist’. The monism and pluralism
involved have to do with values. So my account is not, strictly speaking,
monist but dualist ; human rights, I say, are grounded in two distinct val-
ues, autonomy and liberty. But since I also use a single term to cover
them both, ‘normative agency’, let me accept the label ‘monist’.
How can we assess these two competing accounts? In several differ-
ent ways, I should say. There are difficulties simply in formulating the
pluralist claim. Where do the further grounds for human rights added
by pluralists end? Why do they end there? And if the term ‘basic’ in
the expression ‘basic human interests’ is brought in to help answer
those questions, what would ‘basic’ mean here? And if a ground that
a pluralist adds comes in degrees, then we have to know how much
is needed to make it a matter of a human right. And which matters of jus-
tice, fairness, and equality are integral to human rights, and which are
not, and why?
But I am interested now in only one kind of assessment: meeting the
practical constraints of uptake and durability. If it is the term ‘human
right’ as used in the on-going public discourse that interests us, then
those constraints will have to be met. There are forms of pluralism
that would clearly fail to meet them. Perhaps even most forms of plural-
ism would fail. I am not going to try to decide this. My point is differ-
ent: if one’s concern is the term ‘human right’ as used in the public dis-
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course, as it probably is for most of us, then the ability to meet these
constraints is an important, but ignored, form of assessment. In most
present-day philosophical writing about human rights, the aim of the
work is unspecified. A reader who wants to know what the aim is
will no doubt be left in the dark, and the author will probably be in
the dark too. The answer cannot be: the truth about what human rights
are. There is no one truth to arrive at.
5. Evaluative and functional approaches
Many writers approach human rights largely under the influence of the
tradition. They see human rights in the context of a theory of what is
especially valuable in, and special to, human nature. They see the pres-
ent intension of the term ‘human right’ as having been largely settled by
the end of the Enlightenment. It is not that they need think that nothing
important has happened to the idea since then. After something of a hi-
atus in the nineteenth century, the discourse of human rights went
through a period of astonishing development during the twentieth cen-
tury – developments, for example, in international law – that helped to
settle the extension, and to some extent also influenced the intension, of
the term. But the intension remained substantially as the Enlightenment
had left it: rights that we have simply in virtue of being human, on an
ethical conception of what it is to be ‘human’. Call this the ‘evaluative’
approach.
My own account of human rights, since it bears all the features so far
mentioned, is an ‘evaluative’ account. It proposes that we take the word
‘human’ in the term ‘human right’ to refer to our valuable status as
human persons – that is, as normative agents.
But an account of human rights cannot stop there. On its own, the
consideration of normative agency is often not up to fixing anything ap-
proaching a determinate enough line for practice. We have also to take
into account practical considerations: to be effective, the line has to be
clear and so not take too many complicated bends; given our proneness
to stretch a point, we should probably have to leave a generous safety
margin. So to make the content of, say, the right to security of person
determinate enough in sense to be an effective guide to behaviour, we
need a further ground – call it ‘practicalities’. So in my account I pro-
pose two grounds for human rights: normative agency and practicalities.
The existence conditions for a human right would, on this account, be
James Griffin12
these. One establishes the existence of such a right by showing, first, that
it protects an essential feature of normative agency and, second, that its
determinate content results from the sorts of practical considerations that
I just roughly sketched.
There is, in contrast to this ‘evaluative’ approach, what I shall call
the ‘functional’ approach. Those who adopt the functional approach at-
tach great importance to what, in modern times, we have come to do
with the language of human rights. Indeed, in recent times in the anglo-
phone world this has been the most common approach. Ronald Dwor-
kin has explained legal rights in terms of their function as trumps over
appeals to the general good. Robert Nozick explained human rights
in terms of their function as side-constraints on other justifications of ac-
tion. John Rawls explained human rights as grounds for the rules of war
and for intervention in the internal affairs of another country.3 All of
these are functional accounts of rights.
Writers who adopt the functional approach concentrate on how the
developments of the twentieth century, especially in international law,
have shaped the idea of a ‘human right’. They say that there is a modern
conception of human rights, mainly the creature of the United Nations,
the function of which is to do a certain kind of work in global politics. If
one looks at the real world of legal and political practice, they claim, one
finds that the term ‘human rights’ either relies on their legal recognition
as limiting state sovereignty or constitutes a claim that they should be so
recognized. Two recent advocates of the ‘functional’ approach, much
influenced by Rawls but modifying him, are Joseph Raz and Charles
Beitz.4
This sharp contrast between ‘evaluative’ and ‘functional’ ap-
proaches, if it were defensible, would be of great importance. But the
claim that the function, even merely the predominant function, of
human rights nowadays is to limit sovereignty is a factual claim and, I
should think, surely false. These days human rights discourse is still com-
monly used in our national as well as our international life: for example,
in the European Union’s fairly recent bill of rights and its more recent
incorporation in the legal systems of several member states, in current
campaigns against violations of liberty (for example, in Guantánamo),
and in similar campaigns against torture.
3 See Dworkin 1977, xi–xv; 188–191; Nozick 1974, 28–33; Rawls 1999.
4 See Raz 2010; Beitz 2009.
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This contrast between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ is much too sharp.
If one looks closely at how the United Nations conceives of human
rights, one finds both new features and old. The new feature is that
they are now mobilized to serve in the regulation of the global order.
But it is also the case that the Commission on Human Rights, which
drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, started from a
compendium of all examples of human rights taken from historical
documents. They started their deliberation with the historical extension
of the term. And, like all sensible law-makers or standard-setters, they
did not want to go too deeply into matters of justification because
there is generally more ready agreement on examples than on their ra-
tionale. Despite this, they did commit themselves to one ethical claim:
that human rights were to be seen as deriving from ‘the inherent dignity
of the human person’. This phrase, which appears in the Preambles of
the foundational human rights instruments, namely the two Covenants
of 1966, would inevitably call to the mind of a lawyer or jurisprudent or
a political thinker Pico della Mirandola’s classic tract The Dignity of Man.
And the phrase ‘the dignity of the human person’ refers to a value, not
spelt out by the United Nations but, none the less, a value that the
drafters installed as the foundation of human rights. It is true that the
United Nations put the term ‘human right’ to new uses, but they did
not just amputate its history. They combined new elements with old,
both of which must be kept in mind in order to properly understand
current thought about human rights.
In any case, a particularly salient feature of our present notion of a
‘human right’ is its indeterminateness of sense. What are we to do
about that? This question manifests itself whenever we need to know
the existence conditions of human rights, or when we need to settle the
content of a particular human right, or when we must resolve conflicts
of rights. And we need to do all of these things sometimes; adopting
the functional approach does not save us from that. It is at these
times, I say, that substantive ethical input is necessary – not sufficient
(the law must play a role too) but necessary. We have a human right
to health. But what is that a right to? The United Nations answers: it
is a right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
But even some officials in the World Health Organization reject that as
too lavish. How are we to tell if it is? And a judge on an international
bench cannot resolve conflicts involving human rights by fiat. The res-
olution must be reasoned. But what will count as good reasons? And if
ethical input is necessary, what is it to be?
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The ‘functional’ approach may seem appealing because it is ground-
ed in something reassuringly real: actual practice. But the problems with
this ground are also stubbornly real, and the ‘functional’ approach has no
solutions to them.
One can offer a solution to them by supplying an interpretation of
the United Nations’ use of the word ‘dignity’. The word ‘dignity’ is
used in ordinary speech to refer to much more than just a person’s status
as a normative agent. A person in advanced dementia must be treated
with dignity. Even the corpse of a beloved parent must be treated
with dignity. My case for adopting my interpretation of the United Na-
tions’ phrase ‘the dignity of the human person’ is the project of my
book, but I should like just to observe here that there is something ob-
vious about that interpretation. When Pico wrote about ‘the dignity of
man’ he meant our being normative agents. And, to take a modern ex-
ample, when in 1965 the Ecumenical Council called by Pope John
XXIII (Vatican II) issued its declaration Dignitatis Humanae, it too
meant our status as moral agents.
6. Coda
When nowadays we write about human rights, we usually leave entirely
unspecified what our particular aim and approach is. We should state
them. And we should be prepared to justify them.
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On the nature of human rights
John Tasioulas
I. In search of the normative core
What are we talking about, when we talk about human rights? No
doubt various senses attach to the phrase “human rights”. Some are
purely descriptive, characterizing human rights as features of psycholog-
ical, social or institutional reality. In inquiries conducted by historians,
sociologists, political scientists or lawyers, “human rights” may refer
to a belief-system prevalent in certain Western cultural circles or to
the rights ascribed by a positive legal order to all under its jurisdiction.
But there is another, and arguably explanatorily prior, way of concep-
tualizing human rights, according to which they are normative, or rea-
son-giving, standards of a certain kind. So understood, human rights
need be neither widely-credited nor actually embodied in any social
practice or legal institution. But even when construed normatively,
might there not still be a multiplicity of concepts of human rights,
each with a respectable foothold in ordinary usage? It would seem so.
However, this does not render futile the enterprise of seeking to identify
the core or focal concept, the basic normative idea that enables us to
make the best sense of what we pre-reflectively identify as the discourse
and practice human rights – or the human rights culture, as I will some-
times call it.1 This is the core concept insofar as it constitutes the under-
lying normative idea that animates this culture in its diverse manifesta-
tions, with many other prominent concepts of human rights being prof-
itably interpretable as modifications of it or otherwise dependent upon
it.
The desiderata to which we should attend in seeking to identify the
core normative concept of a human right are a function of what it is for
a philosophical theory to make sense of the culture of human rights. In
the sort of philosophical project I wish to pursue, this consists in giving
an account of the nature, grounds and practical significance of human
1 On focal concepts, see Finnis 2011, ch.1.
rights that both jibes with that culture and presents human rights as a
defensible species of reason-giving standard, one that earns a place in
our general repertoire of normative considerations. Under this general
heading, three more specific desiderata have particular salience.
First, a theory of human rights must capture the distinctive importance
of this class of normative standards. Not every reason-giving consider-
ation, or even moral consideration, is important; nor is every important
normative consideration a human right. Distinctiveness militates against
equating the concept of human rights with some pre-existing normative
concept, while importance excludes interpretations of human rights that
make them readily defeasible by normative considerations of other
kinds. The second desideratum is fidelity to the human rights culture
that has emerged post-1945, especially as it is crystallized in the Interna-
tional Bill of Human Rights: the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948 (UDHR) along with the International Covenants on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and Civil and Polit-
ical Rights (ICCPR) that came into force in 1976. Fidelity is a complex
desideratum, not least because the culture of human rights is multi-fac-
eted and harbors rival self-understandings, let alone outright deficien-
cies. So its satisfaction had better be compatible with criticism of that
culture. But if criticism is to get a grip on its intended object, it must
reflect a grasp of the central normative idea that underlies the culture.
It is important to stress, however, that fidelity does not simply reduce
to the quantitative matter of maximizing the number of items gleaned
from the key human rights instruments that can be interpreted as broad-
ly matching (or claiming to match) the content of norms properly re-
garded as “human rights” by the theory’s lights. Still, one would expect
that norms roughly corresponding in content with the paradigmatic
items in such instruments – for example, the human rights against tor-
ture and enslavement – will be interpretable as (claiming to be) “human
rights” according to a theory that displays the requisite level of fidelity.
Any discrepancies between the theory and the instruments are to be ex-
plained in ways consistent with the hypothesis that the former captures
the normative idea behind the familiar instruments. Finally, a successful,
non-sceptical, theory of human rights will present such rights as stand-
ards with genuine reason-giving force. Moreover, because of the claim
to universality inherent in the discourse of human rights, a cogent re-
sponse must be offered to the widespread anxiety that the discourse sim-
ply imposes “Western” or “liberal” values in a way that unjustifiably
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marginalizes or overrides the claims of non-Western and non-liberal tra-
ditions. Call this desideratum that of non-parochialism.
Success in this philosophical project is by no means assured: the
human rights culture might be found, in the end, not to be plausibly in-
terpretable as reflecting any cogent underlying normative idea. Howev-
er, a theory that satisfied these desiderata would generate not only an
enhanced understanding of the discourse and practice of human rights,
but also a framework in terms of which to evaluate and improve it, in
light of its own underlying ideal.
This chapter addresses only one question that arises within a philos-
ophy of human rights: the specification of the nature of such rights,
identifying what it is that distinguishes the concept of human rights
among other normative concepts. Another important question, not ad-
dressed here, concerns their grounds : given what a human right is, under
which conditions does a would-be human right genuinely merit that
title? Taking either of these questions seriously does not commit one
to the existence of any human rights. Even a sceptic about human rights,
like a sceptic about the existence of unicorns, needs a tolerably clear idea
of the nature of the thing whose existence he is sceptical about, before
explaining his reasons for doubting that anything satisfies the conditions
for being a thing of that sort. Disentangling the two questions, at least
initially, promises two benefits. First, it enables us to characterize
human rights in a way attuned to how the phrase “human right” is em-
ployed and understood in the wider human rights culture. By respecting
that characterization, we can avoid simply changing the subject, as phi-
losophers are sometimes prone to do when they speak about human
rights, thereby diminishing the wider relevance of their investigations.
Second, philosophers should aim to ensure that their disagreements
about human rights, however apparently deep-going, are nonetheless
genuine disagreements about a common subject-matter. Of course,
the situation is complicated by the fact that the twin aims of broader
relevance and genuine philosophical engagement may pull in opposite
directions, especially when philosophical controversies acquire a direc-
tion and momentum independent of the human rights culture. In any
such conflict relevance should tend to prevail, at least in a philosophical
investigation that takes fidelity seriously.
An additional complication is that our answers to the questions of
the nature and grounds of human rights cannot be entirely sealed off
from one another. One’s estimate of the best prospects for grounding
human rights may properly bear on how one conceives of them, if
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only because there is good reason to avoid the sceptical conclusion that
hardly any sound moral principle is aptly characterized as a “human
right”. Conversely, one’s conception of human rights may influence
one’s views as to their grounds. For example, a religious grounding of
human rights is arguably more attractive if we conceive of such rights
as inhering in all members of the human species, rather than just
those of its members that possess certain valuable qualities, such as the
capacity for rational self-determination. This is because human rights
might be thought to track the value bestowed on all human beings by
God’s special love for them, irrespective of variations in their capacities
(see e. g. Wolterstorff 2008 and Perry 2009). Moreover, one’s concep-
tion of the nature of human rights might directly constrain the kind of
grounding appropriate to them. Still, we should resist building into the
nature of human rights anything like a complete account of their
grounds. This maneuver risks obtaining victory over one’s philosophical
opponents on the question of grounds by means of the dubious expedi-
ent of treating them as addressing a different subject.
It would be a mistake to infer from what has just been said that the
nature of human rights is a relatively uncontested terrain on which other
philosophical disputes about human rights – their grounds, the specifi-
cation of their holders and the bearers of their corresponding duties, the
appropriateness of giving them legal force, and so forth – are played out.
Even philosophers who agree on the importance of fidelity to the
human rights culture often subscribe to widely differing views about
their nature. This chapter outlines three broad families of approach to
the nature of human rights – the Reductive, Orthodox and Political
Views – and defends a version of the Orthodox View, according to
which human rights are moral rights possessed by all human beings sim-
ply in virtue of their humanity. Orthodoxy stakes out a conceptual ter-
rain intermediate between its two rivals. Against the Reductive View, it
insists that human rights belong to the more general category of moral
rights. Against the Political View, it resists incorporating some specific
political function – such as operating as benchmarks of political legiti-
macy or triggers for international intervention – into the concept of
human rights. Human rights may be properly invoked to perform myri-
ad political functions, but whether and to what extent they should do so
is a substantive matter, not something constitutive of an adequate grasp
of their nature.
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II. The Reductive View
On the Reductive View, to say that there is a human right to X ulti-
mately amounts to asserting that in the case of all human beings enjoying
or having access to X serves some value that can be more perspicuously
specified independently of the notion of a right. On this view, no illu-
mination about the nature of human rights is to be derived from con-
ceiving of them as belonging to a more general class of rights. Perhaps
the most familiar versions of reductivism construe human rights as
human goods of some sort. But non-teleological versions are also pos-
sible, for example, theories to the effect that assertions of human rights
amount to claims about equality or respect, where the latter are not even
partly understood in terms of the idea of a right. In this section, I shall
only discuss teleological reductivism.
Consider the human right to health. On a simple version of the Re-
ductive View, asserting such a human right is tantamount to the claim
that health is a universal human interest (or that access to certain
forms of health care serves everyone’s interest in health).2 Elaborating
somewhat, the claim is that in the case of each and every human
being: (a) health is an intrinsically valuable component of their lives,
i. e. being healthy in itself makes one’s life better than it otherwise
would be, or (b) health is instrumentally valuable in a person’s life, fa-
cilitating their realization of other intrinsic goods, e. g. enabling them
to develop friendships, acquire knowledge, pursue worthwhile individ-
ual and social goals, and so on. Since health is a universal good, we have
reasons to promote health, both our own and that of others, and we
have reasons to devise laws, institutions and social arrangements that
will deliver health care to those liable to benefit from it.
An important consideration in favor of this form of reductivism is
that it offers a benign explanation of the tendency for human rights
claims to proliferate seemingly without end. Whenever we encounter
a universal human interest, or something that serves such an interest
in the case of everyone, we may assert the existence of a human
right. In this way we can make sense of the idea that there is a right
to “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health” (ICESCR, Art 12), and also to “rest and leisure, includ-
2 The thought that major contemporary human rights documents might be best
interpreted as setting out universal human interests has been advanced in Finnis
2011, 214.
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ing reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with
pay” (UDHR, Art. 24; ICESCR, Art 7).
But this simple form of reductivism faces at least two objections.
First, it makes the language of “human rights” redundant, since we al-
ready have a vocabulary of human interests. No distinctive significance
is accorded to the notion of a human right over and above that possessed
by the notion of a universal human interest. The second problem has a
dual aspect: a lack of fidelity to the human rights culture which is also a
failure to capture the importance of human rights. Although reducti-
vism chimes with the tendency of human rights claims to proliferate,
this is just one strand in contemporary human rights culture. Moreover,
it is a strand that arouses disquiet even among that culture’s most pas-
sionate adherents. But to speak about human interests is to remain at
the level of human well-being and what furthers it. It does not yet
reach the level of morality – in particular, the level of obligations and
their violation, and the reactive attitudes and conduct that such viola-
tions make appropriate: attitudes such as guilt and blame, conduct
such as the infliction of punishment. And yet, we ordinarily conceive
of human rights as prohibiting some of the gravest moral wrongs: tor-
ture, enslavement, or persecution on the grounds of religion, race or
sex. With the language of human rights we embark on a distinctively
moral discourse, one that does not simply reduce to talk of universal
human interests. For such interests can be imperiled in all sorts of
ways without moral wrong-doing of any kind being in the offing.
A natural reply is that I have only considered a crude version of the
Reductive View. The reductivist might instead draw on one or other of
two philosophical theories to overcome the problems examined so far:
the theory of basic human capabilities, advanced in different ways by
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, and the personhood theory of
human rights, elaborated recently by James Griffin (Nussbaum 2000
and 2002; Sen 2004 and 2009, ch.17; Griffin 2008). One strand in ca-
pabilities theory, associated with Nussbaum, presents the language of
“basic human capabilities” as a more perspicuous way of talking about
what normally goes under the heading of “human rights”. Some such
claim is at least implicit in the following remark by Bernard Williams:
The notion of a basic human right seems to me obscure enough, and I
would rather come at it from the perspective of basic human capabilities.
I would prefer capabilities to do the work, and if we are going to have a
language or rhetoric of rights, to have it delivered from them, rather
than the other way round (Williams 1987, 100).
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Capabilities are individuals’ effective opportunities to choose to realize a
range of valuable states of being and doing (in the jargon, “human func-
tionings”). One open-ended and revisable list of basic human capabili-
ties compiled by Nussbaum includes the following elements: life; bodily
health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions;
practical reason; affiliation; play; and control over one’s environment
(Nussbaum 2002, 129–31). Capabilities are fulfilled interests at one re-
move, as it were: just as an interest of mine is fulfilled by engaging in
valuable work (a mode of exercising valuable control over my environ-
ment), I have an interest in having the capability, or effective opportu-
nity, to engage in such work. To this extent, capability theorists have
some sort of answer to the problem of redundancy, since capabilities
are not equivalent to the familiar, unrestricted notion of universal
human interests. The same is true of Griffin’s personhood theory of
human rights. Officially, Griffin adheres to the Orthodox View. But
his argumentation exhibits a pronounced tendency to identify human
rights with a sub-set of universal human interests: our interests in nor-
mative agency or personhood, i. e. autonomy, liberty and the material
goods needed to make both of the former a reality in our lives. More-
over, he finds virtually nothing informative to say about why human
rights count as moral rights in the first place, and only slightly more
about the way in which the considerations he calls “practicalities”
help shape personhood values into human rights.3
But these responses to the problem of redundancy come at a price.
To begin with, both theories have serious difficulties making sense of
the attribution of human rights to those who lack the ability to choose
or the capacity to acquire it, such as newborn infants or those suffering
from severe psychological disabilities. Moreover, even in the case of
competent adults, the multifarious concerns that animate the human
rights culture cannot be readily shoehorned into either the “capability”
or “personhood” rubrics, with their emphasis on being able to make and
effectively pursue one’s own choices. As I have argued elsewhere, we
should prefer a more pluralistic account of the interests served by
human rights (Tasioulas 2010, 658–666). In any case, the deeper prob-
lem with both theories, conceived reductively as we are now doing, is
that they do not adequately track the moral dimension of human rights.
For if you impair my capability to engage in valuable work – for exam-
3 For a criticism of Griffin’s theory for neglecting the character of human rights as
rights, see Tasioulas 2010.
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ple, by beating me in a fair competition for the last remaining decent job
– it does not follow that I have been wronged.4 The same is true if you
fail to advance my personhood interest in staying alive by offering me
your spare healthy kidney when I am in dire need of a transplant. By
contrast, in virtue of having counterpart duties, rights give salience to
a form of moral wrong-doing through which they may be violated.
These problems are exacerbated when we consider the issue of practical
conflicts involving human rights. In this context, Griffin formulates an
eminently plausible maxim: “Human rights are resistant to trade-offs,
but not completely so” (Griffin 2008, 76). This resistance captures
one vital dimension of the importance of human rights. However,
the reductivist tendency of his theory leads him to disrespect his own
maxim. Consider, for example, a murderer who is justly sentenced to
imprisonment for a period of years. Does this sentence violate his
human right to liberty? Griffin concludes that it does, but that the vio-
lation is all-things-considered justified because his right to liberty is
trumped by the demands of retributive justice (ibid., 68 f.). What
leads Griffin to this strained interpretation of the human right to liberty
is precisely his tendency to blur the distinction between human rights
and the personhood interests that underlie them. This renders human
rights excessively liable to “trade-offs”, in contravention of Griffin’s
maxim (see, for further development of these points, Tasioulas 2010,
672–678).
Against the preceding argument, some might respond that effacing
the moral dimension of human rights talk is an advantage of reductive
accounts of the teleological variety. Critics have argued that human
rights encourage the infiltration of potentially destructive and oppressive
moral emotions and responses – such as blame, guilt, resentment, regu-
lation, discipline, punishment, etc. – into more and more domains of
human life. And the risks of doing so are notably enhanced in the
case of human rights because their supposed universality affords a basis
for condemning individuals and societies that are remote from us
both culturally and geographically, rendering them especially vulnerable
4 Hence Amartya Sen’s acknowledgement that capabilities theory cannot deal ad-
equately with the “process” (as opposed to the “opportunity”) aspect of free-
dom, including the fairness of processes that bear on decisions affecting people’s
ability to realize functionings. This prevents capability theory from furnishing a
complete basis for human rights; see Sen 2004, 336 f.
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to demonization.5 But unless we go as far as Bernard Williams towards a
radical Nietzschean scepticism about the claims of morality as such, we
should not abandon the distinctive moral dimension of human rights. In-
stead, an appreciation of the genuine risks inherent in moral discourse of
a universalist cast should discipline our judgments about the existence
and content of human rights, and about the societal processes to be em-
ployed for preventing and responding to their violation.
A less drastic response to the problem is to build into one’s concep-
tion of basic human capabilities or personhood values some kind of
claim as to their moral significance. In this vein, Martha Nussbaum re-
gards her schedule of basic capabilities
as a list of urgent items that should be secured to people no matter what else
we pursue. In this way, we both conceive of capabilities as a set of goals (a
subset of total social goals) and say that they have an urgent claim to be pro-
moted, whatever else we also promote […] We are doing wrong to people
when we do not secure to them the capabilities on this list. The traditional
function of a notion of rights as side constraints is to make this sort of anti-
utilitarian point, and I see no reason why rights construed as capabilities (or
analyzed in terms of capabilities) should not continue to play this role.6
But rather than dispensing with the notion of a moral right, this maneu-
ver may effectively end up presupposing it. For how are we to under-
stand the type of “urgent claim” that basic capabilities involve, or the
“wrong” that is done to people in not securing them, if not in terms
of the idea that people have a right that certain capabilities be secured
and that failure to comply with its counterpart duties is wrongful? Any-
thing short of this threatens to land us with a merely aspirational reading
of human rights on which they are among the innumerable goals there
is good reason – even good moral reason, given their other-regarding
character – for us to achieve. But assimilating human rights to the amor-
phous category of valuable social goals obscures their distinctiveness,
while countenancing the existence of human rights without corre-
sponding obligations compromises their importance.7 In the end, Nuss-
5 See, e. g., Schmitt 1996, 54 f., 78 f. For a much more moderate and plausible
version of this objection, pressed against human rights to “welfare”, see
O’Neill 2005, 438 f.
6 Nussbaum 2002, 143. Similarly, Griffin 2008, 17 asserts that a human right is “a
claim we have on others simply in virtue of being human”, where presumably
some moral claim is at issue.
7 For similar reservations about merely aspirational interpretations of human
rights discourse, see O’Neill 2005, 436–439. However, I differ from O’Neill
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baum herself apparently does not abandon the language of rights; on the
contrary, she elsewhere states that it is essential to invoke it in specifying
the most important capabilities.8
Everything in the foregoing discussion is perfectly consistent with
capabilities or personhood values doing important work within a theory
of human rights. But neither notion is the conceptual kernel of human
rights. Instead, we must go beyond the domain of interests and capabil-
ities in order to capture the distinctive moral character of human rights.
Of course, this might yet be achieved under the aegis of a less radical
version of the Reductive View that identifies the concept of human
rights with some independent moral notion that is not itself elucidated
in terms of the idea of a moral right. Like all reductive views, such ac-
counts will face the challenge of securing the distinctiveness of human
rights. In any case, the argument so far gives us reason enough to ad-
vance to the Orthodox View, which is a non-reductive moral account
of the nature of human rights.
III. The Orthodox View
The Orthodox View is encapsulated by a deceptively familiar thesis, one
open to divergent interpretations:
(N) Human rights are moral rights possessed by all human beings simply in virtue of
their humanity.
Orthodoxy does not obviously entail any helpfully determinate position
as to the grounds of human rights. However, the following methodo-
logical thesis regarding their grounding is plausibly regarded as part of
human rights orthodoxy:
(O) The existence and content of human rights is to be determined primarily by or-
dinary moral reasoning, assisted and supplemented as may be necessary by empirical,
philosophical or legal reasoning.
O constitutes one historically pertinent sense in which human rights are
natural moral rights. They are rights discoverable primarily through the
regarding what the requirement that human rights have counterpart obligations
involves; see Tasioulas 2007.
8 Nussbaum 2002, 120. And, as I mentioned earlier, Griffin himself is officially an
adherent of the Orthodox View, for all the reductivist tendencies of his actual
argumentation.
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workings of ordinary ‘natural’ moral reasoning, as opposed to both di-
vine revelation on the one hand and the myriad forms of ‘artificial’ rea-
soning generated by social conventions and institutions on the other. In
this section, I will leave O to one side and offer an elaboration of N’s
three constituent elements.
(a) “Moral rights …”
One sceptical response to N, to which an undeterred reductivist might
be drawn, goes as follows: “The culture of human rights employs the
notion of a ‘human right’ in an extremely elastic way, one that cannot
without violence be regimented by any philosophically motivated un-
derstanding of the general nature of moral rights. By elaborating on
the character of human rights as moral rights we risk being drawn
into philosophical controversies about rights in general that are alien
to the concerns of the human rights culture”. Given the importance I
have assigned to the desideratum of fidelity, this objection deserves to
be taken seriously. My conjecture is that much is to be gained by elab-
orating on at least three important features of moral rights. These are
largely neutral as regards divergent philosophical theories, but capture
the significance, in ordinary, non-philosophical discourse, of referring
to human rights, as opposed to human values, goals, interests, etc.
Counterpart duties. Moral rights – or the paradigmatic manifestation
of them, usually referred to as “claim rights” – involve counterpart
moral duties or obligations (I use these two expressions interchangea-
bly).9 The existence of a right to x, on the part of A, entails moral duties
on the part of others variously to protect, respect, etc. A’s possession,
access, etc. to x. Moral duties are reasons for action of a special kind.
First, they are categorical, i. e. their application to the duty-bearer, and
their weight or stringency, is independent of the latter’s motivation.
One cannot evade an obligation, or reduce its stringency, just by alter-
ing one’s preferences or desires. Second, they are exclusionary in their
normative force, i. e. they are not only to be weighed against competing
9 I therefore regard human rights as paradigmatically what, under a Hohfeldian
analysis, are called “claim rights”. This is not to deny that human rights may
be associated with various other Hohfeldian incidents, such as powers, immun-
ities and liabilities. For a Hohfeldian analysis of human rights, see Wellman
2011.
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reasons but also exclude at least some of the latter from bearing on what
all-things-considered the duty-bearer should do (see Raz 1999). So, for
example, a society might serve reasons of wealth-creation by depriving
its most able members of the right to occupational choice. But the rea-
sons to do so are for the most part not to be weighed against the duties
arising from that right; instead, they are neutralized by them. Finally,
the transgression of duties by a duty-bearer who can be properly held
morally responsible, and who lacks any justification or excuse for
their conduct, typically justifies a distinctive range of moral responses,
e. g. blame on the part of onlookers, resentment on the part of the vic-
tim, self-blame (guilt), reparation and repentance on the part of the
rights-violator, and in some cases punishment on the part of the relevant
political community.
I have given an implicitly pluralistic elucidation of the types of du-
ties that may correspond to moral rights: they potentially include not
only “negative” duties of forbearance, but also “positive” duties to un-
dertake a course of conduct. By contrast, there is a prominent tradition
according to which the primary duties associated with natural or human
rights – that is, those duties which do not concern the fulfillment of
other duties associated with such a right, e. g. the duty to make amends
for a previous violation – are exclusively (or overwhelmingly) negative
in content. This feature is presented as crucial in demarcating the rights-
involving part of morality, often designated as the domain of justice,
from the rest of morality. Its acceptance can be motivated by the
thought that the violation of a negative duty is, ceteris paribus, morally
worse than the violation of a positive duty, because of the active char-
acter of the wrong-doer’s will in the first case. To this extent, the re-
striction of human rights to negative primary duties ministers to the
idea that they are especially important norms. All we need say here is
that we have compelling reasons of fidelity not to endorse this as a con-
ceptual restriction on what can count as a right, since it is a notable fea-
ture of the contemporary human rights culture that it acknowledges
many “positive” human rights. Whether we should ultimately accept
deontic negativism about human rights is a substantive question, one
not profitably addressed here.10
10 One important argument for the claim that human rights have exclusively neg-
ative duties, defended by O’Neill 1996, turns on the premises that the primary
duties corresponding to such rights must be claimable independently of any so-
cial or institutional embodiment. For criticism see Tasioulas 2007.
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Contrary to a popular misconception then, a morality of rights is not
fundamentally opposed to a morality of duties. Instead, the notion of
duty is conceptually prior to that of a right. This leaves open the sub-
stantive question whether there are any moral duties without corre-
sponding rights. My own view is that one perfectly legitimate sense
given to the notion of “imperfect duties” properly caters to just this pos-
sibility: for example, duties of charity – such as the duty to show mercy
in sentencing – do not have corresponding right-holders. On the other
hand, it is also worth noting that the significance accorded to duties here
is perfectly compatible with acknowledging the important supereroga-
tory dimensions of the human rights culture. Those who make heroic
sacrifices for the sake of human rights typically do not thereby simply
comply with duties associated with human rights, since they would
not be blameable for refraining from their heroic conduct. Still, they
are properly admired as defenders of human rights because not all of
the reasons we have to promote compliance with human rights duties
are themselves duty-imposing.
Individualistic grounding. Individual moral rights, of which human
moral rights are a sub-species, are not only rights of individuals, they
are also grounded in some normatively salient characteristic of the indi-
vidual right-holder.11 According to some theorists, it is some interest(s)
of the right-holder that is capable of generating duties variously to pro-
tect, respect, etc. that interest (Raz 1986, ch.7). For other theorists, the
proposal to ground moral rights in interests misconstrues their distinc-
tive normative role. The appropriate response to interests, they claim,
is fully determined by agent-neutral reasons to promote or maximize
those interests, which leaves considerable scope for inter-personal
trade-offs of interests. Moral rights, by contrast, constitute agent-relative
limitations on what anyone may do to others in the name of promoting
the general welfare or even enhanced overall compliance with rights
themselves. Many of those impressed by this line of thought contend
that moral rights are not grounded in the interests of the right-holder
but in a special normative status they enjoy, such as that of being an
equal and inviolable member of the moral community (Nagel 2004,
11 A consequence of this individualistic characterization of human rights is that
supposed collective rights, such as the right to (national) self-determination,
do not count as human rights proper. I do not think this constitutes a serious
defect of fidelity. Such rights do not, in any case, fit the specification given
by N.
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ch. 3). For yet others, both considerations pertaining to interests and sta-
tus need to be invoked to justify claims about moral rights.Which ac-
count should be adopted for human rights cannot be decided at the con-
ceptual level of specifying their nature.
The individualistic character of rights offers one strand of explana-
tion for the belief, popular among Marxists, conservatives, feminists
and non-Western critics that the morality of rights rests on a flawed
“atomistic” conception of human life, one that cuts us adrift from
meaningful personal and social bonds with others and imposes a narrow-
ly “egoistic” construal of human ends. But the individualistic grounding
of moral rights does not justify this negative portrayal. As we have seen,
the discourse of rights is inseparable from that of moral duties, and the
latter set stringent moral limits on the pursuit of self-interested ends.
Moreover, these duties may require positive action, as opposed to
mere non-interference with others. Many rights, such as the right to
marry and have a family or to membership of a nation, serve interests
in valuable forms of solidarity or altruistic endeavor. They are not rights
to goods which a person can enjoy in isolation from others also enjoying
them. Beyond this, philosophers who regard rights as grounded in inter-
ests may appeal to interests – for example, in friendship or making a val-
uable contribution to one’s community, and so on – that are not
straightforwardly “egoistic” but, rather, involve self-fulfillment through
an appropriate engagement with the welfare of others. And lastly, of
course, advocates of moral rights are ill-advised to regard them as ex-
hausting the whole of morality or as occupying a foundational place
within it, so that all moral considerations ultimately trace back to
them. In addition to moral rights, a sane, pluralistic construal of morality
will incorporate imperfect duties, virtues, ideals, and other considera-
tions, many of which do not share the individualistic character of
moral rights, their content sometimes reflecting the value of forms of
solidarity whose moral significance cannot be fully captured by the lan-
guage of individual rights. These other moral considerations create space
for the possibility that it may be wrong – because, for example, it would
be heartless or disloyal – for me to do that which I nonetheless have a
moral right to do; and also for the possibility that conflicting, non-
rights-based considerations might defeat the reasons for respecting rights
in particular cases.
All of the foregoing observations are compatible with acknowledg-
ing that many extant philosophical accounts of moral rights are defective
in the ways suggested. And of course there is the more general point
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that, like all forms of moral discourse, the morality of rights is liable to
distortion and abuse, its individualistic character rendering it susceptible
to rhetorical appropriation by ideologies that further atomistic or egoist-
ic forms of personal life and social organization.
Directed character duties corresponding to rights. Individual moral rights
are held by identifiable individuals; violations of the duties correspond-
ing to those rights entail the wronging of the right-holder. This con-
trasts with violations of imperfect duties (those with no corresponding
right-holder, such as a generalized duty of charity), which do not con-
stitute the wronging of any particular individual. The directed character
of wrong-doings that are rights-violations can be seen as following from
the first two features of individual moral rights: that they are sources of
obligations grounded in some special feature of the individual who pos-
sesses the right. It explains the personal sense of grievance, victimization
or resentment that is associated with violations of rights as compared
with imperfect duties or other moral considerations.
These three features underline the fact that human rights belong first
and foremost to the domain of moral principles. They do not simply
consist in a schedule of interests or valuable goals, however important,
since merely failing to protect, or even acting against, another’s interest
or a valuable goal are not per se grounds for moral condemnation. From
a third-person perspective, the mere fact that another’s interests will be
impacted by a course of action does not entail that there is a duty in the
offing; from a first-person perspective, we are largely passive with re-
spect to the honoring of our rights whereas the fulfillment of our inter-
ests typically requires our active engagement.
(b) “… possessed by all human beings …”
All human rights, at least paradigmatically, are possessed by all human
beings. For the purpose of articulating a serviceable concept of
human rights, I shall take it that the human beings who possess
human rights must at least include rationally competent adult members
of the human species.
Does asserting that human rights are “possessed by all human be-
ings” necessarily commit one to the claim that they are an invariant set
of rights possessed by all human beings throughout history? On this
view, whatever the relevant schedule of human rights is, it must be
just as imputable to Stone Age cavemen as to denizens of advanced,
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twenty-first century societies. Human rights are, therefore, “natural
rights”, understood as rights genuinely attributable to humans even in
a state of nature, one in which there is not only no state claiming a mo-
nopoly on the legitimate use of coercion but also nothing beyond the
most rudimentary forms of social organization. Call this the “state of na-
ture dogma”, in line with Charles Beitz’s complaint that “the tendency
to identify human rights with natural rights represents a kind of unwit-
ting philosophical dogmatism”.12 Perhaps we can intelligibly impute to
cavemen a right not to be tortured, but how can we reasonably ascribe
to them rights that refer to activities that are barely conceivable, let
alone feasible, in their historical epoch, such as rights to a fair trial or
to political participation? Orthodoxy, on this view, is deeply unfaithful
to the ambitions of the human rights culture, especially in the post-Uni-
versal Declaration period.
Orthodox theorists who wish to preserve a trans-historical interpre-
tation of human rights whilst meeting the concern about fidelity can de-
ploy at least two strategies: abstraction and idealization. The first identifies
a comparatively small set of abstractly specified human rights that are
trans-historical in scope and treats the great majority of the human rights
familiar from international instruments as arising from the application of
these abstract rights to specific historical circumstances. Deploying this
approach, James Griffin contends that, at the highest level of generality,
there are three human rights each of which is trans-historical in cover-
age: human rights to autonomy, welfare (“minimum provision”), and
liberty.13 Other, more specific human rights count as human rights be-
cause they are derivations from universal human rights in specific times
and places (Griffin 2008, 149; see also Wellman 2011, 28 f.). On this
view, not all human rights are “universal”, although some of the univer-
sal human rights will include more specific rights than the three highest-
level rights.
12 Beitz 2003, 38; the rest of the paragraph summarizes a line of attack on con-
temporary philosophy of human rights that is concisely developed in that arti-
cle. For a persuasive argument to the effect that Beitz over-generalizes in attrib-
uting this dogma to contemporary philosophical theorists of human rights, see
Buchanan 2008, 55 f.
13 The strategy of identifying a trinity of highest-level, universal rights has, of
course, Lockean and Jeffersonian antecedents; see Haakonssen 1991, 50.
Note, however, that Griffin officially eschews the state of nature dogma, insofar
as he is prepared to conceive of human rights as “rights that we all have simply
in virtue of being human agents in society” (Griffin 2008, 50).
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The abstraction strategy, however, carries the unwelcome implica-
tion that almost all of the standard items in human rights documents
are not bona fide human rights, since they lack the requisite kind of
trans-historical universality. To counter this implication, one may de-
velop, as Griffin does, an interpretation of thesis (b) that abandons the
universality of the lower-level human rights. But then trans-historical
universality will cease to be an essential feature of human rights. To
this the reply may be that it remains essential, if only indirectly, because
the lower-level rights are derived from higher-level rights that are uni-
versal in this sense. This is the strategy that Griffin pursues regarding
freedom of expression, which he takes to be a trans-historically applica-
ble human right, and freedom of the press, which is an implication of it
in specific circumstances (Griffin 2008, 38). But even supposing that
derivation from a universal human right is enough to allay the original
concern about the status of non-universal lower-level rights as human
rights, a problem remains. In order for the strategy to succeed on its
own terms, the higher-level universal rights must be truly rights and
not just universal human interests. Otherwise, the abstraction strategy
would amount to a reversion to the Reductive View, with all the prob-
lems it faces. Yet it is hardly obvious that this condition can be met such
that, in a sufficient number of cases, the lower-level rights are plausibly
construed as derivations from the self-same universal basic right.
Presumably, humans throughout history have had an interest in au-
tonomy, liberty, minimum material provision and perhaps even free-
dom of expression. But rights differ from the interests on which they
are based because they involve counterpart duties. And we determine
the identity of rights in key part by reference to these duties.14 Is
there a recognizably unitary right to freedom of expression that applies
across the whole range of human history and, in the context of modern-
ity, generates the specific rights Griffin supposes it does? If it existed, it
would need to have broadly equivalent high-level deontic implications
across human history. But it is a tall order to demonstrate that the free
expression rights of a medieval serf, let alone a Stone Age caveman, in-
volve more specific determinations of the very same high-level duties as
the free expression rights of members of modern-day societies. Is it plau-
sible, for instance, that roughly the equivalent level of expressive free-
dom is secured to humans in each epoch, only by different means?
14 Griffin 2008, 97 himself says that “[t]he content of a human right is also the
content of the corresponding duty”.
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How can this be squared with the tremendous variation over time in
conditions, such as those affecting the feasibility and cost of compliance
with the counterpart duties, that shape the content of a right to expres-
sive freedom? The overwhelming likelihood is that if there is a unitary
high-level right to freedom of expression that applies across human his-
tory, its deontic content is more minimal than Griffin supposes, even in
the context of modernity. If so, Beitz’s objection still stands.
The other response to the Beitzian challenge – idealization – in-
structs us to specify the duties corresponding to a given right by refer-
ence to certain ideal, but in principle attainable, conditions. Even if
these ideal conditions constitute a plurality of possible sets of circum-
stances, they may nonetheless yield the self-same schedule of human
rights. All human beings, throughout human history, could then be as-
cribed those rights. The main normative upshot of so ascribing them
would be that for each human being, there is a duty to provide them
with the objects of those rights to the extent that the relevant ideal con-
ditions materialize in their case. Even cavemen, the argument goes,
meaningfully possess a right to a fair trial, because the existence and con-
tent of human rights is fixed by reference to the ideal conditions for fur-
thering the interests (or whatever consideration is taken to justify human
rights) that underlie them. It is just that the duties potentially associated
with a given individual’s right may never crystallize – may never give
anyone reason to do anything – because the circumstances do not
arise (for the reason that they cannot do so).
This idealizing ploy severely attenuates the connection between
human rights and their corresponding duties. It is one thing to assert
the existence of a human right even if the primary duties associated
with it have not been allocated or their precise content fully specified
at any given time (see Tasioulas 2007). It is quite another to say that
a given kind of right can be meaningfully possessed by individuals
even if there is no prospect of rights of this sort generating any primary
duties for many centuries. Although there is certainly a strain of human
rights discourse that exhibits this feature, its legitimization would pur-
chase trans-historical universality at the price of losing its grip on the na-
ture of human rights discourse as a discourse of rights that generate duties
that guide the conduct of others in relation to the right-holder. More
generally, the idealizing strategy’s appeal to ideal conditions makes the
existence and content of human rights potentially highly indeterminate,
hostage to the play of utopian speculation about possible future devel-
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opments in science and technology and in forms of social, economic and
personal life.
The limitations of both the abstraction and idealization strategies, al-
though not demonstrably fatal to either, nonetheless lead me to abandon
the trans-historical interpretation of universality as a necessary condition
on anything counting as a human right. After all, applicability to all
human beings in all times and places was hardly a desideratum that ex-
ercised the framers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Nor
does this indifference to timelessness signal a break with the natural
law tradition to which orthodoxy seeks to assimilate the contemporary
human rights movement. On the contrary, a similar attitude marks the
work of key figures in that tradition, including both the mediaeval
canon lawyers, who initiated it in the twelfth century, and Kant, who
gave it its most philosophically sophisticated modern formulation. As
Brian Tierney observed in his classic study of the origins and develop-
ment of the idea of natural rights, from its very inception mainstream
thought on the subject did not cleave to the “state of nature dogma”:
“[T]he first rights theories were not derived from contemplation of
the individual isolated from his fellows – isolé sur son île comme Rob-
inson – but from reflection on the right ordering of human relationships
in emerging societies” (Tierney 1997, 70).15
On the interpretation of N that I am advancing, when speaking
about the rights possessed by all human beings qua humans, it is appro-
priate to specify, whether explicitly or implicitly, constraints on the his-
torical period which they inhabit. In understanding the human rights re-
ferred to by the contemporary human rights culture, the relevant histor-
ical period should normally be taken to be that of modernity. Or, in the
words of A.M. Newlands, the New Zealand delegate to the drafting
committee for the Universal Declaration, “human rights were rooted
in the nature of man himself, as well as in the structure and needs of
the modern world” (cited in Morsink 2009, 29). This does not mean
that slaves in the ancient world or medieval serfs are conceptually debar-
red from possessing human rights, since on a number of eligible and il-
luminating specifications of the relevant historical period they clearly do
possess them. Nor does it preclude special moral significance attaching
15 Similarly, A.J. Simmons attributes to Kant a conception of natural rights “that
could not possibly be possessed in a state of nature, that depend on the existence
of quite contingent social arrangements, or that could only be secured in a civil
(i. e. , political) condition”, Simmons 2001, 186.
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to those human rights – “natural rights”, in the Lockean sense – that do
have trans-historical application. But it does enable us to make good,
unforced sense of the thought that rights of the sort enumerated in
the Universal Declaration are universal, in the sense of being possessed
by all human beings.
Of course, the characterization of “modernity” is itself an endlessly
contested matter. Still, what I have in mind is not especially nebulous.
Conditions of modernity refer to a historical context in which features
of the following kind either obtain in the life of each human being or
are reasonably accessible: significant levels of scientific and technological
expertise and capacity; heavy reliance on industrialized modes of pro-
duction; the existence of a market-based economy of global reach; a de-
veloped legal system that is both efficacious and broad-ranging; the per-
vasive influence of individualism and secularism in shaping forms of life,
and so on. One advantage of this view, in contrast with the idealizing
approach, is that it yields a more determinate context within which
to make the assessments of feasibility that most theories of human rights
take to be necessary in grounding human rights. It is therefore less sus-
ceptible to the accusation of utopianism than the idealizing interpreta-
tion of (b). A further advantage is that it offers a charitable interpretation
of at least some of the growth in the number of human rights that have
been asserted from the seventeenth century until the present. This plau-
sibly reflects the way in which changed socio-historical circumstances,
such as rapid progress in technological innovations, bear on our assess-
ments of the existence of human rights and their normative content.
(c) “… simply in virtue of their humanity”
It follows from what has been said under (b) that it is not essential to
human rights that they are possessed in virtue of non-contingent facts
about human beings. Accordingly, this cannot be what (c) is supposed
to exclude. Instead, I take (c) to rule out (1) certain conditions for
the existence of human rights: in particular, it is not necessary for
human rights to exist that they be enforceable, or enshrined in law,
or even socially recognized as such rights,and (2) certain kinds of con-
ditions in the specification of both the conditions for possessing human
rights and the normative content generated by such rights. Regarding
(1), I have argued elsewhere against the claim that a right must be ac-
tually enforceable in order to count as a right, as well as against the
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claim that it must actually be legally embodied (Tasioulas 2007). The
conditions of legalization or social recognition overlook the fact that
human rights are normative considerations whose existence is independ-
ent of law and social practice, considerations of a kind which even
someone as sceptical about rights as Bentham must also recognize, to
the extent that they believe that legal and social norms can be held
up to critical scrutiny (for a helpful critique of the legalistic view of
rights, see Sen 2006). I therefore turn to the negative thesis embodied
in (2).
In consequence of (c), the possession of a human right cannot be
conditional on some conduct or achievement of the right-holder, a re-
lationship to which they belong, or their membership of a particular
community or group. Instead, human rights are rights possessed by all
human beings (however properly characterized) in all or certain gener-
ally specified socio-historical conditions simply in virtue of being
human. The requirement that the conditions should be “generally
specified” precludes the use of such devices as proper names or their ad-
jectival modifications in their specification, e. g. “human inhabitants of
modern Western societies”, etc. The same requirement bears on the
formulation of the duties corresponding to human rights.
It is important to note an asymmetry in the constraints bearing on
the conditions for the possession of human rights and the specification
of their content. Although the possession of human rights is not condi-
tional on any special relationship of the right-holder, their membership
of a community, or any action or achievement of theirs, it is entirely
acceptable for the content of the counterpart duty to refer to such con-
ditions. The duty to allow a person to participate in their community’s
political decision-making is conditional on their being a member of that
community. The duty to provide a person with formal education is con-
ditional on their being able to benefit from it. The duty to provide a
person with fair pay is conditional on their engaging in remunerative
work. The duty to provide someone with a fair trial is conditional on
their being charged with a criminal offence.
Nicholas Wolterstorff has denied the admissibility of such conditions
in formulating human rights; he speaks of conditions (over and above
being human) for possessing a human right, but the argument works
equally well if we take it to be directed at conditions in the specification
of the duties associated with the right. The argument is that this would
permit us to interpret any (genuine?) right as a human right, thereby
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causing us to lose our grip on the idea that human rights are only a sub-
set of the general class of moral rights:
If there really were this conditional human right [e.g. the right to be for-
mally educated if capable of being so educated], then presumably we could
generalize to the conclusion that to every non-human right there is a cor-
responding human right. One simply tucks the status into a conditional
clause within the right. Human rights would be everywhere. Correspond-
ing to the right to receive a monthly Social Security check from the U.S.
government, this being a right attached to the status of being a U.S. citizen
age sixty-five or older, there is the right to receive a monthly Social Secur-
ity check from the U.S. government if one is a U.S. citizen age sixty-five or
older. This now is a right attached to the status of being a human being; it is
a human right (Wolterstorff 2008, 314 f.).
Combined with his largely undefended assumption that human rights, if
worthy of that name, must inhere in all members of the species Homo
sapiens, this leads Wolterstorff to endorse a highly minimalist schedule
of human rights. This is because many familiar human rights, especially
many whose primary counterpart duties are ‘positive’, cannot be mean-
ingfully possessed by some members of the species Homo sapiens if the
content of the right is specified without the use of conditionals.
Thus, it makes little sense to say that someone suffering from severe de-
mentia, for example, has a right to formal education, political participa-
tion or an adequate standard of living. By contrast, it does make sense to
say that they have a right to life or not to be tortured (for the sake of
amusement).
Now, one might argue for a more expansive list of human rights by
contesting Wolterstorff’s assumption that all human rights must be pos-
sessed by all members of the species Homo sapiens. This is not something
that seems obviously forced on us by considerations of fidelity. But this
maneuver will not rescue some standardly invoked human rights the
content of whose duties seems to be conditional, e. g. the right to a
fair trial or to fair pay. So we need to ask whether Wolterstorff’s prohib-
ition of conditional content is really warranted. I believe it is not.
Rather than excluding such conditions in the specification of the
duties corresponding to human rights, we should adopt the more mod-
erate course of imposing restrictions on eligible types of conditions.
Two constraints recommend themselves from the preceding discussion.
The first excludes the use of proper names in specifying the content of
the duty. This deals with Wolterstorff’s example, which refers both to
the United States and to the Social Security department of that nation’s
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government. Another is that the conditions specifying the duties must
refer to circumstances that are not unduly remote for all human beings
given the socio-historical conditions to which the existence of the right
has been indexed. This constraint may be taken to follow from a more
general one: that the conditions specified in the duties mirror the socio-
historical conditions to which the existence of the right has been rela-
tivized. I do not present these constraints as foolproof against any ingen-
ious argument for assimilating implausible candidate rights to the cate-
gory of human rights. My point is simply that this is the way to
begin in trying to address Wolterstorff’s concern, especially if our inter-
pretation of human rights is to stand a decent chance of satisfying the
desideratum of fidelity.
With intuitively compelling constraints on the proper specification
of a human right in hand, we can proceed to distinguish between
human rights proper and more specific rights derived from them that
need not themselves be human rights, but which we possess partly in
virtue of our human rights.16 They will fail to be human rights when
their derivation from genuine human rights depends upon premises
about factual circumstances that are not among those that apply to all
human beings within the relevant socio-historical period. For example,
my human right to political participation, combined with the fact that I
am an Australian citizen, generates a moral right to vote in Australia’s
general elections. The latter is not strictly a human right – only a subset
of human beings in the world have a right to vote in Australian general
elections – but it is an implication of my human right to political par-
ticipation. It follows that one way of violating my human right to po-
litical participation is to violate the non-human right to vote that it con-
fers on me in light of my membership of a particular democratic society.
Returning to Wolterstorff’s original example, we can say that the con-
voluted right he describes is not a human right; it is, instead, a moral or
at least a legal right one may have in virtue of U.S. citizenship. How-
ever, it may turn out to be central to the justification of the latter right
that it helps secure a right that is a genuine human right, the right to an
adequate standard of living.
16 This is a specific instance of the general distinction between “core” and “deriv-
ative” rights; see Raz 1986, 168–170.
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(d) Refining N?
Some find N wanting on the grounds that it is unduly permissive. With-
in its extension, they believe, fall norms that are plainly not moral rights
or, at least, not human rights. Let us focus on the second version of the
complaint. According to this objection, some of the universal moral
rights that comply with N lack the distinctive importance that typifies
human rights. This may be because they are thought comparatively
“trivial”, such as the rights not to be insulted or pinched. Or it may
be because, although important, they belong to a “private” sphere
and so are not appropriately enforced by social or state action, such as
the right not to be betrayed in one’s personal relations. Relatedly, rights
of both categories are notably absent from the key human rights instru-
ments, so that N’s deficiency with respect to the desideratum of distinc-
tive importance is compounded by infidelity.
However, this objection is hardly decisive. One may question
whether the rights touted as “trivial”, assuming they are indeed rights,
really are trivial as opposed to being simply not as important as other
rights. In this connection it is worth reflecting on the far from negligible
significance of the right not to be pinched, or otherwise man-handled,
in the struggle to ensure a non-oppressive work environment for
women. In any case, many of the supposedly “trivial” rights can be
readily interpreted as specific implications of more general rights
which are clearly important and find a place in human rights instru-
ments. So, for example, the right not to be pinched is a specific impli-
cation of the more general right of bodily security, just as the right to
wear eccentric clothes is a specific implication of the more general
right of freedom of expression. The right not to be personally betrayed
cannot be dealt with quite so easily, although an orthodox theorist
might begin by pointing out that it is a mistake to construe human rights
documents as seeking to furnish an exhaustive list of human rights. In-
stead, they understandably tend to include only those human rights that
are genuinely under threat and regarding which preventative and reme-
dial action by the state is both legitimate and potentially effective.
A more conciliatory response, in the face of these supposed counter-
examples, is to append a further condition to N, according to which
there are always pro tanto – and, hence, defeasible – reasons for according
human rights social protection.17 This gives us a revised form of N:
17 This is a condition strongly in keeping with the natural rights tradition and is
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(N*): Human rights are moral rights, possessed by all human beings simply in virtue
of their humanity, and regarding which there are always pro tanto reasons to accord
them social protection.
The idea of social protection embraces an exceptionally broad array
of measures for giving effect to rights, ranging from informal, non-co-
ercive channels such as public opinion at one extreme to coercive legal
mechanisms for punishing human rights violators and compensating
their victims at the other. Indeed, it is not even obvious that, on such
a broad understanding, the right not to be personally betrayed is entirely
winnowed out of the category of human rights. Arguably, this right may
be appropriately protected not only through informal public censure,
but also through certain limited, and indirectly coercive, legal means,
such as compulsory classes for school-children regarding the ethics of
personal relations or judicial awards in divorce settlements.
Partly because it doesn’t obviously correct the supposed problem of
over-inclusiveness, some might go further in revising N. They contend
that universal moral rights are properly characterized as human rights
only to the extent that there is a pro tanto reason to enact them as en-
forceable legal rights with matching content.18 Hence:
(N**): Human rights are moral rights, possessed by all human beings simply in vir-
tue of their humanity, and regarding which there are always pro tanto reasons to
enact them as legally enforceable rights.
Of course, much will depend here on the explanations sponsors of N**
give of how to determine the existence of a pro tanto case for legal en-
forcement. If such a case exists whenever making it a legally enforceable
right would enhance in some respect the right’s prospects of fulfillment,
then it will be fairly easy to meet the concern about undue restrictive-
ness. On the other hand, the efficacy of N** as a filter will be corre-
spondingly diminished. However that may be, N** seems more likely
to filter out the general right against personal betrayal than N*. Assum-
given a lucid formulation by Mill : “When we call anything a person’s right, we
mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of it,
either by the force of law, or by that of education and opinion” (Mill 1998, 97).
More recently, Amartya Sen has written in a similar vein that a human right
must meet a condition of “social influenceability”, (Sen 2004, 329), which
can be understood as a corollary of Mill’s condition.
18 “[H]uman rights have an inherently juridical nature and are conceptually ori-
ented toward positive enactment by legislative bodies”, Habermas 2001, 122;
Raz 2010b, 43–44.
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ing that many or most personal betrayals fall outside the scope of legit-
imate state intervention, the state arguably lacks even a pro tanto reason
for enacting a legally enforceable right against personal betrayal. More-
over, N** also has antecedents in the natural rights tradition, especially
its Kantian variant. And it resonates with the intentions of the drafters of
the UDHR, such as Eleanor Roosevelt, who regarded that document as
a template for the incorporation of enforceable rights into the domestic
legal and constitutional orders of individual states.
Still, I believe we should resist injecting a juris-generative dimension
into the very concept of a human right. Firstly, N** is unduly restrictive.
The language of human rights is often used in ways that do not obvi-
ously carry the implication that there is even a pro tanto case for the le-
galization of the human right whose existence the speaker asserts. Invo-
cations of human rights by those who are sceptics about coercive legal
orders generally (e. g. anarchists) are perhaps the most dramatic counter-
examples to N**. Another way in which N** is unduly restrictive is in
counter-intuitively excluding certain norms from the category of
human rights because, on closer inspection, it emerges that a pro tanto
case for enacting them as coercive legal rights does not exist. This
point is not confined to rights that operate within the “private” sphere,
such as the right not to be betrayed. Consider, for example, the right to
rebel against a tyrannical government. Although this is plausibly regard-
ed as a human right, it is hardly obvious that there is a reason to enact it
as an enforceable legal right. It would seem pointless to do so, since the
right concerns a situation in which the legal system itself has become the
chief threat to human rights.
Second, N** generates artificial distinctions. Grant, for example, that
the right to free speech includes a right to have a say regarding certain
decisions that significantly affect one’s interests. Assume further that the
duties generated by that right with respect to governmental, but not
familial, decision-making are eligible for enforcement as legal rights. It
seems artificial to hive off the first set of deontic implications, and to
refer to them as “human rights”, while the non-enforceable implications
are ascribed to a “universal right”. After all, both sets of deontic impli-
cations are justified by the self-same considerations. Why should a dif-
ference in the eligible modes of implementing different components of
the self-same right warrant this conceptual dualism? Note that this prob-
lem threatens to arise with respect to all human rights, since they all pre-
sumably generate some duties that are not eligible for legal enforcement.
The human right not to be tortured, for example, arguably places a duty
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on parents not to encourage in their children a permissive attitude to-
wards torture, but this is a duty that for the most part seems ineligible
for legal enforcement.
Finally, even if we focus on the category of rights that satisfy N**, it
seems misleading to accord this kind of conceptual centrality to the cri-
terion of enforceability as legal rights. In a series of important writings,
Amartya Sen has emphasized the diversity of ways of implementing
human rights, of which the legislative route is only one, with the cre-
ation of legally enforceable rights being itself just one pathway on
that route (Sen 2004, 343–345; 2006, 2919–2921; 2009, ch. 17;
2010). Other forms of implementation include official and unofficial
modes of recognizing the existence and implications of human rights,
for example, through non-binding declarations such as the UDHR.
They also include the kind of grass roots agitation pursued by non-gov-
ernmental organizations that monitor human rights violations, publicize
their findings, and seek to mobilize public opinion against the perpetra-
tors of the violations. Moreover, as Sen has also observed, there is no
compelling reason to believe that the enactment of enforceable legal
rights with matching normative content is always the ideal way of giving
force even to those rights that satisfy N**.19 Why then privilege enfor-
ceability as legal rights by building it into the very nature of human
rights, when other modes of implementation may be preferable in a sig-
nificant range of cases? The orthodox theorist, I conclude, does best to
adhere to N or N*. For the sake of convenience, I will henceforth con-
tinue to refer to N as representing the Orthodox View.
IV. The Political View
However one judges the respective merits of N, N* and N**, all remain
firmly within the orbit of the Orthodox View. In recent years, howev-
er, a significant number of philosophers have argued that orthodoxy ne-
19 Sen offers the following nice example: “[T]he moral or political entitlement,
which can easily be seen as a human right, of a somewhat slow speaker not
to be snubbed in an open public meeting by a rudely articulate sprinter may
well be important both for the self-respect of the leisurely speaker and for pub-
lic good, but it is not likely to be a good subject for punitive legislation. The
protection of that human right would have to be sought elsewhere. The effec-
tiveness of the human rights perspective does not rest on seeing them invariably
as putative proposals for legislation” (Sen 2004, 345).
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glects the essentially political character of human rights. Advocates of this
Political View advance one or both of the following broad theses. First,
that human rights perform a distinctive political function or set of func-
tions, and that it is the omission of any reference to this political role in
the specification of the core concept of a human right that undermines
the Orthodox View. This claim is primarily motivated by considerations
relating to the distinctive importance of human rights as opposed to
other standards, including the rights that properly feature in a liberal
democratic constitution, and by considerations of fidelity to the wider
human rights culture. Moreover, since this view is likely to result in a
more parsimonious list of human rights than N or its variants, it is
also presented as comparatively non-parochial. Second, human rights
stand in need of a special kind of justification. It is neither necessary
nor sufficient that they be grounded by ordinary moral reasoning, as re-
quired by O ; instead they must have a basis in an autonomous form of
“public reason”. Only in this way, it is claimed, can the global advocacy
of human rights escape the charge of parochialism. Some advocates of
the Political View endorse both claims (e. g. Rawls), others only one
(e. g. Raz). In the rest of this chapter, I limit myself to addressing the
first claim.
The labels I have used risk conveying the mistaken impression that
the Orthodox View is “apolitical”. However, N is certainly compatible
with the proposition that, as a contingent matter, human rights have se-
rious political implications in particular circumstances, e. g. they may re-
quire us to create and maintain powerful and costly political institutions,
such as the state. Indeed, a proponent of N can even accept certain nec-
essary truths concerning the political significance of human rights. Thus,
N together with the arguably necessary truth that states should respect
principles of justice leads to the conclusion that they should respect
human rights, assuming the latter constitute a sub-set of the principles
of justice. The dispute between Orthodox and Political accounts of
human rights pivots, instead, on whether a political role belongs to
the essence of a human right, so that an adequate understanding of
what a human right is involves conceiving of it as a right that plays
the specified political role.
We can distinguish two importantly different versions of the Polit-
ical View: the sub-set and the sui generis approaches. Proponents of the
sub-set approach reject N-type accounts as seriously incomplete specifica-
tions of the nature of human rights; instead, they regard human rights as
a sub-set of the general class of universal moral rights picked out by N or
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its variants, a sub-set distinguished by the political role such rights per-
form. Because they presuppose a conception of universal moral rights
that broadly conforms to an N-like specification, sub-set approaches
are not root-and-branch deviations from orthodoxy. Advocates of the
sui generis approach, by contrast, do not presuppose a conception of uni-
versal moral rights that broadly conforms to N ; instead, they either re-
ject, or are non-committal towards, the thesis that human rights are to
be understood in terms of an underlying layer of universal moral rights.
This is because they wish to avoid encumbering the concept of human
rights with various commitments that N-type rights supposedly bring
with them, commitments they regard as alien to the contemporary
human rights culture. Some proponents of the sui generis approach go
even further, being sceptical or agnostic about the idea that human
rights are helpfully understood as falling under the general concept of
an individual moral right. Sui generis theories of this latter sort can be
conceived as building a political element into a reductive account of
human rights, whereas standards sub-set theories inject such an element
into an Orthodox account.
What, then, are the political role(s) that various advocates of Polit-
ical Views have attributed to the very nature of human rights? One fo-
cuses on the addressees of human rights norms:
PV1. It belongs to the very nature of human rights that the primary re-
sponsibility for compliance with them rests – on some versions, rests ex-
clusively – with the officials of states, or state-like entities, or at least co-
ercive institutional schemes. By “primary responsibility” is meant a re-
sponsibility associated with the human right that does not have as its
subject-matter some other responsibility associated with that right.
The state’s primary responsibilities under human rights can therefore in-
clude the responsibility to prevent, make reparation for, punish, etc.
certain types of misconduct on the part of its subjects, provided that
the misconduct is not itself characterized as a human rights violation.
If the relevant political entity bearing the primary responsibility fails
to discharge it, other agents – citizens of the relevant state, other states,
international institutions, etc. – may incur secondary responsibilities to
respond to this initial breach in various ways.
Some variant of PV1 appears to be accepted by Charles Beitz (2009)
and, prior to a change of heart, by Thomas Pogge (Pogge 2002,
ch. 7, subsequently recanted in the 2007 edition). On Pogge’s version
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of PV1, a “human rights” violation only exists when some failure on the
part of officials of a coercive institutional scheme is present. Hence, we
cannot automatically infer from the fact that A has tortured B simply for
the pleasure the former derives from doing so that B’s human rights have
been violated. A may well have violated a right of B’s not to be tor-
tured, even an N-type right. But the act of torture will only be a
human rights violation if A is an official of the state or his conduct is suit-
ably connected to a coercive institutional order inhabited by A and B.
One form of connection, stressed by Pogge, emerges from an affirma-
tive answer to the question of whether the act of torture is a foreseeable
and reasonably avoidable upshot of the imposition of that order. How-
ever, it is doubtful that we have sufficient reason to countenance a dual-
ism of human rights and universal moral rights of this sort unless the for-
mer notion is given some additional, and more specific, political dimen-
sion.
We should therefore turn to two other political functions in terms of
which the Political View has been framed. Internally, human rights are
interpreted as bearing on the legitimacy of a state or comparable insti-
tution, constraining its right to rule (PV2); externally, they operate as
standards whose violation is capable of triggering a case for international
action (PV3):
PV2. It belongs to the very nature of human rights that they bear on the
legitimacy of states or state-like entities, or at least political institutions
of some more generally specified kind. “Legitimacy” is to be understood
as justified authority, such that a political institution is legitimate to the
extent that its laws (and other official acts) generate a pro tanto obligation
of compliance on the part of its putative subjects that is additional to
whatever obligation they have to do what the law requires independent-
ly of the existence of the law in question.
PV3. It belongs to the very nature of human rights that their violation is
capable of generating a pro tanto justification for some form of interna-
tional response on the part of outside agents, such as other states, inter-
national and regional institutions, non-governmental organizations, and
so on. The nature of the international response that is the distinguishing
mark of human rights is variously understood by different theorists : for
some it is specifically military intervention, or sovereignty-limiting in-
tervention more broadly construed, whereas for others it constitutes
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an even more diverse group of responses, some of which are not aptly
assimilated to the category of “intervention”.
Now, there is a general objection to the Political View in all three of its
guises: it construes human rights as conceptually parasitic on the idea of
some kind of political institution, whether it be the state (Beitz 1999;
Raz 2010a; 2010b), state-like entities (Rawls’ “peoples”), or coercive
institutional schemes (Pogge).20 PV3 goes beyond this by building
into the notion of human rights the idea that they regulate certain ac-
tivities within a system of states, or at least a system of political institu-
tions of a specified kind – hence Beitz’s strikingly deflationary character-
ization of human rights as “revisionist appurtenances of a global political
order composed of independent states” (Beitz 2009, 197). But the lan-
guage of human rights is often employed by people who do not accept
the desirability of states (e. g. anarchists), or who reject any global order
that is a system of states or state-like entities (e. g. cosmopolitans who
favor a unitary world government). What is more, they often appeal
to human rights principles in order to defend their views about the
state and the state system. Why should we interpret their invocation
of human rights standards in terms of institutions they reject, and reject
precisely on human rights grounds? Of course, it is true that use of the
concept of human rights, on a Political View, does not necessarily in-
volve endorsing either states or state systems. It may be that even though
the distinctive nature of human rights is given by reference to their
bearing on states in the ways specified by PV1-PV3, one can invoke
them as standards of assessment without endorsing either states or the
state system within at least ideal theory. But it would be peculiar, to
say the least, to defend a version of PV if one did not believe that the
language of human rights achieves its fullest expression in the context
of assessments of states or relations within the state system.
Reflecting on anarchists and cosmopolitans who believe in human
rights throws into sharp relief the difficulties arising from the statist
character of Political Views. But it would be misleading to present
those difficulties as stemming from the need to accommodate eccentric
or minority ethical and political opinions. Even those who endorse the
institution of the state may intelligibly see themselves as doing so on the
basis of human rights principles that do not essentially incorporate any
reference to that institution. Hence the ease with which they are pre-
20 To save words, I shall mainly refer to “states” in characterizing PVs.
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pared to make judgments involving human rights in situations in which
a state dimension is totally absent or extremely tenuous. Orthodoxy bet-
ter enables us to accommodate these possibilities by giving us a purer,
moral concept of human rights, free of any such specific institutional
entanglements. Insofar as an (additional) institutional dimension poten-
tially enters into human rights discourse, it does so in a non-conceptual,
flexible and context-dependent ways, for example: as part of the spec-
ification of the socio-historical conditions over which particular human
rights claims are supposed to hold,21 and in deliberation concerning the
concrete specification and practical implementation of human rights.
This is a preferable way of registering the human rights significance of
the state or other political institutions, as opposed to the tight concep-
tual linkage between human rights language and the state or state system
enjoined by PV1–3. It maintains an important distinction between
moral principles and the political structures that embody them, thereby
respecting the great diversity of ways in which the language of human
rights operates in ordinary discourse.
I have outlined PV1–3 in very broad terms. Individual theorists en-
dorse more specific versions of them. Moreover, the three theses are
logically independent. Some apparently endorse versions of all three
(e. g. Beitz 1999; Cohen 2004 and 2006 and perhaps Rawls 1999), oth-
ers are unambiguously committed to only two (e. g. Dworkin 2011
seems to combine PV1 and PV2) or just one (e. g. Raz 2010a and
2010b explicitly endorses PV3 and repudiates PV2, but may be commit-
ted to some weak version of PV1). The combination of PV2 and PV3,
according to which human rights are characterized as both conditions of
internal legitimacy and limitations on immunity from international inter-
vention (e. g. Rawls and Cohen), presents special difficulties. There ap-
pears to be a discrepancy between the conditions of internal legitimacy
and those of international intervention, such that the self-same list of
rights is incapable of discharging both functions. Whether a state pos-
sesses legitimacy depends on the morality of its actions in relation to
its putative subjects. But whether it is liable, even in principle, to exter-
nal interference depends on other considerations, including the value of
political self-determination and facts about the geo-political environ-
21 Thus, as I have already argued, most discussions of human rights claims today
presuppose a context of modernity, and one of the facts of modernity is the ex-
istence (or at least the availability though not necessarily the ultimate desirabil-
ity) of something like the state system, see II.(b), above.
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ment, such as the incidence of predatory behavior among states. In con-
sequence, the mere fact that a state oversteps the bounds of its legitimate
authority does not give rise to a reason, in any circumstances, for inter-
ference by other states, just as not every personal wrong-doing gives
others reason to prevent or punish it (Raz 2010a, 330). Subscribers to
the combination of PV2 and PV3 might respond by specifying more
precisely how human rights operate as defeasible triggers for external in-
tervention, rather than all-things-considered justifications. However,
leaving PV2 to one side, in the remainder of this chapter I offer some
reasons for endorsing N over the versions of PV3 elaborated by John
Rawls and Joseph Raz (sub-set theorists) and Charles Beitz (a sui generis
theorist). I will focus in particular on the desideratum of fidelity, since in
the case of Raz and Beitz at least it is a major motivation for their em-
brace of PV3.
Whether we accept PV3 will depend, in part, on the availability of a
concrete and illuminating specification of the kind of “international re-
sponse” the violation of human rights is said to justify. One such spec-
ification is Rawls’ two-level view of political rights. To the extent that
Rawls acknowledges rights possessed by all human beings simply in vir-
tue of their humanity, they are the rights integral to a liberal conception
of justice.22 Let us call them liberal constitutional rights. The universality of
these rights follows from the Rawlsian claim that the most reasonable
political conception of justice is a liberal one. Even though he describes
some non-liberal societies – decent hierarchical peoples – as well-or-
dered, and hence as equal members in good standing of the Society
of Peoples, their deviation from political liberalism renders the concep-
tions of justice upheld by these societies only “not fully unreasonable”
(Rawls 1999, 74). In terms of content, Rawls’ liberal constitutional
rights map fairly well onto the schedule of rights in the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights. But they are not human rights, which for
Rawls are only a sub-set of liberal constitutional rights (both a sub-set
of the rights themselves and, in some cases, of the content of particular
rights). They are those liberal constitutional rights capable of generating
22 A liberal conception of justice consists of three “characteristic principles” that:
(a) enumerate “basic rights and liberties of the kind familiar from a constitution-
al regime”, (b) assign these rights and liberties “a special priority, especially with
respect to the claims of the general good and perfectionism values”, and (c)
guarantee to all citizens “the requisite primary goods to enable them to make
intelligent and effective use of their freedoms” (Rawls 1999, 14).
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a defeasible or pro tanto justification for forceful intervention by well-or-
dered societies against any society responsible for severe and widespread
violations of those rights.
What is “forceful” intervention? Passing over the details of some ex-
egetical controversies, I shall take Rawls to mean “military interven-
tion”.23 Under the heading of the kinds of “intervention” that can be
justified by human rights violations Rawls includes not only military in-
tervention but also, for example, diplomatic and economic sanctions.
Thus, a society that complies with human rights (and is non-aggressive)
is immune from “justified and forceful intervention”, whether this takes
the form of diplomatic or economic sanctions or, at the limit, military
force (Rawls 1999, 80). But on my interpretation, the coercive inter-
vention account accords criterial status in characterizing human rights
only to military intervention. On this view, what it is for a right to be
a human right is partly that its violation can act as a defeasible trigger
for military intervention against the society that perpetrates the viola-
tions. However, a society’s compliance with the full schedule of
human rights apparently has the effect of ruling out all forms of inter-
vention against it, including the non-military variety (Tasioulas 2002,
380–390).24
Consider how Rawls’ theory fares against our desiderata. As defea-
sible triggers of military intervention, human rights play an undeniably
important role. Moreover, they are a proper sub-set of all rights – a
“special class of urgent rights” (Rawls 1999, 79) – and therefore occupy
a distinctive place among the principles of justice. The comparative
minimalism of Rawls’ schedule of human rights ministers to the non-
parochialism requirement (Rawls 1999, 65). By admitting only a hand-
ful of urgent rights as human rights, he markedly enhances the prospects
of their finding favor among non-liberal societies. However, an obvious
problem with Rawls’ view is a lack of fidelity to the wider human rights
culture, since it results in a notoriously parsimonious schedule of human
rights, limited to the following:
23 For a more detailed discussion of the interpretative issues, see Tasioulas 2009.
24 Rawls’ view on this last issue is not entirely clear, since he does not adequately
spell out what he means by “justified and forceful intervention”. Thus, it is un-
certain whether, according to Rawls, purely verbal criticism counts as a “dip-
lomatic sanction”. For a persuasive argument that it does, see Nickel 2006,
271 f.
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[the] right to life (to the means of subsistence and security); to liberty (to
freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient
measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and
thought) ; to property (personal property); and to formal equality as ex-
pressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar cases be treated
similarly) (Rawls 1999, 65).
Rights absent from this list, but present in the standard international
human rights documents, include: human rights to non-discrimination
on the grounds of sex, race and religion; human rights to freedom of
opinion, speech, movement and political participation; human rights
to education, work and an adequate standard of living; and so on.
These, says Rawls, are “liberal aspirations”, not human rights properly
so called.25
One reply is that the truncated list of human rights should be toler-
ated as it represents an appropriate compromise between the competing
claims of fidelity and non-parochialism: a curbing of the traditional as-
pirations of the human rights movement (in terms of the number and
content of human rights) in order to secure a non-parochial grounding
of those fewer rights that remain. Insofar as this argument does not sim-
ply consist in a bare appeal to the virtues of parsimony in one’s schedule
of human rights, it might be thought to implicate Rawls’ rejection of O.
The claim would then be that the shorter list of human rights picked out
by Rawls’ version of PV3 receives independent support from the fact
that only this list can be vindicated by the form of “public reason”
that, he claims, is significantly non-parochial as compared with any
O-compliant justification. Without going into details, it is doubtful
that this line of argument can succeed. This is because, for Rawls,
human rights are a sub-set of the wider set of liberal constitutional
rights. These latter rights are derived by means of a process that takes
the core ideas of liberal democratic culture as simply given; to this ex-
tent, it is scarcely a non-parochial justification. In any case, the narrow-
ing down of these rights into a doctrine of human rights is largely ach-
ieved by Rawls’ adoption of PV3 (and, presumably, PV2). Hence,
Rawls’ rejection of O seems to offer little by way of an independent
grounding for PV3 based on the consideration of non-parochialism.
25 For Rawls’ discussion of human rights instruments, see Rawls 1999, 80, n. 23.
Among his contentions is that only Articles 3 to 18 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights are human rights proper. For the discrepancy between
Rawls’ schedule and that extractable from leading human rights covenants,
see Tasioulas 2002, 381–383.
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A less dramatic response is adopted by two other proponents of
PV3, Raz and Beitz. They preserve Rawls’ insight that human rights
are essentially triggers for an international response when violated, but
have a broader understanding of the nature of the criterial response.
For Raz, it is any form of intervention, not only military, that would
normally be excluded as an infringement of state sovereignty. Human
rights are those universal moral rights whose violation does not come
within a state’s sphere of sovereign immunity:
I will take human rights to be rights which set limits to the sovereignty of
states, in that their actual or anticipated violation is a (defeasible) reason for
taking action against the violator in the international arena, even when – in
cases not involving violation of either human rights or the commission of
other offences – the action would not be permissible, or normatively avail-
able on the grounds that it would infringe the sovereignty of the state (Raz
2010a, 328).
Of course, much depends on how the sphere of sovereignty is delimit-
ed. If Raz’s position is not to exclude too many rights that figure in
human rights instruments, it will probably need to rely on the distinctly
minority view – associated with China but very few other states – that
even acts such as publicly expressed criticism by the government of one
state against another come within the scope of sovereign immunity.
Beitz goes even further than Raz, characterizing human rights as
[T]he constitutive norms of a global practice whose aim is to protect indi-
viduals against threats to their most important interests arising from the acts
and omissions of their governments (including failures to regulate the con-
duct of other agents). The practice seeks to achieve this aim by bringing
these aspects of the domestic conduct of governments within the scope
of legitimate international concern (Beitz 2009, 197).26
Beitz’s notion of “legitimate international concern” is broader than
Raz’s focus on intervention in at least two ways. First, it is not elucidat-
ed by reference to any norm of state sovereignty. Second, it is not lim-
ited to forms of response that are aptly classified as interventionary, e. g.,
because they defy the will of the government of the target state or curb
its freedom. Instead, “international concern” encompasses a diverse
array of trans-national responses such as offers of assistance or adaptation
26 It seems a curious, but perhaps unintended, result of this characterization that
states are not under any primary obligations arising from human rights to be-
have in certain ways in relation to people other than their own citizens, i. e.
it results in an exclusivist version of PV1.
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of a state’s own behavior in the hope of improving conditions in anoth-
er state.27
Views such as those of Raz and Beitz do not obviously suffer from
the problem of infidelity that arises for Rawls in virtue of the latter’s
conceptual prioritization of military intervention. Indeed, Raz asserts
that so far as fidelity is concerned, the boot is on the other foot. This
is because he believes there are many universal moral rights, such as
the right not to be personally betrayed and the right not to be pinched,
which do not count as human rights – for example, they do not appear
in standard human rights documents – but which are plausibly human
rights on the Orthodox View. His take on PV3, by contrast, enables
good sense to be made of the exclusion of such rights from human rights
charters. The first is ruled out because betrayals within personal relations
are not within the purview of legitimate state authority, and the second
because pinching, even if a violation of a universal moral right, does not
have the kind of importance necessary to justify international interven-
tion.
Raz’s attempt to throw the charge of infidelity back in the face of
the orthodox theorist is not successful. He relies on an excessively
rigid interpretation of the desideratum of fidelity, one that fetishizes
the content of the key international human rights documents. Perhaps
most adherents of the Orthodox View are committed to the existence
of some, perhaps many, human rights that have never figured in the
key human rights instruments. But this is a serious defect only if the or-
thodox theorist cannot offer plausible explanations for their absence that
is compatible with their being human rights. Yet such explanations
abound. One is that the statist focus of international law and politics – rath-
er than of human rights discourse itself – tends to ensure that the rights
enumerated in such documents fall within states’ perceived domain of
legitimate or effective action. Hence the absence from human rights
documents of the right not to be personally betrayed. Another is that
the documents do not purport to be exhaustive of all human rights,
but to list some of the more important ones, especially those that appear
most threatened in contemporary conditions. This is compatible with
some less important human rights – such as the right not to be pinched
27 Beitz discusses six kinds of international concern in some detail : accountability;
inducement; assistance; domestic contestation and engagement; compulsion;
and external adaptation. See Beitz 2009, 33–42.
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– being derivations from more important, but also more abstract human
rights, such as the right to bodily security.
At this point, the orthodox theorist is well-placed to go on the of-
fensive against sub-set theorists like Rawls and Raz. Given that they are
committed to a concept of moral rights that fits the Orthodox View (I
leave aside Rawls’ endorsement of PV1 and PV2), and given also that
the rights they believe are instantiated by this concept are a good
enough match (with accompanying explanation) for the standard
items in human rights documents, it seems reasonable to take N as an
elucidation of the core concept. After all, it is not as if an orthodox the-
orist cannot consider the further question of which violations of human
rights may properly qualify the doctrine of state sovereignty or justify
various kinds of international response. But these will be a sub-set of
the class of human rights, not the class of human rights themselves.
At the very least, we may wonder whether there is more than a termi-
nological dispute here, as opposed to some intellectually deep-going
challenge to orthodoxy.
This counter-attack, however, is ineffective against sui generis theo-
rists such as Beitz, since they are not committed to explicating human
rights as parasitic on an underlying layer of universal moral rights that
fit the Orthodox bill. But a sui generis approach remains open to two
large objections, one of which is unique to it, the other of which also
applies to sub-set versions of PV3.
Consider, first, Beitz’s claim that human rights are not best inter-
preted as a sub-set of universal moral rights, but rather as norms validat-
ing international responses to protect individuals’ “urgent interests”
against standard threats posed to them by their own governments.
One problem here is that Beitz rejects the sub-set approach because
he encumbers the Orthodox View, what he calls a “naturalistic” ap-
proach to human rights, with a commitment to the sort of trans-histor-
ical universality that need form no part of it (see 2.III(b), above).28 So
Beitz’s main reason for not conceiving human rights in terms of a back-
ground notion of universal moral rights is misplaced. But he apparently
goes even further, following proponents of the Reductive View in of-
fering an elucidation of the nature of human rights that attributes no in-
dependent significance to the notion of “rights” or “moral rights”. But
28 Interestingly, Beitz himself notes that the naturalistic approach encompasses im-
portant strands that reject the requirement of “timelessness”; see Beitz 2009, 58,
n. 20.
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how is the “importance” or “urgency” of interests to be understood if
we prescind from the thought that, in the case of each individual, a right
is generated by the interest? Beitz’s suggestion that such interests “have a
kind of importance that it would be reasonable to recognize across a
wide range of possible lives” is unhelpfully vague (Beitz 2009, 111).
More generally, it is doubtful that a sui generis account of this sort can
capture the widespread understanding of human rights as moral consid-
erations and, moreover, moral considerations of a distinctive kind. In-
deed, it is not even clear whether Beitz believes that the interests he
identifies with human rights generate duties on the part of governments
with respect to their own citizens. It is even less clear whether duties, as
opposed to reasons, have to be in play when it comes to the rationale for
international concern. As a result, something like the problems of the
Reductive View re-emerge: the consequent notion of a “human
right” seems lacking in the requisite moral significance.
The second objection applies to all three defenders of PV3 discussed
in this section. It is a further elaboration of the charge of infidelity, but
one aimed not at the congruence of the resultant list of human rights
with the rights in standard human rights documents, but at the prioriti-
zation of international responses of intervention and concern in under-
standing the nature of human rights. Given the myriad roles performed
by the discourse of human rights in ordinary life – roles such as guiding
one’s personal conduct, providing standards for criticizing one’s own
government, in addition to various international roles – what compel-
ling rationale is there for conceptualizing human rights as triggers for
an international response? The question is especially acute when the in-
ternational response, as in Rawls’ coercive intervention account, is mili-
tary intervention. But the same complaint can be motivated with regard
to the considerably softer version of the thesis advanced by Beitz, as re-
flection on some hypothetical cases brings out.
Suppose that studies reliably establish that efforts by external agents
to encourage traditionalist, non-Western societies to comply with rights
to be free from severe poverty or discrimination on the grounds of sex,
for example, are almost invariably either unacceptably intrusive (e. g. in-
consistent with the self-determination of the relevant societies) or else
utterly ineffective where they are not counter-productive. Such a find-
ing might plausibly prevent the violation of such norms from triggering
“international concern”, since the basis for international concern that
Beitz has in mind is one that would be operative in the generality of
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cases in which violations occur.29 But the point here is not so much
whether this or that putative human right would be vindicated. It is, in-
stead, the deeper question of whether this type of consideration is really
an appropriate basis for withholding the label “human right” from any
such norms or treating them as at best marginal instantiations of the core
concept. For the imagined empirical findings would leave intact the
possibility that all human beings, simply in virtue of their humanity,
possess a moral right to be free from severe poverty or discrimination
on the grounds of sex. So even if Beitz’s version of PV3 can accommo-
date most of the rights ordinarily labeled “human rights”, it does so on
the basis of apparently extraneous considerations.
To conclude: although ostensibly motivated by considerations of fi-
delity, versions of PV3 have their own problems on this score, not only
in potentially failing to embrace a sufficiently broad range of human
rights, but also in skewing our understanding of such rights by concep-
tually privileging one or two of the myriad roles they play in moral and
political life. Aside from this problem, Political Views are impaled on
the horns of a dilemma. The more plausible versions of the sub-set ap-
proach, such as Raz’s, are readily construed as refinements of ortho-
doxy, leaving N in place as the core concept of a human right. Sui generis
views, on the other hand, involve a radical break from N but, precisely
for this reason, they encounter many of the difficulties that afflict reduc-
tivism in making sense of human rights.
V. Conclusion
It is sometimes proposed that to make the philosophical treatment of
certain key moral concepts engage with their use in everyday life, one
must make a decisive break from the tradition of philosophical reflection
on those concepts. The Reductive and the Political Views pursue this
proposal in relation to the concept of a human right. I have argued
that both attempts face serious problems, and that we should adopt a
version of the Orthodox View. Unlike the Reductive View, the Ortho-
dox View does not lose its grip on the all-important fact that human
rights are rights: not just a moral category, but a distinctive one within
29 And Beitz himself clear-sightedly faces up to the possibility that such rights
might not be defensible as triggers for international concern; see Beitz 2009,
ch. 7.
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the moral domain. Unlike the Political View, it does not conceptually
bind human rights to particular institutional structures, such as the
state system, or kinds of relations and interactions within them, such
as intervention. Instead, the Orthodox View offers us a picture of
human right as intermediate moral principles: mediating between the
fundamental values (if any) that ground them, on the one hand, and
the institutional and social structures that concretize and implement
them, on the other. This does not mean that most of the concerns raised
by proponents of the Reductive and Political views may be safely ignor-
ed; instead, their significance is re-located from the conceptual realm to
that of substantive debate. In the case of the Reductive View, the de-
bates are mostly about the grounds of human rights; in the case of
the Political View, they concern the implementation of human rights,
including their implications for the legitimacy of municipal and interna-
tional legal orders and the varieties of international action in response to
their violation.30
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Human rights without foundations?
Peter Schaber
Different authors such as Charles Beitz and Joseph Raz argue against
what they call ‘the traditional view’ of human rights: the view that
there are universal human rights based on essential features of human
beings. Human rights, they think, are rights with a certain political func-
tion, namely to limit the sovereignty of states. In his paper “Human
Rights without Foundations” Joseph Raz calls this “the political con-
ception of human rights” (Raz 2010, 328). The political conception
is, Raz argues, closer to contemporary human rights practice than the
traditional views. According to Raz, the traditional views provide us
with conceptions of human rights that are so remote from the current
practice of human rights “as to be irrelevant to it” (ibid., 323). This,
Raz thinks, speaks against the traditional view or what might also be
called the moral view of human rights and in favor of the political view.
My paper will deal in the first part with this political conception of
human rights; I will argue that we should not accept this view for dif-
ferent reasons: it does not pass the adequacy test it sets out for a satisfac-
tory theory of human rights, and it does not provide us with the justi-
fication of human rights that we need. I will then, in the second part of
the paper, try to show how the traditional or moral view of human
rights could be defended.
1. The political conception of human rights
What does the political conception of human rights amount to? Its basic
idea is that human rights should be seen as a class of rights that limit a
state’s internal autonomy. Human rights violations are reasons for out-
side intervention. As Raz puts it:
“Sovereignity does not justify state actions, but it protects states from ex-
ternal interference. Violation of human rights disables this response
[…].” (ibid., 328)
These rights need not, Raz thinks, be based on certain essential, and one
might add, important features of human beings. Some of them, it is ar-
gued, are based on contingent non-evaluative facts about humans, for
instance the fact that the economic and social structure of a society
leads people living in this society to value certain things. And as a con-
sequence, they do not need to be universal. Human rights are not rights
human beings have in virtue of their humanity. Rather they have these
rights for political reasons: Human rights are taken to be of international
concern, for whatever reasons people think they should be seen this way.
People have reasons to see these rights as of international concern. But
they are not human rights due to these reasons, but rather due to the fact
that they are taken to be of international concern.
This account of human rights, Beitz and Raz think, gets us closer to
the reality of the current human rights practice. And this is, they think,
one of the reasons why this account should be accepted. A satisfactory
theory of human rights has to account for the actual human rights prac-
tice. And this is exactly what the political conception does, they argue:
“The dominant trend in human rights practice is to take the fact that a right
is a human right as a defeasibly sufficient ground for taking action against
violations in the international arena […].” (ibid., 328)
Intervention justified by human rights violations are taken by Raz in a
wide sense, including not just military intervention, but milder forms
such as “making conformity to rights a condition of aid, calling on states
to report on their […] protection of human rights, condemning viola-
tion, refusing to provide landing or over-flight rights, trade boycotts,
and others” (Raz 2007, n. 14).
2. Accounting for human rights practice?
One might question the idea that a theory of human rights has to ac-
count for the current human rights practice. But even if we accept
this as an adequacy test for a satisfactory theory of human rights, we
have no good reasons to accept the political conception of human
rights.
Let me explain. If we take a closer look at the UN Declaration of
Human Rights, we find a very long list of different human rights, a
list that has been developed over the years, influenced by different po-
litical concerns as well (for example, to get the socialist countries on
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board). The idea of outside intervention is a rather new development,
still at an early stage, mainly based on the terrible experiences of the in-
ternational community with non-intervention in the face of genocide,
mass rape and other crimes against humanity, as it was the case, for in-
stance, in Rwanda in 1994.
The list of human rights is indeed long. Nevertheless, very few vio-
lations of human rights are taken as reasons for intervention, even if ‘in-
tervention’ is understood in a very wide sense. I am thinking not just of
the famous right to have periodic holidays with pay, but also other and
definitely more important rights such as the right to work, the right
freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, the right to
enjoy the arts, the right to political participation and the right of peoples
to freely dispose of their natural resources, as stated in Article 1 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The violation of none of these rights is taken as a valid reason for
any kind of intervention. Just take, for instance, the right of peoples
to freely dispose of their natural resources. Corrupt and incompetent re-
gimes violate this right without doubt in many different ways (see
Wenar 2008). Nevertheless, the international community is not both-
ered about this. The way the regimes of these countries use the resource
wealth is still considered a purely internal matter. And I think that this
applies to all the rights I have just mentioned: to the right to work
(which does not exist in our Western countries), the right to participate
in the cultural life, the right to enjoy the arts. If at all, the international
community intervenes – even if we take ‘intervention’ in a wide sense –
only if basic human rights are violated on a massive scale. It is true that
there has been more talk about outside intervention in recent years, but
it normally refers to these basic rights. It does not seem to be the case
that the political conception really gets us any closer to the contempo-
rary human rights practice than the traditional view. It does not seem to
pass its own adequacy test.
Still, one could hold the view that human rights should be under-
stood as rights that serve a political function, namely to limit the sover-
eignty of states. One could argue that this is the way they should be
taken in the future; and perhaps we are slowly moving in this direction.
But then the question arises which rights violations should be seen as
reasons for limiting state sovereignty. The UN report “The Responsi-
bility to Protect” mentions genocide, ethnic cleansing, and exposure
of the population to mass starvation as valid reasons for military inter-
vention (International Commission 2001, 33). What, if anything, should
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we add? Just all human rights we find in the UN Declaration? And just
because they are found there? Is the reason the violations of these rights
allow for intervention just that they are accepted as human rights, what-
ever their justification might be? But then we are faced with the ques-
tion: Why should human rights be taken as rights that limit state sover-
eignty? What is it about them that makes them so important? I take it
that this has to be justified, that we indeed need good reasons for limit-
ing state sovereignty, the internal autonomy of a community. I cannot
see what the political conception could tell us here.
Charles Beitz argues in his book “The Idea of Human Rights” that
the current human rights practice has a certain normative authority: his
approach “claims for the practice a certain authority in guiding our
thinking about the nature of human rights” (Beitz 2009, 10).
But why should one accept this? Beitz gives us two reasons for ac-
cepting this: a) “the practice […] consumes a considerable amount of
human and other resources, and people tend to regard its norm with
great seriousness” and (b) the second reason is “that we have prima
facie reason to regard the practice of human rights as valuable” (ibid.,
11).
I do not see why we should see the fact that people take the official
human rights with great seriousness as a reason for the normative au-
thority of the practice. It is not the fact that people regard things
with great seriousness that provides them with a normative authority;
it is rather that there are reasons why things should be taken with
great seriousness which provide them with normative authority.
As regards the second point: Of course, the practice of human rights
is valuable, but again I cannot see why this should be seen as a reason for
assigning normative authority to the current practice. The practice is
valuable, because or insofar as the right things are done. Preventing gov-
ernments from torturing political opponents, from putting people in
prison without a fair trail, from treating people in degrading and inhu-
man ways, is without a doubt valuable. That it is valuable means: It is
what has to be done, it is about protecting rights that have to be pro-
tected. The human rights practice is valuable insofar as this is the case.
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3. Non-evaluative facts
Raz doubts whether all human rights can be justified – as some philos-
ophers think – only by non-contingent evaluative facts about human
beings (Raz 2010, 335). And, he thinks, in so far as this is impossible,
human rights are not universal rights, rights humans have in virtue of
them being human. I guess that this is one of the central ideas of a po-
litical conception of human rights. Let me consider two reasons for
doubting that all human rights are universal rights based on non-contin-
gent evaluative facts about humans:
a) The first reason has to do with the fact that the human rights we
have, as Charles Beitz puts it, “bear on nearly every dimension of a so-
ciety’s basic institutional structure, from protection against misuse of
state power to requirements for the political process, health and welfare
society and levels of compensation for work” (Beitz 2003). They are not
best interpreted as securing the minimal conditions of any decent human
life or, so one could add, they are not best interpreted by any other sin-
gle comparable justificatory idea.
b) The second reason has to do with the fact that some human
rights, it is argued, can only be established by contingent facts about
people. The rights people are supposed to have depend, as Raz thinks,
on the social and economic structure of a society, enabling people living
in these societies to value these rights. Others living in societies with dif-
ferent social and economic structures are not able to value the same
rights. And if this is the case, that is, if the same rights are not valued
by people due to a given economic and social structure, it is wrong
to assign to people living in these societies the same rights, Raz suggests.
“Typically rights are established by arguments about the value of having
them. Their existence depends on there being interests whose existence
warrants holding others subject to duties to protect and to promote
them” (Raz 2010, 335). Raz thinks that the right to education is a
good example: “Whether education […] is needed to meet that individ-
ual interest is itself a contingent matter” (ibid., 336). It depends on the
conditions in which people find themselves.
So the first problem has to do with the diversity of human rights, the
second with the diversity of what is valued by people due to certain
contingent facts.
As regards the first problem: The officially recognized human rights
indeed touch on different matters. But it is not clear what follows from
this for the justification of human rights. Even if they are concerned
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with very different matters: why should they all be taken as human
rights? They might not be based on just one basic non-contingent fea-
ture of human beings. But still, they need a justification different from
just saying that certain rights are taken to be human rights or taken to
be, as Beitz puts it, “standards appropriate to the institutions of modern
[…] societies coexisting in a global political economy in which human
beings face a series of predictable threats” (Beitz 2003, 44).
Why should they be seen as standards appropriate to the institutions
of modern societies? And why should they be seen as of international
concern? We need an answer to these questions that goes beyond the
reference to the common human rights practice. And this holds no mat-
ter whether such an answer refers to different justificatory ideas or just
one.
As regards the second objection: Indeed, certain rights can only be
implemented if certain social conditions are fulfilled. The realization of a
right to education depends on the existence of certain institutions
(schools, universities). Raz thinks that education is only of value to peo-
ple if these institutions exist. It might indeed be the case that education
is not actually valued by people living in such a society, but education
might nevertheless be of value to them. If so, they have reason to set up
those institutions. If education is an essential aspect of their life, it should
be protected by rights, independently of whether it is actually valued by
people or not.
In any case, the institutional background conditions for the realiza-
tion of rights are not the reasons for ascribing the rights concerned: It is
not that people have a right to basic education because there is an estab-
lished educational system. They have such a right, provided that this
protects an essential aspect of a human life. As I will argue below, rights
protect people’s normative authority over essential aspects of their lives.
In a society where functioning educational institutions do not exist, this
aspect of the normative authority over oneself might not be valued by
people. But education could nevertheless be valuable to them, and if this
is the case, people have reasons to build up educational institutions. And
I think that people have a right to education, provided that this right
protects people’s ability to exercise their normative authority. I will
come back to this point in section 6.
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4. Universal acceptance?
Human rights are rights, Charles Beitz tells us, “of international con-
cern” (Beitz 2009, 23). This is what he thinks human rights amount
to. But then, as stated above, this claim needs to be justified: Why
should human rights be of international concern? Defenders of the po-
litical conception of human rights have doubts whether such a justifica-
tion of human rights can be given, that is, whether we can justify
human rights in a way that is acceptable to all. And indeed, it is ques-
tionable whether a Kantian or a utilitarian or any other justification
will ever be acceptable to all, given the different cultural environments
people live in.
There is a unifying concept to be found in the official human rights
documents. The final declaration of the second International Confer-
ence of Human Rights in Vienna, which has been signed by 197 states,
says “that all human rights derive from the dignity and worth inherent in
the human person” (see Clapham 2006, 539). But then, one could say,
any interpretation of the term ‘dignity’, a term which is no doubt in
need of interpretation, will definitely be contested.
This is taken by the defenders of the political conception as a reason
not to be too worried about a justification of human rights. There are
many different justifications of these rights; the essential thing is, they
think, that we agree on a list of human rights that we take with great
seriousness. But this idea mixes the political and the moral view of
human rights. From a political point of view it is important that the of-
ficial human rights, or at least the essential ones, are taken seriously and
that they are accepted by the majority of states. From a political point of
view we should not worry why a government respects the right not be
tortured, for instance, whether they do this for certain religious or for
Kantian or for utilitarian reasons. Who cares? The essential thing polit-
ically is that states respect this and other human rights.
But I think that things look different from a moral point of view.
The fact that no justification will ever be acceptable for all cultures
does not mean that there is no valid justification of human rights.
Moral issues are not decided by democratic votes. A moral view is
not wrong because it is not accepted by most people. If people have
human rights, they have it for certain reasons. There are reasons for call-
ing certain rights human rights and for giving them a special normative
status. There are reasons why certain rights should be seen to be of in-
ternational concern, as Beitz puts it. We need to find out what these
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reasons are. We have to do this not just with regard to the intervention
issue, but also in order to be able to determine which rights are human
rights, that is, which rights are rights of international concern; why they
are of international concern and why they are so important.
5. Humanity
But how could rights be established as human rights? A natural and
widespread thought is that humans have these rights in virtue of their hu-
manity. Human rights are those rights they have insofar as they are hu-
mans. But this needs to be explained. Why should being human be a
reason for having rights? What is morally important about being
human? The term ‘humanity’ might refer to some non-evaluative and
at the same time non-contingent facts about human beings such as,
for instance, that they are capable of acting for reasons. But could this
fact provide us with a reason for assigning rights? The only right
which could follow would be the right that protects the capacity to
act for reasons. But how do we get from this to human rights such as
the right not be tortured or not to be the object of degrading treatment
or punishment or the right not be discriminated against? These rights do
not protect the capacity to act for reasons. That is to say, people have a
right not be tortured, but not because torture would threaten the ca-
pacity to act for reasons. Victims of torture are capable of acting for rea-
sons, and the same is true of people who are subjected to degrading
treatment as well as the victims of discrimination.
But probably the terms ‘humanity’ or just ‘human’ should be under-
stood in a different way. James Griffin thinks quite rightly that the word
‘human’ refers to the concept of agency, and more precisely to the con-
cept of “normative agency” (Griffin 2008, 45): He talks about “the view
that normative agency is the typical human condition” (ibid., 45). Hu-
mans act for reasons against a background of what they see as a good life,
that is, a conception of a worthwhile life. Hence it is suggested that
human rights protect people’s ability to pursue what they see as a
worthwhile life. They do not protect a worthwhile life, but rather the
ability to shape one’s life according to one’s own idea of a worthwhile
life.
But again, how do we get from here to the right not to be tortured,
the right not to be discriminated against? Victims of torture and dis-
crimination still have the ability to pursue their conception of a
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worthwhile life. It is obviously something else that is protected by the
right not to be tortured as well as by the other rights mentioned, for in-
stance, the right not to be discriminated against.
Griffin probably takes normative agency to mean not being domi-
nated or controlled by others, as is certainly the case when a person is
tortured. The right not to be tortured, one could argue, is based on
the fact that we attach a high value to this essential aspect of agency.
And it has been argued that this might be the point of human rights:
to protect what we consider to be very valuable. But the fact that some-
thing is valued by people does not lead to a corresponding right protect-
ing the valued object. I might value getting a higher salary, but this def-
initely does not establish a right to get one. It is also not a question of
attaching a high value to something. Being able to get a certain position
at the university might have a high value for me, but it does not establish
a right to get the position.
One might say that rights are not based on the fact that certain things
are valued by us, but rather on the fact that certain things are valuable for
us. They protect, one might say, basic aspects of what is valuable to us.
The normative fact is not that those things are valued by persons, but
rather that they are valuable for them. But do such normative facts gen-
erate rights, human rights? Not everything that is valuable for us does:
To get a certain job might be of high value to me, but this does not es-
tablish a right to get the job. The account of what is of value for us must
be more specific in order to lead us to rights. We might have any kind
of reason not to destroy, to protect and probably also to promote what is
valuable for people. Values provide us with reasons, but rights do more,
they provide us with duties. What generates the duties that correspond
to human rights?
6. A basic right
It might be a basic moral right that generates universal human rights. First
of all, the justification of human rights can only be done by normative
facts. Reasons to ascribe rights are provided by things that are valuable,
important or themselves rights. A basic right would be a normative
property people have, and in addition a normative property that is
able to provide us with reasons for rights. But which basic moral
right could serve this role?
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It might be helpful to have a look at official human rights docu-
ments. As I’ve already said, the declaration of the second World Con-
ference on Human Rights 1993 in Vienna states “that all human rights
derive from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person”. The
preamble of another human rights treaty, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, also tells us that all rights of the Covenant de-
rive from the inherent dignity of the human person. Thus, inherent dig-
nity might be taken as such a basic moral right on which all other
human rights are based. The concept of dignity, of course, needs ex-
planation. What does inherent dignity mean?
One could say that it means something that is violated when people
are subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The victims are
treated as if they did not count, that is, as if they had no say over what is
done to them. Inhuman and degrading treatment of people amounts to
denying that they have their own normative authority, which might just
be the basic right people have. Inherent dignity might be taken as hav-
ing normative authority over essential aspects of one’s own life, provided
that this is what paradigmatic violations of human dignity such as inhu-
man and degrading treatment amount to.
But what does it mean to have such a normative authority? It means
being authorized to stand up for certain things: to be treated or not
treated in certain ways. It also means having a say in deciding your
own destiny, having a say as far as it is in your power to determine
what happens to you. Thus, it is the right to decide for yourself con-
cerning what is done with your own body and mind. It is the right
to decide what job you’re going to have, with whom you are going
to live, whom you will get married to, what books you are going to
write, etc.
Normative authority also includes the right to exclude others from
using your person for their purposes. It is also the right to authorize oth-
ers to do to certain things with you. Respecting people’s normative au-
thority is, one could say, respecting their right to be a sovereign person.
Acts of humiliation, degradation or torture violate this sovereignty of
people. When humans are humiliated, they are treated as if they did
not count, as if they could be used at will.
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7. Deriving human rights
Recognizing that others have a normative authority over their lives has
certain normative implications: It provides us with reasons to assign fur-
ther rights to humans. If I have a normative authority over myself, I also
have the right to exercise my normative authority. Thus, I have rights to
those goods and capacities that are required to do so. I have the right to
use my body and mind the way I want to use them. And I’m able to do
this if I have options. Thus, in order to exercise my normative author-
ity, I need options. But I think I need more than just any options: What
I need are acceptable options: that is, options I have reason to choose. If
you are faced with options you have no reason to choose, that is to
say, you would never choose if you were not forced to, you are not
choosing. If I have a right to exercise my normative authority over
my life, I also need rights which protect acceptable options: Rights pro-
tect the options people have. My right would remain unfulfilled if I had
no acceptable options. This would be the case, for example, if I had to
live a life in absolute poverty. My right over myself could not be exer-
cised. If I have a right to exercise my normative authority, I can demand
of others to provide me with acceptable options. Thus, dignity provides
us with reasons to assign further rights, namely all those rights required
to protect options we need to exercise the basic moral right which I take
to be what inherent dignity means: to have normative authority over
oneself.
Different human rights protect the normative authority of people:
the right to liberty and security, the right not be held in slavery or ser-
vitude (Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), the
right not to be tortured and degraded (Article 5), the right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion (Article 18), the right to freedom of
opinion and expression (Article 19) and others. The normative authority
is also protected by social human rights such as, for instance, the right to
an adequate standard of living (Article 25) or the right to basic education
(Article 26). The normative authority over essential aspects of one’s life
can only be exercised if one has access to basic goods as well as to the
development of basic capacities. Thus, a normative authority over one-
self as a basic moral right could lead us to other rights we have as hu-
mans. Of course, the idea of a basic moral right to have normative au-
thority over essential aspects of one’s own life needs to be elaborated in a
way which cannot be done here. But I think it is a way worth pursuing:
to base human rights on a basic moral right of persons, namely the right
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to have a normative authority over essential aspects over one’s own life,
that is, the right to be an independent being and recognized as such.
In taking this path, we should not be worried by the political aspects
of human rights: whether they are universally accepted, whether they
guide the current human rights practice. Human rights might be
about respecting the basic moral right to have and to exercise your nor-
mative authority. This might in the end lead us to a theory of human
rights that could explain why human rights are so important, and
even “why”, as Raz puts it, “all and only such rights should be recog-
nised as setting limits to sovereignty” (Raz 2010, 334) and thus why
they should be respected by all governments. I do not know whether
all rights we find in the Universal Declaration can be justified by refer-
ence to this basic moral right. Some of them might not be justified this
way; but then, it could well be the case that some of the official rights
should as a matter of fact not be seen as human rights. But I think it is a
promising way of providing us with reasons for establishing rights of in-
ternational concern, that is, rights we all have to care about. This would
be a traditional or moral theory of human rights and not a political one.
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The political and moral conceptions of human rights
– a mixed account
Erasmus Mayr
1. Introduction1
One of the central issues in the modern human rights debate is the con-
troversy over whether human rights should be primarily conceived as
moral rights or as politico-legal concepts. Moral conceptions of
human rights, developing themes from classical and modern natural
law theory, typically take human rights to be moral rights which
every human being possesses qua member of the human species. As
Alan Gewirth put it : “We may assume, as true by definition, that
human rights are rights that all persons have simply insofar as they are
human” (Gewirth 1982, 41). Adherents of the moral conceptions typ-
ically try to derive these rights from central features of human nature or
basic human interests. There exists, however, a considerable latitude in
both the number and kinds of features and interests that are thought to
provide the basis for human rights.2
Political conceptions of human rights, on the other hand, take their
cue from the current, especially post-WWII human rights discourse and
international practice, to whose central strands, they believe, every phil-
osophical conception of human rights must do justice in order to qualify
as an adequate conception.3 Accordingly, they see human rights essen-
tially as individual rights that limit the sovereignty of states and whose
infringement by state agencies is a cause of international concern and,
possibly, a reason for intervention. According to John Rawls, the first
prominent proponent of the political conception, “[h]uman rights are
1 For helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper I am indebted to Elif
Özmen and Erich Ammereller.
2 See the debate between Griffin and Tasioulas as to how many fundamental
human rights should be posited, cf. Tasioulas 2002; Griffin 2008, 51 ff.
3 Cf. Beitz’s description of what he calls his “practical conception” of human
rights (Beitz 2009, 102 ff.).
a class of rights that play a special role in a reasonable Law of Peoples:
they restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and they
specify limits to a regime’s internal autonomy.”4 Human rights viola-
tions need not always fully justify international sanctions and interven-
tions, but they necessarily provide pro tanto reasons for other states to
take interventive measures, and this provision is, conceptually, part of
what it is for a right to be a “human right” (cf. Raz 2010; Beitz
2009, 109).
At first glance, the difference between the two approaches may ap-
pear to be extreme, and it may even seem that both kinds of conceptions
are not engaged in the same kind of enterprise. While moral concep-
tions seem to be engaged in the normative enquiry as to what moral rights
human beings possess qua human beings, political conceptions appear to
address the primarily descriptive task of providing a conceptualization of
current human rights practice. If this were true, then moral conceptions,
though able to justify human rights independently of the current prac-
tice, might, for this very reason, have no impact on this practice, while
political conceptions, though directly connected to this practice, might
lack critical potential with regard to it.5 But both impressions would be
mistaken: Adherents of the moral conceptions can well consider what
John Tasioulas has called “fidelity” to the current practice as a key re-
quirement of any conception of human rights6, while on the other
hand features of the current practice can well be criticized on the
basis of a political conception (cf. Beitz 2009, 105f.), for instance if a
putative right accepted in international human rights conventions is
not really of sufficient weight for its violation to provide pro tanto rea-
sons for international intervention. Thus, adherents of both conceptions
can both intend to relate their conceptions meaningfully to current
human rights practice and, at the same time, to retain some critical po-
tential in relation to it.
Similarly, the impression that political conceptions only attempt to
provide an answer to the conceptual question of what it is for a right
to be a human right, while moral conceptions additionally address the
further questions of how human rights are justified and whence their
4 Rawls 1999, 79. A different kind of political conception, which focuses on the
function of human rights as legal rights within the national legal order, is devel-
oped by Habermas 1992, 136, based on his strict separation of law and morals.
5 This worry is also raised by Gilabert 2011, 15.
6 Cf. John Tasioulas “On the Nature of Human Rights”, in this volume, 18.
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normative force derives,7 should be resisted. While it is true that, on the
moral conception, the connection between the question about the na-
ture of human rights and the explanation of their normative force is par-
ticularly close, adherents of the political conception regularly say some-
thing about the question of justification as well. Indeed, their accounts
of the nature of human rights impose constraints on the possible justi-
fication of such rights, and often they have tried to demonstrate how
these constraints can be met.
Although, accordingly, both the moral and the political conception
are engaged in the same enterprise and address the same normative is-
sues, the differences between both conceptions still seem to be quite
stark. The most important points of divergence concern the following
three questions:
(1) Are human rights part of individual morality or of political mor-
ality, i. e. do they only concern the conduct of political institutions? If,
as it is claimed by the moral conception, human rights are rights held by
human beings as such, the corresponding duties must (also) be part of
individual morality, and these duties would have to apply to actions ir-
respective of any political setting within which they take place. If, how-
ever, human rights are essentially rights limiting state sovereignty, they
are primarily objects of political morality, which need not necessarily
impose duties on individuals unless the latter perform public functions.8
The answer to this first question is crucial for determining which
group of agents can violate human rights and bears duties for their safe-
guarding. According to the moral conception, human rights are just a
subclass of moral rights imposing duties on individuals; therefore indi-
viduals can, unproblematically, violate such rights9 and are, by way of
obligations to help others, themselves the direct bearers of duties for
safeguarding these rights. These two points are contested by a “statist”
(Beitz 2009, 122; cf. also Nickel 2007, 38f.) or “institutional”
(Pogge) view of human rights. Thomas Pogge, for instance, insists
that violations of human rights necessarily involve “official disrespect”
(Pogge 2002, 58), and argues that ascribing a human right to person
7 Cf. Beitz’s (2009, 103) claim that moral conceptions “treat the question of the
authority of human rights as internal to the question of their nature.”
8 Cf. Raz’s (2010, 335) characterization of human rights as rights “which tran-
scend private morality.”
9 Cf. Orend 2002, 133. Koller 1998, 100f., argues that human rights must im-
pose duties on individuals, for otherwise states would have no reasons for en-
forcing them.
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P primarily implies claims about how the society in which P lives should
be organized (ibid., 64f.). Insofar as human right claims do entail moral
duties for individuals, for Pogge, these duties are only indirect and con-
cern the individuals’ contributing to a structure of society in which per-
sons are protected from certain harms. Beitz insists that states are both
the primary “subjects” of the duties derived from human rights and
the principal guarantors in case of violations by other states. Whereas
moral conceptions of human rights are directly at odds with an “institu-
tional” or “statist” understanding of human rights, political conceptions,
while not implying such a view per se,10 are clearly compatible with it.
(2) The (relative) (a)historicity of human rights. If we look at Rawls’
characterization of human rights, it seems clear that the existence of
such rights presupposes a system of states11 whose relations with each
other are either already governed by a Law of Peoples or, at least, can
meaningfully be subjected to it. Therefore, the existence of something
like the current system of states functions as an implicit background as-
sumption for a political conception of human rights such as Rawls’.
Consequently, on such a conception, ascribing human rights would
not make sense either historically at a time where no system of states
comparable to the present one existed, or in a hypothetical situation
where all states have merged into one global state.
Against this conclusion, moral conceptions argue for a much more
temporally extended, if not even timeless ascribability of human rights.
While Tasioulas argues against a timeless existence of human rights, and
wants to restrict their validity to the obtaining of the conditions of
“modernity” (Tasioulas 2007, 76) – which still gives human rights a
much wider span of ‘existence’ than they have on the Rawlsian concep-
tion – philosophers like Griffin argue for the existence of some abstract
10 Political conceptions are only committed to the claim that what distinguishes
human rights from other rights is that they impose limits to state sovereignty;
this does not exclude that some rights both impose such limits and directly gen-
erate individual moral duties on the part of other persons (see below).
11 Officially, for Rawls, the actors to which the Law of Peoples is meant to apply
are peoples rather than states, cf. esp. 1999, §2. However, the sovereignty-lim-
iting function of human rights is best spelled out in terms of the duties of states
or “regimes”; cf. Rawls own formulation “specify limits to a regime’s internal
autonomy”, 1999, 79.
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timeless rights, which, according to the specific circumstances of differ-
ent epochs, may take on different forms.12
(3) The conditions for justifying human rights claims. For moral
conceptions, justifying a human rights claim requires showing that a
person possesses a moral right simply in virtue of being a human
being. In other words, what distinguishes the justification of human
rights from the justification of other rights is a certain restriction on
how the rights-claim can be justified, i. e. the justification must not
rely on characteristics a person does not have simply in virtue of
being human. For political conceptions, a human rights claim is justified
by showing that the person possesses an individual right that limits the
sovereignty of states and whose infringement is a cause for international
concern. The reasons justifying the rights claim may, but need not, ac-
cording to all political conceptions, necessarily be moral reasons. What is
distinctive about the justification of human rights claims is, therefore,
not a restriction on possible ways of justification, but an additional char-
acteristic of the alleged right which must be justified. That is, on the po-
litical conception, the distinction is based on what must be justified,
rather than on how this is justified.
While points (1) to (3) undoubtedly state key points of divergence
between adherents of the moral and political conceptions, one might
still be doubtful whether we are not overstating the differences between
the two positions. True, it might be conceded, when we look at para-
digmatic proponents of these positions, such as Rawls or Gewirth, there
will be considerable disagreement on all these points, as well as on oth-
ers. But the differences will begin to dwindle once we look at political
conceptions which claim that human rights are a subclass of individual
moral rights, such as Joseph Raz’s theory. Theories of this latter kind
combine key elements of both the moral and the political conception,
and in looking at them we may well begin to wonder whether there
is really a substantial question at issue between adherents of the two con-
ceptions.
As I will try to argue, however, there remain important points of
contention between the two conceptions, which concern, primarily,
the questions of how human rights are to be distinguished from other
individual rights and what is required for justifying human rights claims.
With regard to both these questions, I believe, there are clear advantages
12 Griffin 2008, 49f. Griffin admits, though, that the applicability of human rights
could be restricted to human agents in society.
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for adherents of a moderate version of the political conception, such as
Raz’s: Human rights are indeed to be distinguished by their function of
limiting state sovereignty. But in developing a viable version of the po-
litical conception we must be careful both to connect the external limit-
ing function, which has been stressed by Rawls, with an internal limit-
ing function, which is both systematically and historically more funda-
mental, and not to lose sight of the connection between the rise of the
modern state and the development of human rights theories. Spelling out
the way in which human rights essentially limit the authority of the
modern state will show that, even though they are singled out essentially
by their political function, accepting human rights claims is not tied to
the existence of an international system of states, nor even to the exis-
tence of states at all. And it will further rehabilitate the project of adher-
ents of the moral conception, namely that of showing that there is a sub-
stantive list of rights possessed universally by human beings per se, when
we see that universality of human rights is required to ground an obli-
gation of other states, or of the international community, to interfere to
protect human rights. So the account of human rights that I am going to
argue for can aptly be called a mixed account: While it follows a mod-
erate version of the political conception with regard to the distinguish-
ing characteristic of human rights, it concedes that human rights can
only be ascribed the role they have in international practice today if
many of the central claims of adherents of the moral conceptions are
true.
In the following, I will begin by briefly looking at three main expo-
nents of the two conceptions: James Griffin as a defender of the moral
conception, John Rawls as an exponent of what might be called the
strictly political conception, and Joseph Raz, who has developed a mod-
erate version of the latter. I will then go on to show why the moral con-
ception fails to offer a convincing answer to the conceptual question of
what distinguishes human rights from other individual rights, before
turning to the task of developing a viable version of the political con-
ception. In the final section, I’ll look at some consequences of this theo-
ry, especially with regard to the justification of human right claims.
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2. Griffin, Rawls, Raz
Though Griffin views his project in On Human Rights as situated within
what he calls the “Enlightenment Project on Human Rights” (Griffin
2008, 9), which he connects to the moral conception, his version of
the latter is a considerable development from the traditional version as
expressed by Gewirth’s dictum quoted earlier. Human rights, for Grif-
fin, are not just rights possessed by human beings per se, but essentially
“protections of our human standing or […] personhood” (ibid., 33),
whose centerpiece is what Griffin calls the capacity for “normative
agency”. The latter comprises the following three basic elements:
To be an agent, in the fullest sense of which we are capable, one must (first)
choose one’s path through life – that is, not be dominated or controlled by
someone or something else (call it “autonomy”). And (second) one’s choice
must be real ; one must have at least a certain minimum education and in-
formation. And having chosen, one must then be able to act; that is, one
must have at least the minimum provision of resources and capabilities
that it takes (call all of this “minimum provision”). And none of this is
any good if someone blocks one; so (third) others must also not forcibly
stop one from pursuing what one sees as a worthwhile life (call this “liber-
ty”) (ibid., 33).
Personhood is, however, not the only ground for human rights. For
while the content and extent of some rights can be fixed in a sufficiently
determinate manner simply by reference to their function of protecting
one of the basic features of personhood – such as in the case of the right
not to be tortured – this is not generally true: In most cases, this func-
tion alone does not give a sufficiently clear-cut rationale for what spe-
cific protections are to be included within the content of the right and
which not, though such a rationale is clearly necessary for applying the
rights in practice. We have to know not only what interest is supposed
to be protected by a right, but also what it is supposed to be a right to, in
order for the right to play an action-guiding role. Precisely determining
the exact boundaries of a right is particularly difficult when the rights of
one person are in potential conflict with the rights or essential interests
of others. To give rights a tolerably determinate content in such cases,
Griffin introduces the notion of “practicalities”, which are to serve as
the second ground for human rights. “Practicalities” are “features of
human nature and of the nature of human societies”, knowledge of
which is required to make rights “socially manageable” (ibid., 38).
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From the three basic features of personhood together with practical-
ities, it is possible, according to Griffin, to derive most of the conven-
tionally accepted human rights. Many specific human rights, such as the
right to a free press, will not turn out to be truly universal on this ac-
count, as Griffin recognizes; for, depending on historical circumstances,
they may simply have no point in some social settings. However, the
more abstract human rights from which they are derived by applying
those abstract rights to particular historical and social circumstances
can claim universality, at least within all human societies. As we have
seen, the most abstract rights protect the standing of a human being as
a normative agent, or self-decider – and this standing is in danger of vi-
olation, and in need of protection by human rights, in any social setting
whatsoever (ibid., 49f.).
What Griffin regards as essential for human rights – that they are
moral rights protecting the status of personhood – becomes, on the strict
version of the political conception proposed by John Rawls in The Law
of Peoples, an accidental property of human rights at best. Rawls first in-
troduces the notion of human rights into his account of the law of peo-
ples when wondering which principles of international justice liberal so-
cieties might agree upon when put into an original position analogous
to the one envisaged for deciding on the basic principles of justice with-
in a society in his Theory of Justice (Rawls 1999, 37). However, the no-
tion becomes truly important only when Rawls extends his account of
the law of peoples to cover a society not only of liberal, but also of “de-
cent” hierarchical peoples. The rules of international justice are gener-
ated, according to Rawls, by constructing an original position among
decent peoples, which includes not just liberal peoples but also societies
which are hierarchically ordered, i. e. do not accord their members all
the rights conceded by liberal states, but that are nevertheless “decent”
because they are – outwardly – non-aggressive, and because – inwardly
– they safeguard their members’ human rights and impose moral duties
and obligations on all persons within their territories and their law-ad-
ministering officials reasonably believe that the law is guided by a com-
mon idea of justice (ibid. 64ff.). The principles such peoples would
agree upon, in the original position, would include, according to
Rawls, a rule excluding forceful intervention by other states, subject
to the proviso that a state does not violate human rights.
Thus, human rights, in Rawls’ account, have a twofold function:
Firstly, their fulfillment is necessary for a society to qualify as “decent”
in the sense of the law of peoples, and secondly their fulfillment is –
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alongside a lack of outward aggression – sufficient to exclude outside in-
tervention; or, to put it differently, human rights are the only individual
rights whose violation gives pro tanto grounds for international inter-
vention (ibid., 80). As these are the only features that essentially qualify
human rights, the list of human rights Rawls accepts is considerably
shorter than the lists accepted in the traditional moral conception (cf.
ibid., 65). Furthermore, human rights as envisaged by Rawls need
not be moral rights. Rawls especially stresses that their inclusion in
the Law of Peoples cannot rest on any specific moral argument – for
this would base them on a comprehensive doctrine, which would be in-
compatible with their general acceptance in the original position. In-
stead, the justification for these rights rests only on the (supposed) fact
that decent societies in the original position would accept both the ne-
cessity for their protection and the possibility of intervention against
their violations. And this justification does not guarantee that the rights
of individuals picked out in this way will be moral rights of these indi-
viduals.13
The account of Joseph Raz, which follows Rawls in claiming that
“setting limits to sovereignty […] is the predominant mark of human
rights” (Raz 2010, 334), parts company with him in acknowledging
that human rights are moral individual rights. (For this reason one can
call Raz’s position a moderate version of the political conception.)
Still, human rights are only a sub-class of these moral individual rights,
and are singled out among the latter by their function with regard to
their political and institutional impact and the claim to institutional rec-
ognition transcending private morality – and not, as Raz stresses, by the
fact that they are possessed by human beings per se, nor by their univer-
sality (ibid., 334 ff). (Nor by the fact that they protect essential features
of personhood.)
Justifying a human rights claim, for Raz, involves three steps: First,
an individual right must be established in the first place (e. g. by showing
how it is required for the satisfaction of some individual interest). Sec-
ond, it must be demonstrated that, under certain conditions, states are
obliged to respect and protect this right. And last, it must be shown
13 It is important not to be misled into a moral reading by Rawls’ description of
the relevant societies as “decent”. As “decent” societies are, for him, partly de-
fined by their acceptance of human rights, it is clearly not possible to derive an
independent moral justification for these rights from the fact that they are ac-
cepted by such societies.
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that, with regard to this respect and protection, states should not enjoy
the immunity from interference which the doctrine of state sovereignty
normally accords to states with regard to their internal affairs.14
3. Between the moral and the political conception
Comparing Raz’s version of the political conception and a refined ver-
sion of the moral conception might well make one wonder whether the
two theories are really fundamentally opposed to one another. True,
both theories insist on different contents of the concept “human rights”
and on different standards of justification of human right claims. But
might not both approaches eventually converge and thus be combined
into a unified account of human rights? E.g., to take Griffin’s and Raz’s
theories, are not rights protecting personhood the ideal candidates, if
there are any, for individual rights whose violation is sufficiently impor-
tant to give cause for international concern? Would this not yield an at-
tractive ‘division of labor’ between both approaches, presumably vindi-
cating to some extent the (erroneous) impression mentioned earlier that
the political conception is primarily concerned with the conceptual
question and the moral conception primarily concerned with the ques-
tion of justification of human rights claims?
While a positive answer to these questions would, undoubtedly,
have many attractions, it is unfortunately not available, because this
‘convergence’ of both approaches cannot be expected. The role of rights
possessed by human beings per se within an adequate theory of human
rights is more complex, as we will see in the final section of the paper.
3.1 The failure of the moral conception
The moral conception is faced with a number of interrelated worries,
the most important of which is the Irrelevance Objection, which has
been raised by Raz (ibid., 327f.) and goes as follows: If adherents of
this conception want their theories to have any relevance for and impact
on current human rights practice, they must aim at “fidelity” (Tasioulas)
14 Raz 2010, 336. There is a parallel to the three-step procedure for justifying
human rights claims Beitz proposes, 2009, 137, though Beitz’s procedure in-
volves no step for deriving rights from interests.
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to the main features of this practice. For, otherwise, though they may
well succeed in establishing human right claims independently of this
practice, e. g. by singling out a criterion X fulfillment of which qualifies
a right as a human right, it would be unclear why any divergence be-
tween these claims and the human rights claims actually accepted in cur-
rent practice should be considered as a fault in the latter and should give
rise to rational pressure to modify it so that it accords with the human
right claims on the basis of criterion X.
Among the chief features of the current practice is, indisputably, the
role ascribed to human rights in international law, viz. that their viola-
tions give grounds for international concern and, possibly, humanitarian
intervention. Each theory fulfilling the “fidelity” constraint must estab-
lish that all human rights do or should have this international role. Of
course, one cannot, without begging the question at issue against the
moral conception, require that this has to come out as a conceptual
truth on any adequate theory; but such a theory must at least, by and
large, “extensionally” fulfill this requirement.
Now, when one considers the moral conception’s traditional crite-
rion for a right to qualify as a human right, i. e. that it is a right possessed
by every human being as such, it is quite implausible to assume that the
class of rights singled out in this way should either completely or ap-
proximately overlap with the class of individual rights whose violations
would give ground for international concern. This difficulty is particu-
larly glaring if we look at the ‘simple’ version of the moral conception,
such as expressed in Gewirth’s dictum. Even when we presuppose that
the task of singling out those rights which are possessed by human be-
ings as such can be resolved, it is very hard to see why the violation of
these rights, in comparison with the violation of other rights, should
generally be of such a greater weight that it would justify their special
role in international law.
Two kinds of rights possessed by human beings as such provide par-
ticularly strong grounds for skepticism. First, there are very trivial moral
rights that are possessed by everybody:15 E.g. when I play cards with
you, I have the moral right not to be cheated by you, and this right
can be derived from my standing as a person and the moral duty of re-
spect you owe to me in virtue of this standing. So, presumably, it is a
right I have qua person. Nevertheless, it is not plausibly a human
right, for it is clearly not a right whose violation – either by you, or
15 Following example from Griffin 2008, 41.
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by the state when it fails to protect me from your cheating – provides a
pro tanto reason for international concern. Even though states should do
something to protect people against being cheated in private card circles,
and even if there were no decisive practical obstacles, or costs to others,
involved in doing so, it is not a failing of sufficient weight to provide
grounds for international concern. For the whole point of the idea of
sovereignty in international law is to protect states against the ‘butting
in’ of other states or international agencies for minor injustices or failures
to protect its citizens. And if we were to renounce the idea that states
can legitimately reject some outside interference into their internal af-
fairs, even when they have failed to fully live up to the standards of po-
litical justice, we would have altogether rejected the institution of state
sovereignty as it presently exists in international law; and an account of
human rights that was based on this rejection of sovereignty could hard-
ly count as exhibiting “fidelity” to current human rights practice.
The second kind of case involves moral rights possessed by human
beings per se that cannot be enforced or protected by state agencies.
Take the right to gratitude for beneficiary acts one has performed. Ob-
viously, it would be perfectly senseless for state agencies to enforce such
a right, if only because such enforcement would be self-confuting: No
action enforced by state agencies could count as a fulfillment of the
moral right to gratitude. These moral rights, which for reasons of prin-
ciple resist transformation into institutional or legal rights, cannot play
the roles assigned to them by the current human rights practice. So, if
“fidelity” to current human rights practice is a desideratum for which
rights can count as human rights, these rights cannot be considered as
human rights, though they would qualify as human rights on the crite-
rion defended by the traditional view of the moral conception.
These cases provide strong grounds for thinking that there will be
considerable extensional divergence between rights possessed by
human beings as such and rights whose violation gives grounds for in-
ternational concern. But once we accept such divergence, the Irrele-
vance Objection becomes pressing: Why should we adjust our current
human rights practice to fit a criterion the fulfillment of which does not
guarantee one of the central roles of human rights in the current prac-
tice?
Now, an adherent of the moral conception might respond at this
point that he need not ascribe human rights merely on the basis of
moral rights or of interests shared by all human beings as such, but
that only rights possessed by all human beings as such that fulfill further
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conditions qualify as human rights. One important condition of this
kind would be a “threshold of importance” condition: Only rights
whose protection is sufficiently crucial to its bearer can count as
human rights. Therefore, completely trivial individual rights, even
when possessed by all human beings as such, need not qualify as
human rights, nor need the right to gratitude if its implementation
would be self-defeating.
However, there is one major difficulty for this kind of response.
When an adherent of the moral conception spells out the additional
conditions, in particular a “threshold of importance” condition, he
seems to be faced with the following dilemma: Either these conditions
make explicit or implicit reference to these interests having sufficient
weight to limit state sovereignty – but then the proposal turns out to
be a version of the political conception in disguise. Or else these con-
ditions lack such reference – but then it’s hard to see how the original
difficulty is overcome, i. e. how the gap between what qualifies as a
human right on the proposed criterion and what is to play the role
human rights do in fact play in contemporary international law is to
be bridged. Call this the Threshold Objection16 to the moral concep-
tion.
These considerations provide a strong case for the claim that the
‘simple’ version of the moral conception, which simply equates
human rights with individual rights possessed by human beings per se,
will not succeed in fulfilling the “fidelity” constraint, because the class
of rights that would qualify as human rights according to this version
would not even approximately coincide with the class of individual
rights whose violations provide grounds for international concern.
However, it is not immediately clear whether the same kind of criti-
cism also applies to more sophisticated versions of the moral conception
such as Griffin’s, which considers human rights to be rights that protect
the essential ingredients and preconditions of personhood and “norma-
tive agency” (see 2.). E.g., the objection based on trivial rights obviously
fails to apply here, because these rights do not protect their bearers’ es-
sential standing as persons and self-determining actors. With regard to
the second kind of case mentioned above – individual moral rights
that resist transformation into legal rights, such as the right to gratitude
we have considered earlier – Griffin can appeal to his second ground for
16 Also Raz 2010, 325f., criticizes the moral conception (in Griffin’s version) for
its inability to spell out in a principled way minimal standards for human rights.
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human rights, practicalities. Knowledge of human nature and society
will tell us that such rights are no good candidates for legal enforcement.
But there are two central difficulties remaining for Griffin’s account.
The first, as Raz has argued, lies in dealing with the Threshold Objec-
tion. As we have seen, Griffin is faced with the task of giving a clear-cut
formula for which rights protect essential ingredients and preconditions
of personhood. In attempting to provide such a formula, he is “torn”
between two different poles: On the one hand, he could restrict the
class of human rights to those rights whose enjoyment is essential for
bare human status, or for the bare status as an intentional agent. And, of-
ficially, that is the course he is taking: “they are rights not to anything
that promotes human good or flourishing, but merely to what is needed
for human status”.17 However, de facto, Griffin believes that he can
qualify a much larger class of rights as human rights than those rights
which protect bare intentional agency; e. g. he also includes the right
to education within his list of human rights. But as these further rights
cannot be plausibly seen as rights protecting the essentials of person-
hood, Griffin, who explicitly does not want the class of human rights
to coincide with the class of individual rights tout court, needs some
principled way to distinguish among those rights that do not merely
protect bare personhood. He attempts to do so by adding the proviso
“minimal” to the content of those further rights – but that is hardly a
principled distinction.18 The only way to draw this distinction in a
17 Griffin 2008, 34. Again, in Griffin 2010, 348, he insists that “being a normative
agent” is a threshold term.
18 For this criticism cf. Raz 2010, 326. Griffin 2010, 348, in his answer to Raz,
argues that in order to draw the dividing line between states below the thresh-
old of normative agency and states at or above it, “we should consider the gen-
eral run of people” and “we should focus on the conditions necessary to ensure
that this general run of people will be at or above the threshold.” At least gen-
eral literacy, Griffin argues, will, on this criterion, be required, because in some
parts of the world literacy “is the most efficient way of reducing infant mortal-
ity”. While this answer, arguably, goes some way to drawing the distinction in a
more principled way, it is still not fully convincing: For it has the consequence
that the status of the right to basic literacy does not derive from the interests of
the right-bearers themselves, but from the interests of other persons (e. g. new-
born or future infants). So, it turns out, on Griffin’s new strategy, human rights
do not always, or even essentially, protect the status of the right-bearer as a nor-
mative agent! And this is hardly compatible with the traditional view of human
rights as founded in the interests and needs of the right-bearers themselves, to
which Griffin wants to do justice in his account.
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way that guarantees fulfillment of the “fidelity” constraint, it seems, is to
add some requirement of the form that violation of these rights by state
agencies should be sufficiently serious to justify international concern.
But doing so would amount to espousing a version of the political con-
ception of human rights.
The second central difficulty for Griffin springs from the question of
how to account for the historical ‘growth’ in human rights lists. The
group of particular human rights accepted almost generally today (and
accepted by Griffin himself) contains many rights that would have
been either absurd or pointless to posit as human rights in the 17th or
18th century, such as a general right to literacy. If Griffin were right
in his assumption that human rights are “minimal” protections of per-
sonhood and that the elements of personhood itself are timeless in the
way described, the explanation for this change could only lie in a change
in the historical circumstances,19 for personhood itself is the same for
people then and now. Two possible changes, it seems, could explain
an expansion: The rise of new threats to personhood, and the enlarged
ability of other people, or the state, to deal with those threats. But while
for some human rights, the expansion could be explained in this way –
e.g. for the right of freedom of the press – such an explanation is not
plausible for all rights.
Take the right for elementary education, for instance, as possessed
by an illiterate peasant in a remote and isolated rural region in the
Andes whose social and economic structure has changed little since
the 17th century. Certainly, even without elementary education, this
peasant is able not only to be a true self-determiner20 – within limita-
tions, of course, but this applies to everyone – but even to live a decent
and happy life. This was as true of many illiterate peasants in the 17th
century as it is now. However, in the 17th century, it would have
been pointless to assume that the peasant had a human right to elemen-
tary education – not only due to both the lack of an institution to pro-
vide universal elementary education and the comparatively much small-
er need for literate working people than nowadays, but also because he
could be a normative agent without it. If we look at the peasant’s situa-
tion today, we see differences in external circumstances, which, as Grif-
fin would say, allow us to derive his right to elementary education from
19 Rather than in a change of what Griffin 2008, 38 calls “practicalities”, for these
latter are supposed to be more general features.
20 As Griffin himself accepts, 2010, 348.
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his more abstract right to autonomy. But as we have constructed the
case, the change in external circumstances has no relation to the peas-
ant’s own life – to how he determines (or not) what course of life to
pursue! How, then, could it relate to new threats to his standing as a
normative agent, or how could there be old threats to this status
which could now better be safeguarded against? But if there are no
such threats, how could the change in outward circumstances justify a
new human rights claim?
The correct analysis of this case seems to be the following: What
provides the grounds for ascribing the right to elementary education
to the peasant now are basic considerations of equality: It is a grave
mark of disrespect to persons to treat them unequally with regard to im-
portant interests, even when these are not essential to normative agency,
because this at least implicitly shows that one denies them equal moral
status with others. Griffin explicitly excludes equality as a third ground
of human rights in addition to the protection of personhood and prac-
ticalities (Griffin 2008, 44). But equality-based considerations do have
an independent role to play in justifying human rights. This role, how-
ever, is not one adherents of the moral conception can easily capture:
For demands of equality arise as often from considerations about the
particular agent who is acting and his special characteristics as they do
from considerations about the nature of the person towards whom
the agent is acting. In other words, considerations of equality are as
often agent-based as they are patient-based. Some demands on what
the agent must do follow only from the particular agent he is and
what he can do overall. For instance, an individual human being in
his private dealings can well display a significant amount of partiality;
he is not required to treat “equal things equally”, and can, at least to
a certain degree, act according to his own principles or even arbitrary
preferences. E.g. when deciding which charities I’ll support I am per-
fectly at liberty to pick out those whose religious background I can
identify with or even to choose at my whim. This kind of partiality
or arbitrariness is, however, considered illegitimate in actions of state
agencies: State officials are not allowed to base state support for private
charitable organizations on their own sympathies or their religious back-
ground. And much less are they allowed to let such considerations in-
fluence their decisions when then intervene in people’s rights.
Looking at such cases, and keeping in mind that the state is a special
kind of agent, both with respect to the extent of its power and to its
claim to legitimacy in exerting force, it is very plausible to assume
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that, for the state, there exist special kinds of demands that derive only
from the kind of agent it is – in particular concerning which consider-
ations it can legitimately base its decisions on. And it is equally plausible
to expect that these specific kinds of demands will be relevant to human
rights claims. But insofar as these demands are linked to the special kind
of agent a state is, it is very hard to see how adherents of the moral con-
ception, who only focus on the human person vis-à-vis whom the state
or another agent is acting, can adequately capture these specific de-
mands.
If these considerations are correct, they show that even a more so-
phisticated version of the moral conception, such as Griffin’s, cannot
evade the Irrelevance Objection without somehow taking into account
the special status of the state as an agent sui generis if they want to fulfill
the “fidelity” constraint. But it is very hard to see how they can do so
without covertly accepting the central tenet of the political conception
of human rights, namely that there is a conceptual connection between
what makes a right a human right and its imposing requirements on the
state. We can therefore conclude that a moral conception developed
along the lines of the traditional conception cannot provide for the re-
quired overlap between the rights it singles out itself and the rights the
violation of which is legitimately seen as a matter for international con-
cern. The only way to ensure such overlap, it seems, is to accept some
form of the political conception that builds this connection into its very
concept of human rights.
3.2 Towards an adequate version of the political conception
Hence on the conceptual level, the political conception is preferable.
However, as we are going to see, this does not make the project of
the moral conception – that of showing that there are rights possessed
by human beings per se – redundant. Nor does it mean that current ver-
sions of the political conception are not in any need of modification.
To develop an adequate version of the political conception, let’s
take as our starting point Rawls’ characterization of human rights:
“Human rights are a class of rights that play a special role in a reasonable
Law of Peoples: they restrict the justifying reasons for war and its con-
duct, and they specify limits to a regime’s internal autonomy.” (Rawls
1999, 79) While Rawls is undoubtedly correct to stress the international
dimension of human rights, focusing just on this international role
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would nonetheless be a distorting oversimplification and amounts to ne-
glecting an essential aspect of the history of the concept of human
rights. One main concern is that Rawls’ view ties human rights too
strictly to the existing system of national states and its concomitant in-
ternational legal order.21 As a critique of Rawls’ exaggerated reliance
of the law of peoples as the primary locus of human rights, this worry
seems justified: Human rights are clearly not just rights whose violations
give grounds for international concern. Instead, they are rights that have
this limiting function on the international level because they already limit
any legitimate state power on the purely national level.22
To bring this important point into better focus, we must remind
ourselves that the set of individual rights whose violations give grounds
for international concern and the set of human rights are not necessarily
co-extensive. For instance, it is quite conceivable that international law
would legitimately give states a limited power to interfere, under certain
conditions, into the affairs of another country in order to protect the in-
dividual rights of its own citizens because of particular interests of the
state itself, without the range of these rights being restricted to human
rights of these citizens. E.g., states could have the right to interfere in
order to protect certain property rights of their own citizens when an-
other state is no longer able to protect them within its territory. Such
intervention rights might be justifiable when it is of particular impor-
tance for the intervening state that the individual rights are respected,
because, e. g., they concern the trade of important commodities for
the other country’s economy. In this case, the individual rights in ques-
tion are rights violations of which give grounds for international con-
cern by providing possible grounds for interventions. However, this
would not turn the individual property rights in question into human
rights, even though they limit state sovereignty. (It is not that these
rights could not be human rights – the point is that if they are, they
must be so even without the special intervention rights just mentioned.)
What the exclusive focus on the international role of human rights
misses is the centrality of the function of human rights of imposing in-
ternal limits on state power, i. e. limits directly within the relationship
between state and citizen. This function is clearly both systematically
and historically primary, and must be so in any adequate account of
21 Cf. John Tasioulas “On the Nature of Human Rights”, in this volume, 47f.
22 This dependence is recognized by Raz 2010, 336, in his three-step procedure
for justifying human rights claims.
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human rights. These rights only limit state sovereignty on the interna-
tional level because they limit (any) state power internally, and the for-
mer function derives from the latter.23 In the case we’ve constructed in
the last paragraph, this derivation relation is precisely what is lacking;
the property rights in question do not limit any legitimate state
power, because, for instance, the two states in questions could, by a
concerted procedure (e. g. a treaty and parallel national legislation),
abolish their existing intervention rights.
This derivation relation is signally neglected in Rawls’ account of
human rights. Though in the law of peoples the sovereignty of states
is, on his account, restricted by human rights, only in the case of liberal
states is there a preceding internal limitation of state power by human
rights, because their basic structure is “chosen” in accordance with
Rawls’ version of the social contract model and its justification depends
on this model. For non-liberal decent states, though, Rawls cannot
argue for their internal limiting power independently of the law of peo-
ples, because the internal authority of such states toward their citizens
does not depend on any clearly specified model that would make its au-
thority depend on the safeguarding of human rights.24 Hence the bind-
ing role of human rights for such states arises only from the law of peo-
ples – and this cannot be correct, given the primacy of the internal lim-
itation.
The historical precedence of the internally limiting function is also
obvious: Until the 20th century, the idea of international enforcement
was practically completely absent from the human rights discourse.
The only function of human rights was to set limits to the power of
any legitimate state, and this was the only role of human rights envisaged
in the documents of the American and French revolutions. Redress
from violation of human rights was not to be had by international inter-
vention, but either by the state’s own jurisdiction, or, if that failed, by
the armed resistance of the citizens themselves.25 Only after the horrors
of the 1930 s and 40 s and their mostly trans-border perpetration had
shown especially vividly that international back-up was necessary to en-
23 Pace Pogge 1998, 398, who argues for viewing human rights as standards for
judging global institutions.
24 Cf. Rawls 1999, 64f. and 70.
25 Somek 1995, 56 is quite right in tying the origin of human rights discourse to
the right to resistance: “Ohne Widerstand keine Menschenrechte”.
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force human rights did the international role of human rights come into
prominence.
Human rights limit any legitimate state power in two respects: Ei-
ther as negative limits on what positive actions the state can legitimately
take, or as positive claims on what the state must do, i. e. which individ-
ual interests it must protect. However, in view of the historical devel-
opment of the idea of human rights, this claim needs a further qualifi-
cation. Human rights, historically, came to the fore as devices for coun-
tering the threats arising from a particular kind of state – namely the
modern state (which began to emerge, roughly, with the rise of absolut-
ism, in the 17th century) with its special range of powers. That the
human rights discourse historically developed as an ‘answer’ to the in-
herent dangers arising from the modern state with the extensive range
of powers it possessed, in comparison to its predecessors – such as a de-
veloped bureaucratic system, large police and (standing) armed forces,
and an extended legal system – has been convincingly argued by Jack
Donnelly.26 However, even more than the general growth of resources
available to the modern state, the following three key characteristics
crucially distinguished it from its predecessors and made it especially im-
portant to restrict its authority by safeguarding human rights: (i) the mo-
nopoly of power claimed by the modern state within the borders of its
territory, (ii) sovereignty on the international level and (iii) the state’s
claim to regulate, in principle, every area of its citizens’ lives.
Factor (i) was, historically, the key step in the development of the
modern state. 17th century France, which provided the ‘role model’ in
the development of the absolutist state, took this step most dramatically
with Richelieu’s suppression of the Huguenot security places, which
had not been subject to centralized power, and Mazarin’s and Louis
XIV’s suppression of the nobility as an independent power factor of
its own, which left the French centralized state as the only bearer of
military and political power within its own territory. The suppression
of rival bearers of powers, which had earlier been tolerated, went
hand in hand with the abandonment of the idea that several systems
of political authority could co-exist side by side, and that there could
be regional exemptions from state power in favor of another source
of legitimate authority.
Factor (ii) was the ‘other side’ of the coin in international politics;
and in political systems like the Holy Roman Empire, where particular
26 Donnelly 2003, 46ff.
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territories evolved as autonomous political entities by simultaneously
eliminating internal rival bearers of political power within their bounda-
ries and by emancipating themselves from the authority of the central
institutions of the Empire, the development of factors (i) and (ii) was,
perforce, so closely linked that it does not even make sense to regard
them as historically separate.
Factors (i) and (ii) combined to make the individual citizen vulner-
able and helpless in the face of state threats in a way that was both his-
torically new and clamored for a new method of protection. For these
factors eliminated the authorities rival to the state to which the citizen,
at least in theory, had been able to appeal for help and protection against
unjust measures by the state. By this elimination of any extra-state jurid-
ical procedure for the protection of rights and redress in cases of viola-
tion, the only remedy in cases of rights violations by the state itself was,
ultimately, technically illegal armed resistance. And human rights very
quickly emerged as the major resource to justify such technically illegal
resistance – as we can clearly see from Locke’s justification of the Eng-
lish Glorious Revolution, as well as from the justification of the Amer-
ican Revolution in the Declaration of Independence (cf. Locke 1988,
202ff.).
Lastly, factor (iii) implied a fundamental change in the range of the
state’s functions: From the early Middle Ages onwards, the task of the
state had been mainly restricted to outward defense and to the settle-
ment of quarrels between smaller social organizations like clans, tribes
or federations, so that the state’s authorities were thought to have ‘no
business’ settling quarrels arising merely within these organizations. In
the 17th and 18th century, this view changed, and the state was gradually
seen to have both a general duty and authority to safeguard the citizens’
well-being. It is obvious that not only did the potential dangers from
state authority became more pressing and ‘global’ with this change,
but also that a much more comprehensive protection of individual in-
terests by the state could reasonably be expected. This latter aspect
was crucially important for the development of human rights: E.g.,
only when it is considered that state’s business to regulate intra-family
relations and to protect individual interests within such relations can it
make sense to ascribe a claim-right to individuals against the state to
provide such protection.
As the function of human rights has consisted in protecting human
beings specifically from the dangers arising from the institution of such a
state, it seems plausible to modify our claim about the nature of human
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rights in the following way: Human rights are individual rights that con-
strain any state power of comparable extent as the one claimed and pos-
sessed by the modern state (or would do so, where such a state to be
instituted) – i. e. a state power having, in particular, a monopoly of
force within its territory and sovereignty vis-à-vis other states, and con-
cerning itself with all, or most, areas of its citizens’ lives. So the modern
state and its characteristic threats provide the benchmark by which to
determine whether an individual right can count as a human right or
not.
4. Consequences
As we have been arguing, human rights are, essentially, individual rights
that set limits to any state power which is comparable in extent to the
one claimed and possessed by the modern state. Their limiting role is
both from the outside – as their violations provide reasons for interna-
tional concern – and from the inside – they limit any state power direct-
ly within the relation between person and state. In fact, both these as-
pects of the limiting role can be described as limits of “sovereignty”
in the traditional sense of the term, which not only concerns the relation
of one state towards others, providing the basis of non-interference, but
was, as originally introduced in the modern discussion by Jean Bodin,
also a characterization of the internal structure of the state; in the latter
respect, the idea of sovereignty expressed the state’s possessing the high-
est authority against which no appeal “under heaven” or rightful resist-
ance was possible (Bodin, Six Livres, esp. book I, ch. 8). Therefore both
the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ aspect of the limiting role of human rights
are tied together.
What does it mean that human rights impose limits on any legiti-
mate state power? Of course, it means, inter alia, that any state authority
which systematically violates human rights cannot be legitimate – but
the condemnation of illegitimacy, by itself, does not carry very much
weight unless we know what follows from it. As far as the ‘external as-
pect’ of the limiting role is concerned, the violation of human rights
provides cause for international concern, so that international sovereign-
ty is impugned. ‘Internally’, the limiting role manifests itself in restrict-
ing the state’s rightful claim to obedience by its citizens. Violations of
human rights provide citizens with pro tanto reasons for civil disobedi-
ence and, in the extreme case, armed resistance, because they override
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the state’s claim to obedience even in cases where this claim has a strong
moral foundation, e. g. because a well-functioning process of democratic
legitimization is in place. In Raz’s terms, if we see the claim of legiti-
mate state authority to obedience as “protected” by exclusionary reasons
to disregard counteracting considerations which speak against acting as
the authority orders one to act,27 then human rights are those individual
rights whose violations provide reasons overriding even these exclusion-
ary reasons. Of course, this does not mean that every human rights vio-
lation per se justifies civil disobedience or even armed resistance: Only
when violations are systematic and when they cannot be remedied with-
in the state system of legal redress can they justify these measures. But
human rights violations are, in any case, the right kind of consideration
to override the state’s claim to obedience by its citizens.
The characterization of human rights as individual rights which limit
state sovereignty in the two ways described, may easily give rise to the
impression that the existence of human rights, on the account proposed
here, presupposes an actually existing system of nation-state and interna-
tional law, or at least the actual existence of some state power. But this
impression would be mistaken: For individual rights of the sort descri-
bed can exist even without the actual existence of any state – it is merely
necessary that these individual rights are such as to set limits of the kind
described on any state power that the right-bearers might enter into. I.e.
it is necessary that a right should set limits to state sovereignty if there is
or would be a state possessing power comparable in extent to the one
claimed by the modern state. The latter conditional can obviously be
true even if there exists no state of this kind. This separation of
human rights from the actual existence of states or legal institutions
shows that they are not simply legally created rights, but rather must
have their basis in pre-positive morality. In this sense, they are indeed
‘natural’ or ‘moral rights’.
This raises the question, though, what it means to describe an indi-
vidual right as a human right without an already existing system of states.
In order to answer this question, we must spell out in general the con-
ditions an individual right has to meet in order to set limits to any legit-
imate state power in the ways we have described – i. e. we must answer
the general question of what we have to show in order to justify the
27 For the concept of ,exclusionary’ reasons cf. Raz 2006, 49ff. Raz himself argues
that “authoritative” claims should be seen as constituting second-order reasons,
loc. cit., 82ff.
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claim that a particular individual right must be included in the set of
human rights. How one answers this question ultimately depends on
the model for justifying state authority one subscribes to. While I cannot
argue for this theory here in any way, for the following considerations I
will assume for the sake of illustration that the correct theory to rely on
for the justification of political authority is some version of the social
contract model which derives the authority of the state from some
form of rational agreement, based on the individual interests of the per-
sons participating in this agreement.28
On the basis of such a theory, it seems tempting as a first approach to
pick out as human rights those individual rights that people, when con-
tracting to enter into a society with institutions that are comparably
strong and far-reaching as in the modern state, would reasonably want
safeguarded within this society in appropriate ways. In other words,
human rights would be those rights persons would rationally agree to
have safeguarded by the internal structure of the state they agree upon.
The problem with this answer is that it fails to capture the special
importance or urgency of the protection of human rights. Rational
agents would, in the original contract situations, plausibly want all
their rights to be appropriately safeguarded, not just their human rights
(but also, e. g., consumer rights in case of defects of purchased goods).
But not all rights are human rights, nor is a state whose organization
in some respect violates principles of justice per se a state that violates
human rights. The point that not all rights are human rights is often ex-
pressed by the claim that human rights only provide a minimal standard
for government behavior.29 This point is of special importance for po-
litical conceptions, because, plausibly, not all infringements of rights
should provide even pro tanto reasons for international intervention.
How can we capture the idea that human rights are in some sense
minimal? One approach would be to distinguish human rights from oth-
ers by the special kinds of safeguards persons would reasonably want for
the rights in question. For instance, one might argue that while some
rights might reasonably be considered to be accessible to change or abo-
lition by otherwise legitimate political decisions, e. g. by democratic de-
cisions, as there may arise practical need for such changes, no one could
reasonably want human rights to be subject to majority decisions of this
28 Be it a Hobbesian account or a Rawlsian original position model.
29 Nickel 2007, 36. Shue 1996 described human rights as specifying “lower limits
on tolerable human conduct”.
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kind.30 This special need for protection even against democratic deci-
sions is what characterizes human rights.31
However, even this proposal, though it considerably narrows the
number of human rights in comparison to its predecessor, would still
yield too inclusive a criterion for human rights. In particular, rights of
democratic participation – e.g. the right of equal access to political of-
fice, the right to a free and equal vote – would plausibly count as rights
whose possession should not be subject to change by democratic deci-
sion. It is very questionable, though, whether (all) such rights should
properly be regarded as human rights. Hereditary monarchies do not
guarantee equal access to all political offices for all their citizens – in par-
ticular, the position of the monarch is only accessible to a very limited
number of people. Nevertheless, the existence of monarchies does not
per se seem to constitute a violation of the human rights of their citi-
zens. Even if we consider this form of state organization as inferior to
republican democracy, the fault lacks the urgency of redress that is char-
acteristic of violations of human rights.
The key to an answer lies in the role of sovereignty and the mo-
nopoly of force of the modern state. Clearly, this monopoly, which
the modern state characteristically claims, provides its citizens with ob-
vious benefits, especially concerning personal and property security, in
comparison with a state that lacks this monopoly and would therefore
be in danger of regular internal violence and civil strife. In a comparable
way, sovereignty – now used in the technical sense of giving the state
the possibility of rebutting unwanted outside inference in its home af-
fairs – plays a protective role, both by strengthening the state monopoly
on power and by reducing foreign interference that might itself endan-
ger the citizens’ security.
The advantages accruing to the individual citizen from the state mo-
nopoly on power and sovereignty may not be as enormous as they were
30 An alternative way to stress the special standing of human rights is Rawls’ ac-
count of basic liberties in the Theory of Justice, Rawls 1971, esp. §11. Rawls ar-
gues that, in the original position, when determining the principles of justice
applying to the basic structure of society, rational agents would choose equal
basic liberties for all, and that these basic liberties could not be “bargained”
against social or economic advantages (principle of serial ordering). However,
the following objection, with regard to an account of human rights, also applies
to Rawls.
31 Also Wildt 1998, 142, considers it an essential characteristic of human rights
that their protection may not be subject to political majority decisions.
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thought to be by Thomas Hobbes in the Leviathan, but clearly they will
compensate the individual, to a large degree, for many of the injustices
within the organization of the state. This is particularly clear in the case
of unjust judicial decisions: Even when judicial systems generate many
such decisions to the detriment of one person, this person will, provided
these decisions are not too invasive, still be better off when such a sys-
tem for pressing claims exists and efficiently excludes other violent alter-
natives of doing this, than he would be without it. Therefore, a person
might quite reasonably go along with a considerable amount of suppres-
sion if, in exchange, he can enjoy the benefits of the state monopoly on
power and state sovereignty, which would otherwise be denied to him.
There will, however, be a turning-point, where the benefit-loss bal-
ance will no longer be in his favor. Notoriously, Hobbes went so far as
to claim that the benefits from the institution of a sovereign state were
so large compared with a situation where there was no state that they
outweighed every disadvantage arising from state suppression short of
direct danger to one’s own life or basic physical well-being. This
claim rested on his own dire view of what the state of nature without
any sovereign state would be like. But this view is hardly compelling,
and other writers, such as Locke, have held a much more benign
view of the state of nature. Besides, the relevant comparison we have
to draw here is not the one between the modern sovereign state and
a situation completely lacking any state institutions, but between the
modern sovereign state and a considerably weaker type of state,
which, while enforcing some measure of internal and external security,
lacks both the power monopoly and sovereignty in the modern sense
and has (as it was the case with the pre-modern state) a considerably
more restricted range of tasks.
On the basis of a contract model for justifying political power,
human rights thus appear as the ‘baseline’ for reasonable people that
must be met if they are to be able to reasonably enter into any state pos-
sessing the key characteristics of the modern state, especially power mo-
nopoly and sovereignty. Thus, safeguards for human rights are not only
part of any constitutional structure people would rationally agree upon;
inclusion of such safeguards is a precondition for any constitutional
structure people could rationally agree upon – where rational choice is
seen as taking place against the background of the alternative of not in-
stituting a (modern) state at all, with its concurrent disadvantages. Fail-
ure to safeguard human rights means that, for rational agents, it will
never make sense to institute such a state, no matter what the other ad-
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vantages of this institution might be compared to a situation without
that institution. This function of human rights captures Rawls’ idea
that political regimes, in order to make any minimal claim to legitimacy,
must be schemes of social cooperation for (at least minimal) mutual ben-
efit.32 Regimes violating human rights per se fail to satisfy this criterion
because the disadvantages caused by their establishment are necessarily
greater than any compensatory advantages it might bring.
This clearly distinguishes the standard of human rights as a minimal
standard from an ideal standard of (international) justice: Faced with the
alternative of a situation without a modern state, rational agents can
agree upon a system that is significantly unjust, e. g. gives many special
privileges to some individuals. As long as they can rationally do so, the
ensuing system will, as we have argued, not violate human rights,
though it may be substantially unjust. By contrast, human rights are
those rights whose violation cannot be compensated for by any other
economic or security advantage the modern state might bestow on its
citizens.
Viewing human rights as the ‘baseline’ for rational agreement to a
social contract has two important consequences: First, human rights
cannot ever be bargaining stakes. For otherwise their violation could
be compensated for by other advantages the system bestows upon peo-
ple entering into it – and, as we have argued, this is precisely what is
impossible for human rights, though it may be possible for other rights.
Second, the alternatives that form the background for the decision for or
against instituting the modern state can change to some extent due to a
change in historical circumstances. Four factors that form the back-
ground of the quasi-“original position” decision for or against institut-
ing the modern state are especially subject to change, and this change
will make it reasonable for persons to give much greater, or much
less, power to the state. (i) The economic situation of the population;
e. g. in countries subject to severe crises of famine, it can be reasonable
to give the state large powers of intervention into the economic process,
thereby considerably cutting in on the economic liberties of its citizens.
(ii) The situation of external security; again, in countries in danger of
constant aggression by their neighbors, it will be reasonable to give to
the state the necessary means for defending its citizens, which may in-
clude extensive authority to intervene in the citizens’ lives. (iii) The
32 Rawls 2001, 6. This idea also figures importantly in Williams’ account of
human rights (Williams 2006, 62–64).
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possibility and potential form of international intervention; if there is a
fairly just and well-functioning system of international redress for viola-
tions of individual rights – as there is, arguably, in the EU – rational
agents will stand for considerably less intervention by the state and, in
consequence, will considerably restrict the limits of the sovereignty of
their own states (cf. Raz 2010, 330). (iv) The danger of civil war and
internal conflict in case there is no central authority with the three
basic characteristics of the modern state.
What do shifts in conditions (i) through (iv), which can change the
parameters for what agents could rationally acquiesce in, mean for
human rights ? Most importantly, they lead to some degree of relativ-
ization in human rights standards: Improving overall economic condi-
tions and an improving situation of international security and interna-
tional institutions mean (surprisingly) that the number and extent of
human rights will grow – simply because under these conditions, agents
could rationally concede less power to the state or accord the state sov-
ereign power only under a greater number of caveats. But this does not
lead to a total relativization: For some individual rights will be suffi-
ciently important that even under dire external circumstances, giving
up these rights cannot be worth the advantages produced by instituting
a modern state.
Furthermore, the kind of relativization that follows from the version
of the political conception defended here is only relativization to exter-
nal circumstances. This does not imply cultural relativism per se, i. e. the
claim that the validity of human rights claim must be “relativized” to a
particular culture. Instead, relativization to external circumstances is
fully compatible with the possibility that the list of human right claims
valid for every human being is the same once the external circumstances
are fixed.
But what about cultural relativism – does our version of the political
conception not lead to this form of relativism, too? For even if, even
under dire circumstances, rational agents cannot acquiesce in a system
that allows pervasive violations of some of their individual rights,
what guarantees that these rights, for all agents, are the same? Or, ac-
cepting that there may be differences, what guarantees that there is a suf-
ficient overlap between those individual rights such that we can say that
there exists, interculturally, one system of human rights – instead of sev-
eral such systems? If there are several such systems, they would still all
count as systems of human rights when these rights fulfill the criterion
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we have proposed earlier, even though their contents could greatly di-
verge.
The answer to the question of whether there is one system of
human rights or many ultimately depends on the success of the project
pursued by adherents of the moral conception of human rights of show-
ing which rights are possessed by human beings per se. If they can show
that there are fundamental interests common to all human beings per se,
then these interests – or, rather, those of them that are of sufficient
weight – will provide the basis for a set of individual rights that are
valid interculturally. It’s highly plausible to suppose that there will be
some such common set of interests (life, bodily integrity, etc.). How
large this set will be, however, is a different question – and if adherents
of the moral conception should fail to show that there is a substantial
such set, then, indeed, we might have to conclude that there is no sub-
stantial single system with global validity.
Such a negative result would not only show that the project of ad-
herents of the moral conception is doomed to failure for reasons quite
different from the ones we have discussed here. It would also be deeply
damaging to the political conception itself. For, as we have seen earlier,
it is one of the chief features of human rights in the current human
rights practice that their violation gives pro tanto grounds for interna-
tional concern and humanitarian intervention. For whom does it pro-
vide these pro tanto grounds? Primarily, at least, for other states and
the international community. When human rights violations of suffi-
cient magnitude occur and there are no sufficient reason against inter-
vening, the other states and the international community not only
have the possibility of legitimate intervention, i. e. they are not only al-
lowed to intervene; but they even have a duty to intervene under these
circumstances, which corresponds to a claim to assistance of those per-
sons whose human rights are violated.
Now, if we assume that there is no universal system of human
rights, but, e. g. that there are, in different cultures, fundamentally di-
verging such systems, it becomes very hard to see why states from
one of these cultures should have a duty of political morality to inter-
vene to prevent or stop violations of rights which are, in their own cul-
ture, not accepted as human rights. They may be allowed to do so once a
right that sets limits to the sovereignty of the offending state is violated;
but why should they have a duty to intervene in protection of rights that
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they need not themselves accept as human rights, or need not even ac-
cept as individual rights at all?33 The same question arises at the level of
international organizations in which states from different cultures partic-
ipate.
The only way to convincingly account for an obligation of all other
states to help prevent human rights violations is to show that a suffi-
ciently robust set of individual rights is held universally by all human be-
ings, at least at a certain time.34 And the most promising way to establish
that there are rights of this kind is to show that such a set of individual
rights are possessed by human beings per se. Not all of these rights will
count as human rights, if our earlier arguments have been correct, and
the set of human rights to be picked out from the set of the rights uni-
versally possessed by all human beings may be larger or smaller depend-
ing on different external circumstances. But at least there will be enough
overlap in the human rights that are to be accepted whatever the exter-
nal circumstances may be to explain why, in general, both other states
and international organizations have a duty to intervene in order to pro-
tect human rights.
Therefore, the success of the projects pursued by the political con-
ception of human rights – showing which rights can play the role as-
signed to them in the current practice of international law – and of
the moral conception – showing which rights can be derived from in-
terests common to all human persons – are much more closely related
than one may be tempted to think from a look at the contemporary dis-
cussion.
Bibliography
Beitz, Charles R. (2009): The Idea of Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Besson, Samantha/Tasioulas, John (eds.) (2010): The Philosophy of Interna-
tional Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
33 This point is overlooked in Raz’s 3-step procedure for justifying human rights
claims: the third layer, namely that states should not enjoy immunity from in-
terference with regard to violations of such rights, does not yet show why other
states have a positive duty to interfere (Raz 2010, 336).
34 Skorupski 2010, 370, argues against Raz for the need for universality in a differ-
ent, though related, way, claiming that only thus can it be explained why other
states have the standing to demand rectifications of human rights violations.
Erasmus Mayr102
Bodin, Jean (1986): Les six livres de la république, tome 1, ed. by Christiane
Frémont. Paris: Fayard.
Donnelly, Jack (2003): Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd
Edition. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
Gewirth, Alan (1982): Human Rights, Essays on Justifications and Applications.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gilabert, Pablo (2011): Humanist and Political Perspectives on Human Rights.
In: Political Theory 39 (4), 439–467.
Gosepath, Stefan/Lohmann, Georg (eds.) (1998): Philosophie der Menschen-
rechte. Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp.
Griffin, James (2008): On Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Griffin, James (2010): Human Rights and the Autonomy of International Law.
In: Besson, Samantha/Tasioulas, John (2010), 339–355.
Habermas, Jürgen (1992): Faktizität und Geltung. Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp.
Koller, Peter (1998): Der Geltungsbereich der Menschenrechte. In: Gosepath,
Stefan/Lohmann, Georg (1998), 96–123.
Locke, John (1988): Two Treatises of Government, ed. by P. Laslett. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nickel, James (2007): Making Sense of Human Rights. Oxford: Blackwell.
Orend, Brian (2002): Human Rights, Concept and Context. Peterborough:
Broadview Press.
Pogge, Thomas (1998): Menschenrechte als moralische Ansprüche an globale
Institutionen. In: Gosepath, Stefan/Lohmann, Georg (1998), 378–400.
Pogge, Thomas (2002): How Should Human Rights Be Conceived? In:
Pogge, Thomas: World Poverty and Human Rights. Reprint. Cambridge:
Polity Press.
Rawls, John (1971): A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Rawls, John (1999): The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Rawls, John (2001): Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Raz, Joseph (2006): Praktische Gründe und Normen (original title: Practical
Reasons and Norms, 1975), transl. by Ruth Zimmerling. Frankfurt a.M.:
Suhrkamp.
Raz (2010): Human Rights without Foundations. In: Besson, Samantha/Ta-
sioulas (2010), 321–338.
Shue, Henry (1996): Basic Rights Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign
Policy, 2nd Edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Skorupski, John (2010): Human Rights. In: Besson/Tasioulas (2010), 357–
375.
Somek, Alexander (1995): Die Moralisierung der Menschenrechte. Eine Ausei-
nandersetzung mit Ernst Tugendhat. In: Demmerling, Christoph/Rentsch,
Thomas (eds.): Die Gegenwart der Gerechtigkeit: Diskurse zwischen
Recht, praktischer Philosophie und Politik. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag,
48–56.
The political and moral conceptions of human rights – a mixed account 103
Tasioulas, John (2002): Human Rights, Universality and the Values of Person-
hood: Retracing Griffin’s Steps. In: European Journal of Philosophy 10,
79–100.
Tasioulas, John (2007): The Moral Reality of Human Rights. In: Pogge, Tho-
mas (ed.): Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to
the Very Poor? Oxford: Oxford University Press 75–101.
Wildt, Andreas (1998): Menschenrechte und moralische Rechte. In: Gosepath/
Lohmann (1998), 124–145.
Williams, Bernard (2006): Human Rights and Relativism. In: Williams, Ber-
nard: In the Beginning was the Deed, ed. by Geoffrey Hawthorn. Prince-









Most contemporary Anglo-American philosophers are liberal or social
democrats. We endorse democratic forms of government that provide
all citizens equal rights of political participation, and we also endorse
equal rights to basic liberties that protect society’s members from major-
ity will and government overreach – such rights as freedom of speech
and expression, freedom of conscience, freedom of association, and free-
dom of tastes and pursuits. We also support the idea of a democratic so-
ciety without inherited class privilege and freedom of occupation with
rights to equal opportunities of some form; and most (though not all) of
us endorse some account of economic rights and entitlements owed to
all members of society, enabling them to be independent and not eco-
nomically exploitable by others. Moral philosophers however disagree
about the philosophical framework that is best suited to justifying
these liberal and social democratic commitments, a framework that
best enables us to debate and decide how to resolve the many issues
and conflicts regarding rights, interests and the common good that are
a normal part of social and political life in a democratic society.
The range of conceptions that are known as ‘deontological’ is a di-
verse group of positions, mainly united in their rejection of consequen-
tialism. Many contemporary deontological conceptions assign priority
over other social values to principles of justice and the basic rights
and liberties that these principles protect. Or if justice and basic rights
do not have priority over other values, they are among the class of fun-
damental moral principles and values (as in W.D. Ross’s list of seven
prima facie principles, or G.A. Cohen’s egalitarianism). Consequential-
ists, by contrast, normally regard individual rights as secondary principles
which are justifiable in so far as they are instrumental to creating greater
overall good consequences.
Consequentialism involves two basic claims: The first is that what is
right and just to do, whether via individual action or general rules and
institutions, is to take the most effective means to realize ultimately good
consequences (including means that are the cheapest, simplest, most
probable, requiring the least time and effort, etc.). The second basic
claim is that, given available means and resources, we are to create
the greatest sum total of good consequences. The basic idea that we are
to maximize the good incorporates both of these conditions.
For many of its adherents consequentialism is grounded in the seem-
ingly obvious claim that we ought to create the greatest good, impartial-
ly construed. As Sidgwick says, “It is right and reasonable […] to do
what [is] ultimately conducive to universal Good” (Sidgwick 1981,
507). This is Sidgwick’s principle of benevolence, the unshakeable
“philosophical intuition” upon which he grounds his argument for clas-
sical utilitarianism. Sidgwick’s philosophical intuition assumes that prac-
tical rationality fundamentally involves maximizing something. Since
right conduct and just laws must be rational, in ethics practical reason
requires that we impartially maximize ultimate good. Non-consequen-
tialists find that, though good consequences surely must matter to mor-
ality in some way, it is a mistake to construe the Right as simply max-
imizing total Good, for this disregards the interpersonal nature of mor-
ality. Morality, many deontologists say, concerns not the relationship of
persons to states of affairs or impersonal good, but the relationship of
persons to persons, where each is regarded as a distinct individual
whose fundamental good is not to be subordinated to aggregate or uni-
versal good. Consequentialists by contrast appear to assimilate morality
to the impersonal pursuit of non-moral values, such as pleasurable expe-
riences or preference-satisfaction or some other account of well-being,
or perfectionist values such as knowledge, aesthetic appreciation, love
and friendship, or the Vision of God. Non-consequentialists thus object
that what matters primarily for consequentialism is not the nature or
quality of relationships among persons, but maximizing the sum total
of good states of affairs, without regard to the kinds or quality of rela-
tions that obtain among the persons who must pursue this good, and
without regard to how the good is to be distributed among persons.
Here I will discuss versions of consequentialism which seek to avoid
these criticisms regarding the impersonal nature of consequentialist mor-
ality, and do so by incorporating into the good consequences to be pro-
moted either distribution-sensitive values such as equality, or moral val-
ues of justice, such as individual rights, or fairness of outcomes.
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The enduring philosophical attraction of consequentialism, I be-
lieve, is that it provides an outline for a completely rational morality, or a
morality which says that between any two alternatives, one is the
more rational choice, and among all feasible alternative actions or
norms, there is one that it is most rational to choose. The problem is
to find some unambiguous conception of the one rational good that
is reasonable enough to play the extraordinary role of serving as the
final end of all rational conduct. This is an exceptionally tall order. Sidg-
wick thought this rational good could only be pleasurable experience,
since all other ends – including knowledge and the perfection of
human capacities, freedom, justice, enjoyment of beauty, love and
friendship and other desirable human relations, and all other values –
have unreasonable or irrational consequences when regarded as the
sole ultimate good to be maximized. The vast majority of contemporary
consequentialists do not endorse Sidgwick’s hedonism or his classical
utilitarianism, largely because they believe that there are ultimate
goods in addition to, or other than, pleasurable experiences or the sat-
isfaction of individual preferences regardless of their object.
Here I examine three ways that consequentialists argue for moral,
human, or basic individual rights: first, there is the framework provided
by J.S. Mill ; second, distribution sensitive accounts of well-being (such
as relied on by Philip Pettit, Larry Temkin, and Bill Talbott), and then
finally, arguments, such as Amartya Sen’s, that directly incorporate
rights and other moral concepts into the good that is to be maximized.
II. The Millian argument for individual rights
The upshot of consequentialism’s demand that right conduct maximize
the good seems to be that there can be no legitimate constraints upon
taking the most effective means to achieving the greatest good, nor
any limitations upon promoting the sum total of goodness capable of re-
alization. But moral rights, human rights, and other basic rights are nor-
mally understood as restrictions upon taking most effective means to re-
alizing desired or desireable ends – “side constraints” (Nozick),
“trumps” (Dworkin), or “reasonable constraints” (Rawls) upon the ra-
tional pursuit of good consequences. Hence, if basic rights are to have
any justification within an orthodox consequentialist position, they can-
not really be what to many they seem to be. Rather than constraining
pursuit of the ultimate good, consequentialists contend that basic rights
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instead concern the very measures that enable the wholehearted pursuit
of maximum goodness. As J.S. Mill says, though common opinion re-
gards the just “as generically distinct […] from the expedient and in
idea opposed to it”, in truth the just and the expedient always coincide
in the long run (Mill 1979, ch. 5, pts. 1–2).
This was quite a turnaround in thinking within utilitarianism. For
Bentham was quite clear that moral rights are “rhetorical nonsense…-
nonsense upon stilts”. It was Mill apparently who first endorsed the
idea that justice and moral rights are especially effective means to max-
imizing the good. He said that justice and rights are names for especially
important utilities, of such great weight that they warrant special protec-
tions. These especially important utilities are “the essentials of human
well-being” (ibid., ch. 5, pt. 32, 58). “Justice is a name for certain
moral requirements which, regarded collectively, stand higher in the
scale of social utility, and are therefore of more paramount obligation,
than any others” (ibid., ch. 5, pt. 37, 62). These especially important
utilities include, Mill says, “moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt
one another”, to which Mill crucially adds “in which we must never
forget to include a wrongful interference with each other’s freedom”
(ibid., ch. 5, pt. 33, 58). This provides the basis for Mill’s argument
in On Liberty that the rights and liberties that protect individuals’ free-
dom and autonomous self-determination, or “individuality”, are neces-
sary to realize “the permanent interests of man as a progressive being”
(Mill 1978, ch.1, pt.11, 10).
In making this argument Mill draws upon two important insights re-
garding human nature, or natural human propensities. The first is the
anti-paternalist argument1 that under appropriate conditions each person
is in a better position than anyone else to judge what sort of life is the
best life to live. A precondition for individuals’ insight into their well-
being are social conditions that allow for liberty of conscience, freedom
of thought, expression and inquiry, freedom of association, and “free-
dom of tastes and pursuits”. Individual rights protecting these freedoms
are preconditions for “the free development of individuality”, which
Mill thought largely constitutive of living a good life.
The Millian claim that people are normally the best judge of their
own well-being once they have educated their natural abilities is nor-
mally true of people. It may not be true of those brought up in repres-
sive, traditional, or otherwise non-liberal societies, since widespread ed-
1 See Talbott (2005), who relies upon Mill’s argument.
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ucation and free flow of information are not available, and the values
those societies endorse cannot thrive if individuals have personal free-
doms. Cultural relativists might then claim that Mill’s utilitarian argu-
ment for liberal justice is limited to Western democracies, and that
there is no persuasive argument that people in all societies ought to
be guaranteed individual rights needed for self-direction.
This criticism is addressed by a second argument of Mill’s, which
appeals to a fact about human psychology. It is that, other things
being equal, humans enjoy engaging in activities that call upon the ex-
ercise of their developed capacities; moreover, once they have had the
opportunity to develop their “higher” or distinctly human capacities,
then, barring unfavorable circumstances, humans will invariably exercise
a “decided preference” for pursuits and plans of life that involve the ex-
ercise and development of their capacities for intellect, imagination,
higher human feelings and relationships, and moral sentiments. Mill’s
claim strongly resembles Rawls’ “Aristotelian principle”, which also re-
fers to a tendency of human nature – that people with mature capacities
living under favorable conditions normally prefer conditions in which
they have the freedom and opportunity to determine their capacities
and live their own chosen way of life.
I think there is much to be said in support of the empirical assump-
tions about natural human propensities that Mill (and Rawls) rely upon
in arguing that freedom of action and self-determination (or “individu-
ality”) are “essentials of human well-being”. Assuming that certain free-
doms are essentials of well-being, then it seems also true that individuals
generally ought to have the rights of justice that are preconditions for
freedom of conscience, thought, association, and freedom of tastes
and pursuits. If this is what Mill sought to prove on consequentialist
grounds, then I think that, with a few caveats, he makes a credible
case for it.
The question however is whether Mill’s argument for freedom as an
essential of well-being is adequate to argue for equality of rights and lib-
erties within a revised utilitarian framework. This after all is the funda-
mental question of justice at issue, for justice concerns primarily the equal
or fair distribution of rights, and not simply the question of what rights
most individuals normally ought to enjoy to enable them to realize in-
dividual well-being or overall good. Even assuming that Mill has shown
on consequentialist grounds that normally providing individuals with
substantial freedoms is necessary for their individual well-being, this
does not warrant the conclusion that equal freedom and the equal rights
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necessary thereto are always or even ever necessary to maximizing the
sum total of individual well-being (no matter how well-being is con-
strued). For from Mill’s claim that having certain freedoms and the po-
litical rights to protect them are normally necessary conditions of each
person’s well-being, it clearly does not follow that equal rights and
equal freedoms always, or ever, maximally promote total well-being
summed across all individuals in society. For the sum total of individual
well-beings almost always can be marginally increased by denying some
small minority of individuals those freedoms which they would other-
wise use in ways a majority find offensive or scandalous. Mill says, in
arguing for freedom of thought and expression and freedom of the
press: “If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, mankind
would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he
had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind” (ibid., ch. 2,
pt. 1, 16). I believe this is true, but I see no way to establish it on
Mill’s consequentialist grounds. For how can it be that the right of
one person to express an opinion which all the world finds dangerous
or obnoxious can outweigh in its consequences for aggregate well-
being the detrimental effects on the well-being experienced by the
rest of the world? How on any understanding of well-being can denial
of equal rights to one or more persons not often lead to a greater overall
good?
The problem then is not simply to show that respecting certain
rights among persons generally is normally a precondition for promoting
general well-being (or any other good consequence). The crucial prob-
lem rather is to show that those consequentialist rights that are very im-
portant and normally ought to be afforded to everyone ought also to be
equally or fairly distributed among them. That’s the question of justice
that bedevils traditional consequentialist views, and which the Millian
argument does not satisfactorily come to terms with.
One potential way around this problem is to argue for a complicated
account of moral psychology that attributes to humans not simply nat-
ural sympathy and a desire to take everyone’s well-being into account,
but also natural predispositions to cooperate with others on terms of
equal respect and reciprocity. Rawls finds something like this argument
in Mill.2 But even if these conjectures regarding human nature are true,
2 Rawls conjectures that Mill’s argument for the coincidence of maximum utility
and equal justice rests on two further principles of moral psychology Mill in-
vokes. The first is a principle of dignity. Mill says there is “a sense of dignity,
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the argument still would have to show that it is only under favorable
conditions where people’s natural moral sentiments of equality and rec-
iprocity are fully developed and satisfied that aggregate well-being can
be maximized. Then, even assuming that is so, it still remains as a ques-
tion whether these favorable conditions would correspond to the equal
rights favored by liberal and social democrats.
III. The good of equality and other values of justice
The main obstacle to justifying equality of basic rights within Mill’s
framework is that it requires an unlikely coincidence of equal rights
of justice with maximizing the sum of general well-being. Perhaps
this problem can be addressed by directly incorporating into the good
consequences to be promoted certain values normally associated with
justice and individual rights – values such as equality of well-being or
equal distribution of goods, or individual freedom and autonomy. In
an article predating his contractualism, T.M. Scanlon outlines a “two-
tiered” consequentialist approach that regards rights and other norms
of justice as second-tier principles that promote such first-tier values
as freedom, equal distributions of desirable goods, and individuals’ abil-
ity to control significant aspects of their lives (Scanlon 2003, 26–41).
which all humans possess in one form or another, and in some proportion […]
to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of happiness of those in
whom it is strong that nothing which conflicts with it could be otherwise than
momentarily an object of desire for them” (Mill 1979, ch. 2, pt. 6, 9). Second,
Mill says “a natural basis of sentiment for utilitarian morality” is “the desire to
be in unity with our fellow creatures, which is already a powerful principle in
human nature”. (ibid., ch. 3, pt.9–10, 30–31). Mill says that a person who has
developed this “social feeling”, and conceives of himself as a “social being” does
not think of others as “struggling rivals with him for the means of happiness”.
Rather one of his “natural wants [is] that there should be harmony between his
feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures” (ibid., ch. 3, pt.11, 33). Mill
emphasizes that the desire to be in unity with others leads us, not just to take
others’ interests into account, but also to harmonize our own interests with
theirs. Rawls liberally construes this as a desire to act from a principle of reci-
procity: “For Mill says in pt. 10 that the feeling of unity with others, when per-
fect, would never make us desire any beneficial condition for ourselves in the
benefits of which others are not also included” (Rawls 2007, 282). Rawls adds:
“The fact that Mill says this leads us to ask whether the difference principle is a
better expression of Mill’s view about equality and distributive justice, than the
principle of utility” (ibid., 282 n.).
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Scanlon says it is a good thing that individuals are autonomous: that they
are able to freely develop their capacities and choose their own aims and
commitments, make their choices effective in shaping their own lives,
and contribute to the formation of social policy. It is also good that cer-
tain resources are equally distributed among individuals. On this ac-
count, autonomy and equality seem to be higher-order ultimate
goods that apply to the choice and distribution of other ultimate or sub-
ordinate goods. For example, assuming self-determination is an ultimate
good, equal capacity or equal opportunity for self-determination might
be among the goods to be promoted in a pluralist consequentialist view;
or perhaps equal welfare on some views.3 Larry Temkin has endorsed a
similar consequentialist position that regards equal welfare as an intrinsic
good which ought to be promoted. And Bill Talbott refers to “appro-
priately distributed well-being” as the good consequence to be promot-
ed in his argument for universal human rights.4
According to Scanlon’s and similar “two-level” views, equal rights
and other principles of justice are second-tier subordinate principles
that guarantee the values of justice that they are designed to promote,
such as each person’s autonomy, equal welfare, or the proportionate dis-
tribution of income and wealth. For example, equal rights to liberty of
conscience, freedom of thought, freedom of association, freedom of
persons in tastes and pursuits, and other liberal basic liberties are justifi-
able in that they promote a state of affairs where (normal adult) members
of society each enjoy autonomous self-determination. This is one way to
recast Mill’s account in On Liberty that avoids problems mentioned ear-
lier. We might conceive of the good to be promoted as “appropriately
distributed well-being” (Talbott) and regard Mill’s Principle of Liberty
as among the principles of justice that enable each member of society to
realize his or her individuality and other components of well-being.
I’ll focus here on the idea that equality of some good (or some other
preferred distribution) is itself an ultimate good that is to be incorporat-
ed into the maximand of a consequentialist view (e. g., equal well-being
or equal opportunity thereto, or equal proportionate satisfaction, or
3 Scanlon also suggests that, along with equality, the fairness of certain procedures
is a good that ought to be promoted (Scanlon 2003, 30–32). If fairness is de-
scribable only by referring to certain rights or moral principles, his claim resem-
bles a different position endorsed by Amartya Sen, which I will take up in sec-
tion IV below.
4 “For a consequentialist, a just government is one that promotes the (appropri-
ately distributed) well-being of its citizens”; cf. Talbott 2005, 159–160.
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maximin well-being on a prioritarian view). Rawls says that distribution
is normally considered under principles of right, which suggests that
questions regarding the appropriate distribution of goods should involve
non-consequentialist principles. But if the goods to be promoted and
equalized are definable in non-moral terms that are applicable in the
natural or social sciences (equal welfare or well-being, or equal capabil-
ities, for example), then we can regard equal distribution of some natural
or social good as an aspect of the consequentialist end-state that is to be
maximized. On such distribution-sensitive consequentialist views we
would no longer be maximizing simply an aggregate of goods; we
would also seek to maximize an aggregate’s equal (or maximin, or
some other function) distribution according to a consequentialist ac-
count of appropriately defined distributive shares of the good.
Now deciding how much weight to assign to equal distributions is a
difficult issue within a pluralist consequentialist view. The problem is to
construct an index that gives an appropriate weight to equal distribution
compared with other intrinsic goods.5 Let’s assume however that these
problems can be resolved satisfactorily and that an index of goods can be
suitably constructed that gives each good its proper weight within the
consequentialist maximand. To incorporate equal or some other pro-
portionate distribution of goods into the maximand may then seem fit-
ting and a promising avenue for consequentialists who seek to provide a
5 One problem with constructing any such index of ultimate goods in a two-
tiered pluralist consequentialist view is that appeals to intuition (or considered
convictions) regarding the proper balance of values that constitute the maxi-
mand seem unavoidable. By themselves, appeals to considered intuitions or
convictions or the balance or reasons are normal in moral thinking. But the
main attraction of consequentialism, I have claimed, is that it outlines a method
for making rational choices between any alternatives and resolving conflicts be-
tween values, duties, and other normative claims. Given a relatively precise
measure of greater and lesser good, there should always be a determinate answer
to the question of which course of action or rule creates greater sum of good-
ness? The problem is that, once a plurality of goods is injected into the maxi-
mand, that precision is lost and we seem thrown back upon the balancing of
intuitions that many sought to avoid by conceiving of rightness and justice as
maximizing the one rational good. My belief is that non-utilitarian and pluralist
consequentialism often fold all the problems of vagueness, indeterminacy and so
on that deontological views are prone to into the maximand, and then fail to
confront or address these problems, since they are concealed by the maximizing
idiom.
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justification for equal rights. But in the end I do not think this strategy
can succeed, for at least two reasons.
First, for the sake of simplicity, let’s assume that equality is given lex-
ical priority among the plurality of values. Presumably, no one would
argue that equal distribution itself is a good, no matter what is being dis-
tributed (e. g. punishment, grades, or Nobel Prizes). Rather the argu-
ment is that equality of some fundamental good, such as equal well-
being, equal opportunities for welfare, equal capabilities, or equal au-
tonomy, is the sole ultimate good that is to be maximized. Any state
of equality of a fundamental good that is strongly Pareto superior (in
G.A. Cohen’s sense) is preferable; thus, situations where each person
enjoys greater equal good outranks situations where all have less equal
good. Now, it may often be the case that affording each person equal
rights of various kinds is a reliable means to realizing the ultimate
good of equal distribution of well-being or opportunities thereto,
equal autonomy, etc. – often, but not always. For as is well known, be-
cause of peoples’ different wants and needs, unequal income and wealth
normally is required to realize greater equality of well-being; and if this
is true of rights to income and wealth, it is as likely to be true of other
rights and liberties, including those that liberal and social democrats re-
gard as fundamental. There is no more reason to think that equal well-
being, or even equal autonomy, or equal non-domination (Pettit), re-
quires equal rights to liberty of conscience and freedom of thought
and expression, or equal rights to freedom of association, choice of oc-
cupation, and the political rights of participation, than to think it re-
quires equal income. People’s well-being, however defined, is affected
by all sorts of social and biological circumstances and contingencies, and
regardless of what sort or degree of compensation they are given, there
is little reason to think that anything approximating equal well-being
can be achieved only when equal basic rights are provided for.
It seems then that we should have to adjust the relative degree to
which any person enjoys and exercises the full panoply of basic rights
so that equality of well-being (or the opportunity thereto) with others
can be approximated and maintained. For each person there should
be some distinctive trade-off and mixture of rights and liberties that de-
termines his or her share and that is needed to maintain approximate
equality of well-being. For example, equal well-being may require
that some people – those who have bad judgment, or care nothing
for politics, or have no concern for the public good – have no right
to vote, and that others who use their votes wisely enjoy several
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times the voting rights that other people enjoy. Or perhaps people who
have proven themselves prone to imprudent life-choices must be de-
prived of a right to make certain crucial life decisions (regarding their
career or marriage partner, for example) if there is to be any hope
that their well-being is to approximate that of others. Here people de-
prived of their right to vote or make crucial life decisions might be
compensated for the resulting loss to their sense of self-respect and
well-being by a greater share of wealth or some other benefit, in
order to bring them up to the level of equal well-being others enjoy.
Academics, journalists, lawyers, writers, and other wordsmiths may re-
quire far more protections of freedom of speech and of expression than
farmers, plumbers and electricians, unless of course these wordsmiths are
prone to expressing obnoxious views that upset large numbers of people
and undermine their fair share of well-being.
The problem then is that there is little reason to believe that equal
basic rights and liberties of the kind prized by liberal and social demo-
crats, or advocates of universal human rights, will be justified by a max-
imand requiring any fixed distribution of well-being, capabilities, au-
tonomous self-determination, non-domination, or any other natural
or non-moral good. But now suppose these difficulties can be over-
come, and that it is safe to assume that equal rights of a familiar and de-
sirable kind are needed to promote equal well-being, equal autonomy,
or some other intrinsically desirable distribution. A further problem is
that it is unreasonable to contend that equality of any state of affairs
should have lexical priority over all other values, or could serve by itself
as a sufficient account of the ultimate good to be maximized. For to
contend that equality of some good has lexical priority or is the only ul-
timate good implies that any state of affairs of equal distribution is better
than any other unequal state, regardless of how little each person has and
how much better off everyone might otherwise be with an unequal dis-
tribution. For example, a state of equal unhappiness would be better
than a state where everyone was generally satisfied with their lives to
differing degrees. To avoid this undesirable outcome, it is reasonable
to incorporate maximum aggregate well-being or some other aggrega-
tive value into the consequentialist maximand. Then, equality of good is
regarded as but one intrinsic value that is to be put into the balance and
weighed off against other intrinsic goods to determine the ultimate
combination of goods that are to be maximized. (This seems to be Tem-
kin’s position.) Then we have an aggregative-distributive dichotomy of
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the kind discussed by welfare economists, now generalized to include
not just income and wealth, but the plurality of ultimate goods.
In this event, there is even less reason to believe that equality of basic
rights can be maintained at the subordinate level of second-order moral
principles. For the plurality of ultimately good ends must be adjusted to
determine the right combination of goods – “organic unity” or “fitting”
or “weighted end” as it might be – that is to be maximized. And there
appears to be very little likelihood that equality of basic rights will be
preserved in the end, nor is there any guarantee that some individuals
will not lose out entirely in the final distribution of certain basic rights
if this is needed to maximize the plurality of goods. Inequalities of rights
of many different kinds, even of rights that are regarded as basic, would
appear to be unavoidable within virtually any pluralist consequentialist
view, including those that are distribution-sensitive.
So it seems that incorporating into the consequentialist maximand
equality and other distribution-sensitive values that rights and norms
of justice instrumentally promote still does not make the case for equal
basic rights and liberties. Once again we have the familiar problem
that consequentialism faces with respect to justice.
IV. Equal rights as an intrinsic good
It may be then that the only way to guarantee equal basic rights and
other norms of justice within a consequentialist framework is to incor-
porate them directly into the ultimate good that is to be maximized
(perhaps giving them lexical priority over other values). This might
seem entirely appropriate. For evidently what is behind many conse-
quentialists’ concern for distribution-sensitivity of the good is the
thought that certain deontological values and norms of justice – the
equal worth and dignity of persons, equal respect for persons, etc. –
are so important and fundamental that they ought to be protected and
promoted as intrinsic values. For example, assume that the ideas of
equal respect, or respect for persons as free equals, are deontological val-
ues – by which is meant, values that can be satisfactorily described and
explicated only by reference to moral concepts and principles such as
equal rights and other concepts of justice. Suppose that we cannot un-
derstand what is involved in the value of equal respect for persons with-
out regarding persons as having, and being recognized as having, certain
equal basic rights and liberties. Naturalistic terms would not suffice to
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describe or explicate this deontological value, just as they do not suffice
to explicate the normative claim that we ought to recognize and treat
other humans with the respect due free and equal moral persons. The
same may be true of the moral ideal of dignity of persons; it too is a de-
ontological value that can only be explicated by appealing to irreducible
moral concepts. If so, then perhaps the best way for a consequentialist to
guarantee the dignity of and respect for persons is to directly incorporate
the equal rights and other norms of justice needed to explicate these
moral concepts into the consequentialist maximand. This goes beyond
the “two-tiered” positions discussed earlier, which regard basic rights
and other principles of justice as second-order rules instrumental to ach-
ieving appropriately distributed well-being, autonomy or some other
non-moral value.
Amaryta Sen has proposed a version of this view, which he has
called “broad consequentialism”.6 He says: “Consequential evaluation
that takes note of freedoms, rights, and obligations, and their violations
would argue that bad things have happened precisely because someone’s
freedom has been breached, and some rights and duties have been vio-
lated”.7 “The fulfillment of rights is a good thing to happen – the more
the better – as it would be seen in a consequential perspective […]” (Sen
2000, 498). Sen suggests as part of consequential evaluation a “conse-
quentialism of rights” that says: (1) “the badness of the violation of
rights, or the goodness of their fulfillment” are to be “included
among the consequences; (2) there can be ‘trade-offs’ between rights;
and (3) there can be ‘trade-offs’ between the goodness of rights fulfill-
ment and other good consequences” (ibid., 499; 499 n.).
Following Sen, I will call such positions “broad consequentialism” –
“broad” because they include both natural states of affairs and moral
principles (including rights) among the plurality of goods to be maxi-
mized, optimized, or otherwise promoted. Unlike the position just dis-
cussed, which says that equal distribution of some natural or social good
is itself an ultimate good, broad consequentialist positions directly incor-
porate deontological values and moral concepts and principles of justice
6 ‘Broad consequentialism’ is the term he initially uses in Sen 1982. ‘Consequen-
tial evaluation’ or ‘evaluation of comprehensive outcomes’ are used in his re-
cent book, The Idea of Justice (Sen 2009), where it is no longer so clear wheth-
er he intends a distinct version of consequentialism, or simply a method of in-
dividual evaluation not tied to any particular moral conception.
7 Sen (2000), at 494 (emphasis added). This paper develops the position set forth
in ‘Rights and Agency’, where Sen also refers to “goal rights systems”.
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into the maximand. Now, offhand it seems that even incorporating
equal basic rights into the good consequences to be maximized will
not solve the problem raised earlier with pluralist consequentialism;
the plurality of values still inevitably will compromise the equality of
basic rights that liberal democrats contend ought to be maintained.
(For example assuming that average well-being and equal rights to
basic liberties are the two goods to be promoted, restrictions on a de-
spised or otherwise insular minority’s freedom of religion may be re-
quired to maximize good consequences.) To avoid inequalities of
basic liberal liberties, the broad consequentialist might propose assigning
lexical priority to certain equal basic liberties and regard the promotion
of other consequentialist values as subject to this priority condition.
Thus, for example, we maximize average or equal (opportunity for)
well-being, or welfare rights to a threshold of capabilities for all, on con-
dition that everyone’s equal basic rights of conscience, expression, asso-
ciation, and freedom and integrity of their person are respected. This
may not be Sen’s position since he envisions trade-offs between rights,
liberties, and other values, but guaranteeing certain basic liberties and
“maximizing” (or at least “satisficing”) their provision before promoting
other values may be one way to maintain the integrity of a liberal dem-
ocrat position within a consequentialist framework.8
Whether or not assigning lexical priority to certain equal basic rights
and liberties is acceptable to consequentialists, a potential problem with
broad consequentialism of any variety is that it can no longer strictly be
maintained that maximizing the good, or promoting the best conse-
quences, is the sole ultimate principle of right. For there are already
non-consequentialist moral principles built into the ultimate good,
and these principles must be balanced off against other ultimate goods
and the measures that instrumentally promote them. What are we to
do when required to instrumentally promote fair procedures or respect
for rights themselves? What if doing so requires that we violate these
same rights and procedures (e. g. violate the rights of a few to protect
similar or other rights enjoyed by the many)? Which principle has pri-
ority then? To say we should decide by maximizing the good provides
8 Since it may not make sense to maximize either basic liberties or two or more
things, it may be better to think in terms of “satisficing” basic liberties for all
before proceeding to maximize other values. How much such a principle
would resemble Rawls’ non-consequentialist first principle of justice requiring
a “fully adequate scheme” of equal basic liberties is worth considering.
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no answer, for we are trying to decide just what that involves. If the
moral principles that are part of the maximand are to be given any in-
dependent weight at all, then it appears that we have in effect two (or
more) separate moral principles at work – a consequentialist principle
that tells us to maximize aggregate goodness (and perhaps its distribu-
tion), and a deontological one that tells us to observe fair impartial pro-
cedures, respect individual rights, or achieve a just distribution for its
own sake. These separate moral principles must be somehow weighed
against one another to decide what is right to do. If this is done intui-
tively and without appeal to some further consequentialist principle,
then broad consequentialism is really a deontological form of moral in-
tuitionism, or a pluralist deontological view.
My own view is that we might as well give up any pretense of max-
imizing the good or promoting the best consequences in broad conse-
quentialism, and face the fact that once principles of right and justice
(including just distributions, fair procedures, or equal rights, respect
for human rights, or fulfillment of duties) are themselves regarded as ul-
timate intrinsic goods to be realized, then we have a full-fledged intui-
tionist position requiring the balancing of both teleological and deonto-
logical principles. It is only in an attenuated sense that such a broad plu-
ralist position can be said to aim to maximize or promote the best con-
sequences overall. For it can be said of most any moral conception that it
promotes or realizes good consequences in the sense it requires that peo-
ple do the best thing overall by conforming to that conception’s princi-
ples. For example, W. D. Ross’ intuitionism might be said to enjoin that
we realize the best consequences. Ross requires balancing a prima facie
teleological principle of benevolence along with prima facie deontolog-
ical principles of justice, fidelity, gratitude, etc., to come up with a
judgment “all things considered”. It does not seem that Ross’ position
formally differs in any significant way from a broad consequentialist po-
sition; the structure is the same. And Ross’ intuitionism is one standard
example of a deontological moral conception.9
Here it is important to see that in his account of consequentialist
evaluation, Sen’s use of ‘maximize’– taken from set theory and contem-
porary axiomatic economic analysis (Sen 2000, 484) – is different from
its use within classical utilitarianism and other traditional teleological
9 Here it’s noteworthy that Sen recognizes that “the substantive gap between
some versions of broad deontology and broad consequentialism may not be
very great” (Sen 2000, 479 n. 5).
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conceptions. Sen uses the term “optimization” to refer to utilitarianism,
and defines ‘maximizing’ so that it involves ordinal rankings of states of
affairs, and moreover “does not demand completeness of ranking”
(ibid., 483). Among the considerations Sen would take into account
in ranking states of affairs as better or worse are the degree to which in-
dividuals’ rights and duties are fulfilled, alongside considerations of how
much individuals’ capabilities, freedoms, and well-being are promoted.
Now to choose the highest ranked option from among an ordinal
ranking of states of affairs which may contain incommensurable ele-
ments is quite different from maximizing (or in Sen’s usage, “optimiz-
ing”) aggregate goodness, conceived as a measurable state of affairs.
There are different ways to “maximize” outcomes in the sense of ach-
ieving ordinal rankings of them. There are also different ways to repre-
sent peoples’ valuations by choice functions of the kind Sen envisions.
In his lectures on Sidgwick, Rawls says that, to avoid confusion,
modern economic analysis and rational choice theory should use a
term such as ‘multiple-objective function’ rather than ‘utility function’
or ‘welfare function’:
Anyone’s moral or political judgments can […] be represented by some
mathematical function. In terms of this function, one can say: they judge
as if they think that in each case society should maximize this function, pro-
mote the best consequences (as defined by this function) […]. [But] mathe-
matically speaking, the representation-function may be such that there is
no natural sense in which it describes the agent as maximizing anything.
E.g. there may be multiple objectives; or lexical orderings (no continuous
representative function) […]. This way of speaking [maximizing a multi-
ple-objective function] implies no specific political conception. The question
then is: what is the shape, or what are the special features of this function; and
what conceptions and principles stand behind it in the thought and judg-
ments of agents (individuals and society)?10
The implicit suggestion here is that no specific moral or political con-
ception, consequentialist or deontological, is implied by “maximizing”
a “multiple-objective” function of the kind Sen advocates, which con-
tains rights and principles of justice in the maximand. It depends upon
what the aims or objectives are that are being pursued or promoted, as
well as the role of any principles involved in agents’ deliberations and
attitudes towards one another. A further implication, I believe, is that
once we uncover these aims and objectives, including the reasons and
10 Rawls 2007, from Sidgwick lecture III, final section. Compare Rawls 1999,
489, where he voices similar thoughts.
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moral principles underlying judgments of good consequences and rank-
ings of states of affairs in broad consequential conceptions, it may be that
we no longer have a view that says that maximizing good states of affairs
is the sole ultimate moral principle. For if we assign any independent
weight at all to the moral considerations of justice, respect for rights,
etc. that are to be maximized, then it follows that there are moral rea-
sons that constrain the maximization or instrumental promotion of total
goodness. And if we do not assign them any independent weight then
rights and other moral concepts serve no real purpose in the maximand,
but only obscure the good consequences or states of affairs that really
inform our judgments about what is the best thing to do.
For example, suppose one of the goods that are part of a broad con-
sequentalist maximand is said to be “equal rights of free expression”.
Offhand, the value being promoted here would seem to be individuals’
freedom of expression itself and perhaps their enjoying the opportunity
to exercise this freedom equally. If so, then it obscures this fact to incor-
porate a deontological principle of (respect for) equal rights to freedom of
expression and claim that “we want to maximize (respect for) equal
rights of free expression”. If what Sen really has in mind is maximizing
equal (opportunities for) freedom of expression, or equal or adequate
capabilities of certain kinds, then his broad “rights-consequentialism”
is really just a confused version of the pluralistic distribution-sensitive
position discussed in the preceding section. On that account equal rights
(to freedom of expression, or adequate capabilities) might be brought in
as an instrumental principle that promotes the achievement of a state of
affairs where individuals enjoy equal (opportunities for) freedom of ex-
pression and adequate capabilities; but in that case, individual rights
themselves are no longer part of the maximand to be promoted.
Moreover, there is a serious question whether it is even coherent to
include rights, fairness, duties, just distributions, and other moral con-
cepts in the maximand of a consequentialist conception. For if we un-
derstand consequentialism as a distinct kind of moral conception that
says that the sole ultimate principle of right and justice is to maximize
good consequences, then it would seem that there is no conceptual
space left for the claim that there are independent reasons of justice
to respect others’ rights, or that states of affairs where individuals respect
one another’s rights and fair procedures ought to be promoted for their
own sake. In so far as requirements of right and justice are incorporated
into the ultimate good to be promoted and are given any weight inde-
pendent of their consequences at all, it is no longer the case that the sole
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ultimate principle of right action is that we maximize the good. For
among the good consequences to be maximized are people respecting
these antecedent non-maximizing moral principles (of fairness, or rec-
ognition of others’ rights, and so on). Suppose that we inquire why peo-
ple ought to conform to these principles. Why should respect for just
these specific rights be so important? Why should they be equal? It’s
not as if individuals respect one another’s rights without reason, detach-
ed from other considerations. The answer to these questions cannot
simply be that individuals’ compliance with these principles (respect
for rights or rules of fairness, etc.) promotes good consequences, for
then the argument becomes circular. (“We should respect others’
equal basic rights in order to maximize good consequences, which in-
clude respecting others’ equal basic rights.”)11 To avoid this circle, the
broad consequentialist would seem to have to concede that respecting
these principles of right is intrinsically good and hence the right thing
to do for its own sake (“precisely because”, as Sen says, rights and duties
ought to be respected). In that event, the ultimate good itself cannot be
described in the absence of an antecedent non-maximizing moral prin-
ciple of right; principles of right are part of its very definition. But then
it is no longer the case that maximizing the good is the sole ultimate
principle of right, and thus we do not have strictly speaking a conse-
quentialist view.
Moreover, if we assume that these antecedent principles of right can
ever provide sufficient reasons to act independently of their consequen-
ces, and we act on them at all for their own sake and the related deon-
tological values they realize (respect for persons, dignity of persons, etc.),
then we are no longer acting in order to maximize good consequences;
thus we no longer satisfy the consequentialist requirement that requires
that we always act so as to maximize good consequences. Rather these
non-consequentialist principles (respect for others’ rights for example)
and the deontological values they realize are sufficient justification,
and we act upon these principles for their own sake – not for the
11 The charge of circularity here resembles Sidgwick’s response to the claim that
virtuous conduct is the ultimate good to be rationally promoted, or maximized:
“If we mean by Virtue conformity to such prescriptions and prohibitions as
make up the main part of the morality of Common Sense, [then] to say that
‘General Good’ consists solely in general Virtue….would obviously involve
us in a logical circle; since we have seen that the exact determination of
these prescriptions and prohibitions must depend on the definition of this Gen-
eral Good” (Sidgwick 1981, 392).
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sake of further good consequences they promote. To say that we then
maximize the good or promote good consequences by acting on
these very non-instrumental principles of right is uninformative if not
empty.
Perhaps one way to interpret a broad consequentialism that avoids
these problems is to contend that it is an intrinsically valuable state of
affairs when people, no matter what their reasons or what principles
they consciously observe, act in ways that fulfill and do not violate oth-
ers’ rights. If they do so because they think they have a non-consequen-
tialist moral duty (e. g. to respect others as equal moral persons, or to do
justice for its own sake), then their reasons for respecting others’ rights
are false, just as their reasons are false if they think they are under a duty
to respect rights because God commands them to do so. But the fact that
people might need to falsely believe in fundamental deontological prin-
ciples and values or the existence of God in order to be sufficiently mo-
tivated to not violate others’ rights is neither here nor there. The only
reason they really have for recognizing others’ rights is to do their part in
maximizing the sum total of rights-satisfying actions. In this event, it cannot
be said of people generally that “they ought to respect one another’s
rights precisely because [as Sen says] rights ought to be respected”. For
the only reason there can be to respect anyone’s rights on any occasion
is that it results in still greater numbers of rights-respecting actions. This
position is suggested (though I do not think intended) when Sen says:
“The fulfillment of rights is a good thing to happen – the more the bet-
ter – as it would be seen in a consequential perspective […]”.12
It’s hard to know what to make of this suggestion. To begin with, it
offers little prospect of guaranteeing equal basic rights, for it regards
rights as detached from the persons who bear those rights, and demands
that we maximize aggregate rights-satisfactions (or minimize rights vio-
lations) without regard to their distribution among persons. Thus the
rights of some might need to be violated wholesale, in order to mini-
mize total rights-violations overall. More problematic still, this position
would seem to have absurd consequences. If rights-fulfillments were
themselves among the states of affairs to be maximized, then (for exam-
ple) it would make sense for us to go about manufacturing rights claims
12 Sen 2000, 498. Sen refers on p.499, n.34, to Nozick’s suggestion of a “utilita-
rianism of rights”, which would seem to be prone to this problem since it says
that we ought to maximize rights-satisfactions, or alternatively minimize-rights
violations. See Nozick 1974, 28–29.
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for no other reason than maximizing rights-satisfactions; for example,
we might enter into trivial agreements and make legal commitments
to fulfill thousands of promises and contracts we otherwise would not
dream of making, for no purpose other than creating rights in others
with corresponding duties that we fulfill. What could be the point of
maximizing rights-fulfillments, so regarded? (Minimizing rights-viola-
tions would have opposite effects: we minimize prospective violations
of rights by failing to exercise or create those rights; for example, we
should avoid entering into legal transactions creating rights others
might violate; or we should cease expressing ourselves in controversial
ways, to deprive government of opportunities to violate our free expres-
sion rights.)13 The idea that there is something intrinsically good about
the state of affairs of (maximum) rights-fulfillments – where rights are
regarded as detached from peoples’ projects, relations, and reasons for
interacting in a particular way – is peculiar, to say the least.
In any case, I do not think this interpretation of rights-consequen-
tialism solves the problems I’ve raised earlier, since we still need some
explanation of why states of affairs where rights are respected are
worth pursuing for their own sake. The answer cannot be: “They
just are; it’s self-evident”; nor can it be: “Because respecting rights is
instrumental to other goods”.14 Moreover, we need an explanation as
to which rights are most important and ought to be respected as funda-
mental, why just these rights and not others should be equally distributed,
and so on. I do not see a way to address these questions without invok-
ing deontological reasons and moral principles that explicate such deon-
tological values as respect for persons as free and equal, the dignity of
persons, and so on. Once these reasons are invoked, we no longer
have a consequentialist view.
13 The position is also prone to the population problems and other excessive num-
bers problems that consequentialists often confront – for example, if the sum of
rights-satisfactions ought to be maximized then offhand we would seem to be
under a duty to increase population to as many people as needed to maximize
the number of rights-satisfying actions. Minimizing rights-violations would
have the opposite effect in requiring extraordinary birth control measures.
14 For example, if the answer is that respecting rights increases individuals’ free-
dom and autonomy, then we have an example of the kind of position discussed
in the preceding section that Bill Talbott contends for, and not a position that
says that respect for rights is an intrinsically good state of affairs that ought to be
maximized.
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To conclude, I have argued that broad consequentialist positions
and consequentialisms of rights like Sen’s are either incoherent, or
they are not what they pretend to be. We can make perfectly good
sense of what is going on in broad consequentialism within a traditional
intuitionist framework where consequentialist principles are combined
with and weighed or balanced against deontological principles as well
as each other. Depending on the weights or importance assigned to
each of the plurality of principles involved, sometimes individual rights
may be traded off in order to promote greater rights-fulfillment; some-
times they may be traded off to promote other values; and sometimes
individual rights should be enforced simply for their own sake ( just as
Sen suggests (Sen 2000, 499 n.). But in striking a balance among
these consequentialist and deontological principles, nothing is being
maximized in any informative sense, certainly not in the sense of max-
imizing the “one rational good” that has driven teleological conceptions
from Plato’s perfectionism to modern forms of utilitarianism.15 The fact
that Sen describes what is going on in terms of maximizing a mathemat-
ical function does not alter this fact, even if it might create an illusion to
the contrary.
V. Conclusion
I have discussed three common strategies for incorporating the idea of
equal rights – which is essential to both liberal and democratic thought
– into a consequentialist framework, and have argued that each has seri-
ous if not insurmountable problems. This does not mean that all conse-
quentialist efforts to incorporate equal rights must meet with failure. If
we abandon the act-consequentialist principle which assesses the right-
ness of actions solely by their individual tendency to maximize the
good, then there may be a way to formulate an indirect-rule-conse-
quentialist conception and defense of equal rights. The kind of rule-util-
itarianism implicit in Hume’s account of justice, or in Rawls’ practice-
conception of rules, and perhaps other versions, in effect deny the act-
consequentialist assumption that rightness consists in maximizing the
good.16 Instead, they usually begin with the common sense assumption
15 On the doctrine of the one rational good, see Rawls 1999b, 360.
16 See Rawls 1999c. Brad Hooker (2011), section 8, also argues that rule conse-
quentialists reject the assumption that right actions should maximize the good.
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that morality is interpersonal, and that the rightness of actions involves
obedience to certain impartial rules, including rules that bestow upon
individuals the necessary rights and powers needed for each person to
safely and freely pursue his or her individual interests. Taking maximally
good consequences into account is rarely, if ever, a legitimate reason for
individuals or even governments to act upon. Instead it enters into rule
consequentialist justifications (if at all), not at the level of deciding right-
ness of actions, but in the justification of the entire system of rules and
specification of the kinds of rights that individuals ought to have. My
argument does not address these positions, which on the whole seem
to be a more promising way for consequentialists to argue for equal
moral rights.
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Human rights as rights
Rowan Cruft
This essay makes three suggestions: first, that it is attractive to conceive
individualistic justification as one of the hallmarks – maybe even the one
hallmark – of human rights; secondly, that combining this conception
of human rights with standard worries about socioeconomic rights
can tempt one to take the phrase “human rights” to refer to any indi-
vidualistically justified weighty normative consideration (including con-
siderations that are not rights); and thirdly, that reflections on the indi-
viduation of rights and rights’ dynamic quality give us some reason to
resist this temptation – though this reason is interestingly inconclusive.
Human rights as individualistically justified
In recent work, Joseph Raz has adopted a “political” conception ac-
cording to which a central, defining function of human rights is to
set limits to state sovereignty, limits that require states to “account for
their compliance with human rights to international tribunals where
the jurisdictional conditions are in place, and to responsibly acting peo-
ple and organisations outside the state”.1 Part of Raz’s motivation for
this “political” conception is, I venture, a dissatisfaction with the rival
view that takes “human rights” to be a secular way of referring to
what would once have been called “natural rights”: those important
moral rights that people hold simply in virtue of being human. Of
course, this “natural rights” conception might – like Raz’s “political”
conception – make human rights matters of international concern,
but this will be a derivative rather than an essential feature of them
qua human rights.
Raz writes that human rights are “thought to combine exceptional
importance and universality. Even though various writers have offered
explanations of the first element, that of importance, none seems to
1 Raz 2010, 42. Compare the different “political” conceptions of human rights in
Beitz 2009; Cohen 2006; Dworkin 2011, ch. 15; Pogge 2002; Rawls 1999.
me successful” (Raz 2010, 39). A successful explanation here would
make a special kind of importance the distinctive feature of human
rights, thereby bypassing the need to distinguish them by their (purport-
ed) special political role. The explanations of human rights’ importance
on offer tend to make them distinctive as protectors of particular impor-
tant substantive values – personhood, needs, freedoms (Griffin 2008;
Miller 2007, ch. 7; Wiggins 1987, ch. 1; Sen 2004). I share Raz’s con-
cern about these accounts. It seems doubtful that anything can be both
narrow enough to qualify as a genuinely distinct substantive value (‘the’
value that human rights protect) yet still broad enough to encompass all
the things we want to call human rights.2
But Raz fails to notice that his own account of rights in general is
better taken as a theory of the narrower category, human rights, a theory
that gives human rights a special kind of importance which renders un-
necessary a further political account of human rights’ distinctiveness.
Raz’s celebrated general account of rights is as follows:
“X has a right” if and only if X can have rights and, other things being
equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for
holding some other person(s) to be under a duty (Raz 1986, 166).
According to this account, all rights are individualistically justified,
where this means that any given right is justified by what it does for
its holder, considered independently of whether it serves or disserves
people other than its holder. To put this more precisely, a person P’s
right R is individualistically justified if and only if:
1. Some genuine feature F of P is of sufficient non-instrumental im-
portance to constitute a powerful (i. e. hard to defeat) ground for
P’s holding a right that will protect, serve or in some other way en-
sure respect for F – and R is such a right.
2. This ground is undefeated and hence R is justified.3
On Raz’s account, the relevant individualistic right-justifying feature F
will always be some interest of the individual right-holder, an interest
sufficient on its own to justify a duty. Alternative individualistic ap-
proaches make each right justified by how it serves its holder’s autono-
2 For a pluralist approach which allows that various values can ground human
rights when they are appropriately “important”, see Tasioulas 2002.
3 This draws on my Cruft 2006, 154–158.
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my or needs, or by how it embodies its holder’s self-ownership or sta-
tus.4
Individualistic approaches are too narrow to work as general ac-
counts of rights. They fail to explain the many cases in which a right’s
existence depends on something other than the importance of some as-
pect of the right-holder. Trivial property rights (e. g. my property rights
over my pen) are a good counter-example: such rights are clearly mo-
rally justified, but they are surely not justified simply by what they do
for their individual holders, whether this is conceived in terms of inter-
ests, autonomy or status. I have argued elsewhere that most of an indi-
vidual’s justified property rights are justified because the property system
of which they are a part serves the common good (Cruft 2006). Indi-
vidualistic accounts exclude this plausible possibility. This is just one
type of counterexample, but a survey of our morally justified rights sug-
gests that many are justified on non-individualistic grounds, including
the importance of the development of knowledge for its own sake
(e. g. a scientist’s right to pursue research whose results could threaten
cherished religious beliefs), the common good (e. g. the system of rights
created by traffic regulations), the value of beauty (e. g. your right that I
not interrupt your musical performance).
Raz thinks he can accommodate these counter-examples. He con-
siders a journalist’s right to withhold the names of her sources. Raz sug-
gests that this right cannot be justified solely by how it serves the inter-
ests of its holder (an individual journalist), but must instead be justified
in part by how it serves the common good. To accommodate this ex-
ample, Raz allows that a person can qualify as a right-holder even when
that person’s interests only justify duties because serving these interests
in this way also serves other people’s interests. Thus Raz maintains
that the journalist has a right not to reveal her sources because (as re-
quired by his theory) the journalist’s interests justify a duty. Yet he
maintains that the journalist’s interests only justify this duty because
serving them also serves the common good.5 While Raz presents this
as a way to interpret his theory it is actually an admission of defeat
4 The following theorists are all plausibly read as offering individualistic accounts
of rights, although they differ over the particular feature of the individual (e. g.
freedom, interests, needs) that grounds rights, and how exactly the grounding
works: Hart 1955; Kamm 2007, sect. II; Miller 2007, ch. 7; Nagel 2002,
ch. 3; Pogge 2002; Sreenivasan 2010.
5 Raz 1986, 179. See also Raz 1994, 49–55.
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for, as Kamm notes, “[i]f the satisfaction of the interests of others is the
reason why the journalist gets a right to have his interest protected, his
interest is not sufficient to give rise to the duty of non-interference with
his speech”.6
In my view, the individualistic account is most attractive when ap-
plied to those basic rights a person has simply in virtue of being human.
For example, my right not to be dismembered is plausibly individualisti-
cally justified. It is natural to regard my bodily integrity as a feature of
me that is of sufficient non-instrumental importance on its own – inde-
pendently of whether this serves people other than me – to constitute a
powerful ground for rights protecting it, including a right not to be dis-
membered. The other basic rights that protect our most important fea-
tures are similarly plausibly individualistically justified. Why not, then,
take individualistic justification as the hallmark of human rights? This
would furnish us with a conception of human rights within the “natural
rights” tradition, but one that defines them by the distinctively individ-
ualistic structure of their justification, rather than by some distinctive
value (personhood, needs, freedom) that they all purportedly serve.
On this account, a right will qualify as a human right whenever it is jus-
tified simply by what it “does for” its holder considered independently
of whether it serves or disserves others. This “doing something for” the
holder might involve serving the holder’s interests, or protecting her
needs, or securing her freedom, or reflecting her status, etc. So long
6 Kamm 2002, 485. For Raz’s commitment to the sufficiency of the right-holder’s
interests for grounding a duty, see Raz’s original definition of rights at Raz
1986, 166 and also ibid., 183–184. As well as the response to the journalist
case considered in the main text, Raz also offers a second response, aimed at
counter-examples in which a person lacks any interest in having a right (as op-
posed to cases like the journalist, in which the right-holder might have some
interest in their right, but not an interest sufficient on its own to constitute a
powerful ground for duties). Of someone whose property is “more trouble
than it is worth”, Raz says “[t]heir rights serve their interests as persons with
[certain general characteristics] , but they may be against their interests overall”
(ibid., 180). But in what sense do I have any interest in my property qua prop-
erty-owner, if all things considered I would be better off without my property?
And if we allow that people can have such ‘kind’- or ‘role’-based interests, why
should we see them as possessing any justificatory force in the grounding of du-
ties? And even if we allow this, won’t such force be derived from the justifi-
cation for the existence of the relevant general kind (i. e. property owner), a jus-
tification that will surely refer, in non-individualistic fashion, to more than sim-
ply the importance of serving or respecting one member of this kind?
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as the right’s justification is individualistic, it will be a human right
whatever the particular values at work in the justification.
The individualistic approach to human rights is very attractive: as
well as avoiding the difficulty of finding some single substantive value
that all human rights serve, it gives center stage to the common concern
that non-individualistic theories of human rights are inadequate. For ex-
ample, according to welfarist consequentialism, if the long run collective
interest would be best promoted by denying human rights to certain
people, then there would be no justification for the existence of
human rights for the relevant people. Concern about this counter-intui-
tive implication is, in part, what motivates John Rawls’s famous claim
that “[u]tilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between per-
sons” (Rawls 1971, 27). If human rights are individualistically justified
then they offer the special protection grounded in respect for each sep-
arate person that Rawls identifies as necessary – while other rights need
not, and might be justified on consequentialist or other non-individual-
istic grounds.
Defining human rights by their individualistic justificatory structure
seems a promising route for those who want to avoid adopting a “po-
litical” conception of such rights. But two problems might seem press-
ing. First, can the individualistic approach make sense of human rights
that protect social goods – such as the rights to political participation or
to freedom of speech?7 In my view, such rights can be explained as in-
dividualistically justified: for example, the individual’s interest in being
able to have a say in how their community is run seems sufficiently im-
portant on its own to constitute a powerful ground for a right to polit-
ical participation for the relevant individual, independently of whether
this would serve anyone other than this individual. Of course, the right-
justifying interest’s existence depends on the social nature of our world,
but that does not undermine the fact that it justifies a right in an indi-
vidualistic way: given its very great importance to its possessor, it con-
stitutes a powerful right-justifying ground independently of whether
this would serve anyone else.8
7 As in his handling of the journalist’s right not to reveal her sources, Raz is will-
ing to depart from strict individualism in accounting for traditional civil rights
such as the right of free speech; he allows that my possession of this right might
be justified in part by what it does for people other than me (Raz 1986, 179–
180).
8 Note that the thoughts in this paragraph can be re-run without using the con-
cept of interests. Note also that related criticisms will charge the individualistic
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A second problem is of more concern: the individualistic approach
seems over-inclusive, for it seems to encompass a person’s right to
spousal fidelity, their right not to be murdered and many other rights
that are very important, but whose classification as “human rights” is
doubtful. For my spouse’s being faithful to me is sufficiently important
on its own, in terms of what it does for me, to justify a right held by me.
And my not being murdered is similarly clearly sufficiently important to
ground an individualistic justification in this way.
Here I think the theorist faces a difficult choice. Many writers – in-
cluding Gewirth, Sen, Tasioulas and Wellman – are willing to allow that
human rights encompass a range of very important rights including
“personal” ones such as the right to a say in key family decisions, or
the right not to be lied to by one’s friends.9 If this seems too inclusive,
then we could add that human rights are distinguished not only as indi-
vidualistically justified, but also as rights that are “everybody’s business”
– not in the sense that they must entail duties for everyone, for the
human right to free speech, for example, seems primarily to entail duties
for governments and organizations, and not for “ordinary individuals”.10
Rather, the suggestion is that human rights are distinguished as those
rights respect for which can be legitimately demanded on the right-
holder’s behalf by anyone anywhere.11
approach with (i) being unable to accommodate group rights as human rights,
and (ii) being unable to guarantee the universality of human rights. While many
significant theorists doubt that group rights can be genuine human rights (e. g.
Griffin 2008, ch. 15; Wellman 2011, 66–69), my individualistic approach does
not exclude this possibility. It allows that a group right could be individualisti-
cally justified (and hence qualify as a human right) when some feature of the
group considered on its own is sufficiently important to constitute a powerful
ground for the group’s holding a right. Similarly, the individualistic approach
will imply that human rights are universally held if the features of each person
sufficient on their own to justify rights are universal features. The antecedent
here is endorsed by those like Tasioulas who espouse individualistic accounts
of human rights via commitment to Raz’s account of rights in general (see Ta-
sioulas 2002, at p. 87, for defence of the idea that human rights are universally
held, but not across time).
9 The first example is drawn from Sen 1999, 229, the second from Gewirth 1982,
56; see also Wellman 2011, 36–39 and Tasioulas’s contribution to this volume,
“On the Nature of Human Rights”.
10 For the view that human rights must entail duties for all others, see, e. g., Well-
man 2011, 26.
11 I am tempted by John Skorupski’s suggestion that “to demand” in this context
means to make a request backed by a permissibly enforceable threat – where this
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This might still seem too inclusive because many of the most impor-
tant individual moral rights that are standardly protected by the criminal
law (such as my rights not to be murdered or assaulted) are both indi-
vidualistically justified and demandable by anyone on the right-holder’s
behalf – but the conventions of international law, and many thinkers
working on human rights, deny that such ordinary individual criminal
law rights are human rights.12 To narrow the concept further one
could add that human rights are not only (i) individualistically justified
and (ii) demandable by anyone anywhere but also (iii) rights whose vi-
olation can trigger legitimate international intervention. This would be
to add a strong Rawlsian version of the “political” conception of human
rights to my proposed individualistic justificatory one.13
In my view, linguistic usage underdetermines the choice between
the three ways of conceiving human rights sketched above. Quite fre-
quently one encounters the term “human rights” used to refer to any
very important rights – and this importance, I think, is best accounted
for in terms of individualistic justification. But one also encounters
the thesis that human rights cannot be too “private” in the way Ge-
wirth, Sen, Tasioulas and Wellman allow; instead, a particular human
rights violation must be everyone’s business. And the recent growth
of “political” conceptions of human rights reflects a very significant
strand in current human rights discourse.14 It is tempting to try to
argue that when an individualistically justified right possesses features
(ii) and (iii), this is precisely because it is individualistically justified.
For feature (ii), this argument would be that if something (an interest,
need etc.) is sufficiently important to ground an individualistic justifica-
force could be merely social and hence need not involve the type of interna-
tional military intervention that would make the position outlined here collapse
into the “political” position that I am about to introduce in the next paragraph
of the main text (Skorupski 2010, 310).
12 See, e. g., Pogge 2002, ch. 2.
13 Weaker versions of the ‘political’ account – such as that (iv) support for, con-
doning, or maybe even simply allowing violation of human rights is sufficient
to undermine a state’s legitimacy, or to render certain weak forms of interven-
tion justified – do not so obviously help exclude all the moral rights recognised
by criminal law from qualifying as human rights. For it is not implausible to say
that the more a state supports, condones or allows common assaults, rape, mur-
der, fraud and theft, the less legitimate it is, and the more justified weak inter-
national intervention (e. g. official reprimands) can be.
14 See especially Charles Beitz’s argument that the ‘political’ account best reflects
the actual ‘practice’ of human rights (Beitz 2009).
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tion for a right then it will be important enough to legitimate anyone’s
demanding respect for it, unless (as in the case of “private” spousal and
familial rights) so doing would fail to respond appropriately to the par-
ticularly “private” grounding value in question. For feature (iii), the ar-
gument would be that if something is sufficiently important to ground
an individualistic justification for a right then it will be important
enough ceteris paribus to justify international intervention in the right’s
support – it is just that for many individualistically justified rights in
many contexts ceteris is not paribus when the costs of international in-
tervention are considered.
Luckily, I do not need to pursue these arguments for my purposes.
All I need is the thesis that individualistic justification is one of the de-
fining features of human rights. I must confess that I am doubtful that a
political function in terms of international intervention is a further de-
fining feature. Taking this as essential to human rights makes their ex-
istence too contingent on the existence of a system of nations, on inter-
vention being a genuine possibility etc.; and it risks overly narrowing
the set of human rights. But I do not need to pursue this here. My
aim in this section has been merely to argue that individualistic justifi-
cation is one of the defining features of human rights; this offers a plau-
sible secular way of thinking about human rights as forms of “natural
right”, a way that makes sense of the distinctive importance of
human rights without tying them to any particular grounding value.
It does not rule out supplementary defining features of types (ii) and
(iii).
The temptation to deny that human rights are rights
Surprisingly many theorists deny, implicitly or explicitly, that human
rights need be rights. This position allows that of course some human
rights are rights, such as the right not to be tortured. But other
human rights – often socioeconomic human rights in particular (to
food, holidays or “the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health”)15 – are, it is alleged or implied, not genuinely rights at all, but
15 The quotation is from the notoriously demanding Art. 12 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
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rather goals or important values.16 This thesis that human rights are not
all genuine rights, and that this is not a problem for human rights dis-
course, has been explicitly defended by James Nickel:
One approach that should be avoided puts a lot of weight on whether the
norm in question really is, or could be, a right in a strict sense. […] This
approach begs the question of whether human rights are rights in a strict
sense rather than a fairly loose one. The human rights movement and its
purposes are not well served by being forced into a narrow conceptual
framework (Nickel 2010).
Note that the position under consideration accepts that the majority of
human rights listed in international law are genuine human rights ; it sim-
ply denies that this makes them genuine rights. Some human rights are
better conceived not as rights but as goals or important values or some
other non-right consideration.
Why think this? All the reasons to think it stem from the premise
that genuine rights have a strict logical relation to directed duties (duties
owed to someone). Most common is the assumption that rights must
entail such duties. This can mean either that rights are Hohfeldian
claims, in which case any right with a certain content must strictly cor-
relate with a directed duty (owed to the right-holder) with the same
content, or that a given right must (in non-Hohfeldian fashion) be
the ground for a changing set of directed duties owed to the right-hold-
er and perhaps to others.17 Some also allow Hohfeldian privileges, pow-
ers and immunities – and combinations of these positions along with
claims – to constitute rights.18 But, the premise maintains, something
cannot be a right if it lacks some such relation to directed duties.
Thus one reason for adopting the position sketched by Nickel above
is that socio-economic human rights work in a duty-independent way
in international law. Carl Wellman writes: “a real right imposes definite
obligations upon some second party, but the International Covenant on
16 For the charge that Griffin 2008 does not do enough to distinguish his account
of human rights as genuinely grounding rights, see Tasioulas 2010; see Griffin
2010 for a reply.
17 For the former position, see Hohfeld 1964, Kramer 1998. For the latter, see
Raz 1986, 171. See the discussion in the next section below.
18 See e. g. my Cruft 2004; Wellman 2011; Wenar 2010. A privilege to do X is
constituted by the absence of a duty not to do X; a power is (to put it roughly
and imprecisely) constituted by the ability to create a new duty; an immunity is
(similarly roughly) constituted by someone else’s disability to create a new duty
for one (for precise details, see Hohfeld 1964).
Human rights as rights 137
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights commits state parties only to
take steps progressively to achieve the goals it affirms. This seems to
give unlimited discretion to state parties as to what steps they will
take and when they will take them” (Wellman 2011, 71). Those who
think that all human rights are genuine rights can respond to this con-
cern in two ways. First, one might argue that even a mere discretionary
requirement to take “steps progressively to achieve” socio-economic
goods for individuals is a directed duty owed to right-holders, and
hence can correlate with a genuine right in international law, a right
that such steps be taken within the addressee’s discretion. If one takes
the Hohfeldian view that the content of a claim-right is given by the
content of the duties it entails, then this will make the content of the
right to health (to take one example) in international human rights
law rather weaker than perhaps it should be – but it will leave it as a
genuine right, entailing genuine (if weak) directed duties.19 Secondly
and perhaps more persuasively, one might argue that the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights is simply mistaken
in its account of what is entailed by socio-economic human rights. The
morally justified rights that ground human rights law in this area entail
demanding moral directed duties that go beyond the weak requirement
to take progressive steps within one’s discretion.
This response takes us to a second reason to deny that socio-eco-
nomic human rights are genuine rights: they are perceived to be too de-
manding to be justified as rights. Thus Nickel again:
Treating very demanding rights as goals has several advantages. One is that
proposed goals that exceed one’s abilities are not as farcical as proposed du-
ties that exceed one’s abilities. Creating grand lists of human rights that
many countries cannot at present realize seems fraudulent to many people,
and perhaps this fraudulence is reduced if we understand that these “rights”
are really goals that countries should promote. […] Another advantage is
that goals are flexible; addressees with different levels of ability can choose
ways of pursuing the goals that suit their circumstances and means. Because
19 See Nickel’s related thoughts on ‘right-goal mixtures’ (Nickel 2010). One
might see the ‘discretion’ element as incompatible with genuine rights-correla-
tive duties, because it seems to make the duty in international law at most a
Kantian ‘imperfect’ duty. However, I see no reason why ‘imperfect’ duties, if
defined as duties which allow discretion in their exercise, need not be owed to people
and thereby correlate with rights.
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of these attractions of goals, it will be worth exploring ways to transform
very demanding human rights into goals.20
Note that Nickel is not here appealing to “ought implies can” to deny
the logical possibility of rights entailing jointly unfulfillable duties.21 He
is rather arguing that it is “farcical” or “fraudulent” to ascribe rights that
entail duties which vastly exceed what their bearers can do. The thought
is that if an impoverished state could not afford to educate more than a
few of its citizens, then all citizens’ holding genuine rights to be educat-
ed entailing state-borne duties to all citizens to educate them would be
“farcical” or “fraudulent” – but not logically inconsistent, because the
state could afford to educate each individual, taken separately.22
One response – a response that Nickel partially endorses23 – takes
this worry to conceive human rights as too state-focused. If states are
not the primary addressees of human rights, but just one addressee
among others (including all other human individuals, all states and inter-
national institutions), then while some socio-economic duties for im-
poverished states might “farcically” vastly exceed their abilities, similar
rights-derived socio-economic duties borne by wealthy individuals,
states and international institutions will often not do so. Certainly
there can be no human right to that which cannot be provided by
human agency at all, but most people’s socio-economic rights are not
20 Nickel 2010. Somewhat similar thoughts are evident in Dorsey 2005. For the
related thought that fixating on the violation of the Hohfeldian duties correla-
tive to human rights impoverishes human rights discourse, see Brems 2009. And
for the claim that even ‘negative’ or ‘civil’ human rights frequently fail to entail
individually borne directed duties in a traditional way, see Ashford 2006. For
reasons of space I cannot examine Ashford and Brems in the detail they
merit; instead I focus on Nickel’s approach here – and, indeed, on just the
one aspect of Nickel’s approach sketched in the quotations in the main text.
Nickel’s full position encompasses many alternative moves too.
21 For a plausible argument that sometimes jointly unfufillable duties are logically
consistent, see Waldron 1989.
22 For a similar concern – about taking Waldron’s argument for the compatibility
of unfulfillable duties as a ready answer to those who worry about conflicting
rights – see Eddy 2006 at p. 351: “An uncomfortable implication of [Waldron’s]
approach is that if there are twenty million people who are at risk of disease, and
only enough vaccine for one person, we would have to say that all twenty mil-
lion people had a right to the vaccine”. Not inconsistent, perhaps, but surely
farcical.
23 See, e. g., Nickel 2007, 150.
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in this category.24 Instead, there is enough wealth in the world that some
allocation of directed duties (to educate Joe, provide medical care for
Jill, etc.) will be possible that ensures that most people have most of
their socio-economic human rights fulfilled. The allocation will confer
weighty duties on the wealthy, but not on impoverished states. In this
way farcicality can be avoided even with genuine Hohfeldian duty-cor-
relative socio-economic rights.
A more concessive response accepts that it is valuable to regard a
person’s state or government as having special responsibilities vis-à-vis
her human rights. We might therefore resist the conclusion that if
your state genuinely cannot afford to educate more than a few of its citi-
zens, then you no longer hold the human right to education against
your state but only against those who can afford to educate you. But de-
nying that you and your fellows’ human rights against your state entail
genuine directed duties borne by that state is not the only way to go.
One could instead maintain that you and your fellows’ rights to educa-
tion entail less demanding duties for your state, but directed duties
nonetheless : duties owed to citizens, to work towards universal educa-
tion, say, by developing the national economy and infrastructure. Nick-
el considers and partially endorses this alternative too.25 It involves aban-
doning the Hohfeldian premise that a person’s genuine claim-right,
against some second party, to X (e. g. to be educated) must entail duties,
borne by that second party, to ensure X for that person (i. e. to educate
the person). But it is consistent with the non-Hohfeldian view that a
right to X can ground a range of contextually variable directed duties,
not all of which will be straightforwardly to supply X. A position incon-
sistent even with non-Hohfeldian views would have to maintain that
you and your fellows have human rights to education against your
state but your state has no directed duties generated by this right; at
most, it has some strong reasons or maybe some undirected duties to
adopt some relevant goals, say. I shall return to this position in a mo-
ment (I split it into positions (2) and (3) below).
First I should consider a third reason to deny that socio-economic
human rights are genuine rights. Onora O’Neill writes:
24 See Miller 2007, 186. As Miller’s discussion makes clear, that duties cannot re-
quire what humans cannot provide is compatible with some very demanding
duties and rights.
25 See, e. g., Nickel 2007, 151–152.
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[T]he correspondence of universal liberty rights to universal obligations is
relatively well-defined even when institutions are missing or weak. For ex-
ample, violation of a right not to be raped or of a right not to be tortured
may be clear enough, and the perpetrator may even be identifiable, even
when institutions for enforcement are lamentably weak. But the corre-
spondence of universal rights to goods and services to obligations to pro-
vide or deliver remains entirely amorphous when institutions are missing
or weak. Somebody who receives no [subsistence supplies] may no
doubt assert that her rights have been violated, but unless obligations to de-
liver that care have been established and distributed, she will not know
where to press her claim, and it will be systematically obscure whether
there is any perpetrator, or who has neglected or violated her rights
(O’Neill 2000, 105).
Without institutionalization of assistance duties, it is (sometimes) ex-
tremely unclear who bears the duty to assist a person needing assistance.
But if there is nobody who bears the duty to the needy individual, then
that individual cannot have a right, because rights correlate with duties.
Against this charge, one can argue that while the directed duties cor-
relative to socio-economic rights are epistemically obscure without in-
stitutions, they are nonetheless genuinely allocated, and closer examina-
tion of principles of justice will reveal their allocation. Proposals in the
literature include Barry’s contribution principle, Kamm’s principle of
the importance of proximity, Miller’s “connection theory” of responsi-
bility, Wenar’s least-cost principle, Wringe’s suggestion that such duties
are borne by everyone collectively (Barry 2005; Kamm 2007, sect. III;
Miller 2007, 99–107; Wenar 2007, Wringe 2005). If any one of these
proposals is correct, then while the allocation of directed duties corre-
lative to pre-institutional socio-economic rights is obscure, it is none-
theless determinate.
However, it is unlikely that any such principle will always allocate
directed duties to states or governments. Impoverished states or govern-
ments will not be captured by either the “capacity” or “least cost” prin-
ciples, and if they are also post-apartheid or postcolonial states or gov-
ernments, then they might not be captured by the “contribution” prin-
ciple. It seems to me that the strongest reason to go down the route
sketched in the quotation from Nickel at the start of this section – to
weaken the link between human rights and directed duties, and thereby
undermine the thesis that human rights are always genuine rights – arises
from a commitment to seeing human rights as always importantly held
against one’s state or government. This thesis is evident in the way
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human rights language is used, and in the popularity of the “political”
conception.
If on this basis we want to say that even citizens of deeply impov-
erished states hold human rights against their governments to a range
of socio-economic goods that their governments cannot supply widely,
then to avoid “farcicality” we will need to allow that such human rights
need not entail directed duties to supply their precise content to each
right-holder. Instead, we must hold one of the following three posi-
tions:
(1) Certain socio-economic human rights held against impoverished gov-
ernments entail, contra Hohfeld, directed duties (owed to right-holders)
borne by the relevant governments, the content of which differs from
the content of the human right in question (e. g. my human right to a pri-
mary education entails for my government only a duty, owed to me, to
work towards primary educational provision, rather than a duty to educate
me).
As noted earlier, even fairly demanding socio-economic human rights
like the right to be educated might well entail directed duties borne
by beings other than the state in a way that fits the Hohfeldian model
(e. g. duties to educate Joe and Jill, allocated by principles like the “ca-
pacity” or “least cost” ones) – and to that extent such human rights will
be genuine rights even on the Hohfeldian view. But in their central, im-
portant role as binding governments, they will on the Hohfeldian view
not be genuine rights held against governments if they only entail gov-
ernmental duties of type (1).
(2) Certain socio-economic human rights held against impoverished gov-
ernments entail, contra even non-Hohfeldians, only undirected duties
borne by the relevant governments.
(3) Certain socio-economic human rights held against impoverished gov-
ernments entail no duties whatsoever for the relevant governments, but
at best non-right normative factors such as strong reasons to adopt certain
policy goals.
Anything less than (3) – e. g. the view that socio-economic human
rights need entail only weak reasons, or perhaps need entail no norma-
tive factor whatsoever, for their holders’ governments – will leave
human rights doing very little indeed in terms of their relationship to
right-holders’ governments.
Position (1) is quite common in the literature, though its adherents
do not normally think of it as involving a rejection of the thesis that
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human rights are genuine rights. They simply reject the Hohfeldian
premise that a genuine claim-right to X must correlate with a directed
duty to supply X; instead, they maintain merely that genuine rights
must entail some directed duties, though the duties entailed might
change, and need not share the content of the right.26 Position (2) is
much less common,27 and I am rather doubtful about it. For don’t im-
poverished states that do not even attempt to move towards fulfilling
human rights let their citizens down, wronging them and thus violating
directed duties towards them? Aren’t we compelled to see this if we
think citizens hold rights against their states? I am even more doubtful
about position (3): Don’t impoverished states bear some duty-type nor-
mative demands in relation to their citizens’ human rights?
Suppose, however, that we accept one of these positions (1)–(3).
The approach to human rights outlined in the previous section – ac-
cording to which individualistic justification is one of the defining fea-
tures of human rights – gives us a way to make sense of human rights as
distinctive even when they are not genuine rights in one sense or anoth-
er. For we can say that human rights include any case in which some
proper feature F (perhaps needs, important interests, freedom) of a per-
son P is of sufficient non-instrumental importance to justify some seri-
ous normative factor protecting that feature: either a directed duty with
some content or other that will protect F, or an undirected duty pro-
tecting F, or some serious high-weight non-duty reason, important
goal or aim, etc. that asks for protection for F. On this account, we
take individualistic justification as the hallmark of human rights and
thereby allow human rights to include individualistically justified
moral factors that are not rights.
Nickel argues that if we allow that some human rights are not gen-
uine rights, then we can accept international human rights law and
human rights discourse without making these practices farcically de-
manding (Nickel 2010). My individualistic account of human rights of-
fers a way of explaining why this might be correct: if individualistic jus-
tification is the hallmark of human rights, then it would be quite natural
for our practices to have extended the concept to encompass other in-
dividualistically justified serious normative factors. For on this approach,
the human rights that are genuine rights and those that are not will share
a distinctive role as protectors of aspects of an individual sufficient on
26 See, e. g., Raz 1986, 171; Tasioulas 2010, 656–657.
27 But see Ashford 2006.
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their own – before others are considered – to constitute powerful
grounds for such protection. In this way even the human rights that
are not genuine rights play the Rawlsian role of protecting the “sepa-
rateness of persons”.
The cost of denying that human rights
need be genuine rights
The position sketched in the two paragraphs above should perhaps ap-
pear no great innovation to those who reject the Hohfeldian approach
to rights. In replying to O’Neill, John Tasioulas writes:
Why should this indeterminacy [in the pre-institutional allocation of duties
entailed by socio-economic rights] […] undermine the very existence of
such rights prior to their institutional embodiment? Why is not the person’s
interest and the fact that it is sufficient to generate duties to respect, protect,
and further it, etc., enough to warrant the existence of the right? In view of
the strength of the argument for recognizing and imposing duties based on
that interest, there is a strong case for regarding the issue of claimability [i.e.
the issue of the determinate allocation of duties] as separate from that of the
right’s existence (Tasioulas 2007, 94).
On this view rights are prior to the directed duties they entail, and the
directed duties they can generate vary over time. From this view it
might seem a small step to add that as well as generating a changing
set of directed duties, a right might in certain contexts also generate un-
directed duties and other normative phenomena such as important goals.
And it might well then seem rather a small step again to add that some-
times some rights do not generate or have any relation to duties at all,
but only to other normative phenomena like goals. Although Tasioulas
himself insists that rights must entail directed duties (Tasioulas 2010,
656–657), these further steps might seem consistent with the view of
rights he sketches above; an adherent of this view might thus seem
able to embrace each of positions (1)–(3) without abandoning the thesis
that the human rights modeled by these positions are genuine rights.
In my view, though, there is a cost attached to any position that
abandons the thesis that genuine rights are constituted by Hohfeldian
claims, privileges, powers, or immunities or some cluster of these posi-
tions. Those who abandon this position – including those like Tasioulas
who stick to position (1), maintaining that rights must entail some di-
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rected duties – are often motivated by what Raz calls rights’ “dynamic
character”:
[T]here is no closed list of duties which correspond to [a] right. The exis-
tence of a right often leads to holding another to have a duty because of the
existence of certain facts peculiar to the parties or general to the society in
which they live. A change of circumstances may lead to the creation of new
duties based on the old right. The right to political participation is not new,
but only in modern states with their enormously complex bureaucracies
does this right justify […] a duty on the government to make public its
plans and proposals before a decision on them is reached, as well as a
duty to publish its reasons for a decision once reached (Raz 1986, 171).
Many, including Raz, infer that if rights can entail changing waves of
directed duties, then rights should not be construed as Hohfeldian po-
sitions, with their strict relationships between rights with a given con-
tent and directed duties with the same content (or, in the case of priv-
ileges, between rights and the absence of directed duties, or in the cases
of powers and immunities, between rights and the ability or inability to
alter specific directed duties).
But, as Matthew Kramer points out, there is no need to abandon
Hohfeld’s framework in order to make sense of rights’ dynamic charac-
ter. For – to focus only on Hohfeldian claim-rights here – we can ex-
plain this character as involving a rather abstract right (e. g. respect for
one’s life) that correlatively entails rather abstract directed duties (to re-
spect the right-holder’s life), which in changing circumstances will entail
differing more specific right-duty pairs (e. g. in certain contexts the ab-
stract right might generate a right to a dialysis machine correlating with
a duty to provide it ; in others it might not but might still generate a
right to assisted suicide correlating with a corresponding duty). As
Kramer puts it, “[a]n abstract right that is strictly correlated with an ab-
stract duty can comprise or undergird any number of concrete rights,
each of which will of course be strictly correlated with a concrete
duty”.28
When considering rights in general (as opposed to specifically
human rights), I believe we have strong reasons to favor Kramer’s Hoh-
feldian suggestion over the rival view implicit in Raz and Tasioulas.
This is because abandoning the Hohfeldian framework – even while,
28 Kramer 1998, 43. See also Raz’s own awareness that “[t]his objection to the
reduction of rights to duties [i.e. the concern to respect rights’ dynamic char-
acter] does not rule out the possibility that ‘A has a right to X’ is reducible
to ‘There is a duty to secure A in X’” (Raz 1986, 171).
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as in position (1), retaining the thesis that genuine rights entail directed
duties – makes the individuation of rights worryingly indeterminate.
What are the existence conditions for my right to park my car in the
space I have purchased? The Hohfeldian approach naturally character-
izes this right as a combination of (a) my privilege to use the space
and (b) my claim to be unimpeded in using it.29 These Hohfeldian po-
sitions exist if (a) I do not bear a duty to refrain from using the space and
(b) some persons have a directed duty, to me, to allow me to use it un-
impeded. If these conditions are not fulfilled then I cannot have such a
right, according to the Hohfeldian approach. Furthermore, if somebody
has a directed duty to me that is derived from duty (b) (e. g. a traffic war-
den’s duty not to attempt to give me a parking ticket when they see my
car in the space), then the Hohfeldian approach tells us that this will cor-
relate with a right derived from the former right to the parking space.30
And if somebody has a directed duty to me with a different content to
(b), and which is not derived from duty (b), but that is grounded in the
same sorts of considerations that ground (b) (e. g. a duty to allow me to
take priority when I am on the main road and they are waiting to turn
onto it, grounded – like my right to the parking space – in the impor-
tance of efficiency in the movement of traffic around town), then the
Hohfeldian approach tells us that this will correlate with a different
right not derived from my right to the parking space.
By contrast, what will the non-Hohfeldian approach of type (1)
imply about the existence conditions of this right to park in the space
I have purchased? It says that the right is in some sense “prior” to the
directed duties it generates, and that it need not correlate with any
one particular such duty. Instead the right is the ground for a range
of directed duties that vary with context. Which duties are grounded
by or associated with this right, then, and which with other rights? It
seems natural to regard the duty not to impede me in using the space
as the primary duty correlating with the right, while the traffic warden’s
duty to leave me alone is in some sense secondary: derived from the
right, but not correlating with it. And the other driver’s duty to let
me take priority when I am on the main road seems naturally not to
29 Both (a) and (b) should be qualified with the phrase “within reasonable limits”,
but I ignore this for simplicity.
30 For useful discussion of different ways that rights and duties can be derived from
other rights and duties, see Wellman 2011, 48–49.
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be derived from the right to the parking space at all. But I am not sure
how the non-Hohfeldian approach can deliver these conclusions.
Once one abandons the Hohfeldian assumption that each right (or at
least, each claim-right) correlates with or, perhaps, is constituted by a
directed duty with the same content, it is unclear what can enable us
to say that one duty entailed by a right somehow takes priority in the
way it is entailed by the right – is more fundamentally grounded by
the right – than some other duty also entailed by it. It thereby becomes
difficult to distinguish how my right to the parking space relates to the
(fundamental) duty to leave my space unimpeded from how it relates to
the (derivative) traffic warden’s duty not to bother me. Both duties are
entailed by the right. What – other than the Hohfeldian approach – can
allow us to say that one is more fundamentally entailed by it than the
other? Perhaps we could say that the latter duty is only entailed given
a certain contingent background in which traffic wardens exist and
have a certain role, etc., while the former duty will exist in any possible
world where my right to the space exists. On this account, we can
seemingly continue as non-Hohfeldians but note that some duties nec-
essarily exist whenever a right exists while others do not. But on closer
inspection this seems like a way of returning to (or, indeed, of elucidat-
ing) the Hohfeldian notion of correlativity that we were attempting to
move beyond: a right’s correlative duty is whatever duty must exist
wherever the right exists, no matter the changing context.
An even more worrying problem for the non-Hohfeldian approach
is that it threatens to extinguish the distinction between a right and its
grounds.31 For the approach says that a right is the ground for a range
of duties, a ground that exists independently of and prior to these duties.
But what is it for a right to function as a ground in this way? When we
look for the ground for some duty associated with a right, it is very nat-
ural to “look straight through” the right directly to the considerations –
interests, needs, etc. – that ground both right and duty. For instance, if
we enquire into the ground for the duty not to torture Joe, we will be
most unlikely to focus on Joe’s right not to be tortured; instead, we will
look directly at Joe’s basic interest in not being tortured. Similarly, if we
look for the ground for your duty not to impede my parking space, I
think we will look at the important efficiency considerations that justify
31 That is, I think, the non-Hohfeldian approach threatens to collapse into some-
thing like what Tasioulas calls the “Reductive View”. See Tasioulas’s essay in
this volume, “On the Nature of Human Rights”.
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a town’s system of parking regulations. If, instead, we ‘stop’ immediately
at my right to my parking space (or Joe’s right not to be tortured), then
in my view we are not really investigating the duty’s ground. There
might be a sense in which the rights in these examples ground the rel-
evant duties, but I suspect this is an epistemic rather than a metaphysical
sense: if I want to know what duties I have vis-à-vis Joe, then some-
times I can learn about this by focusing on Joe’s rights (e. g. not to be
tortured).32 In the non-epistemic or ‘metaphysical’ sense of grounding
– the sense in which when X grounds Y, X makes Y the case – the
grounds of duties are naturally conceived as certain values; if rights
are the grounds of duties, they seem to be identified with these values.
But this would leave us unable to distinguish my right to my parking
space from my right to priority on the main road, because the duties
they generate (to leave my space unimpeded, and to cede me priority
on the main road) are both grounded in the same value: efficiency in
traffic management.
In response to this the non-Hohfeldian will insist that two rights can
differ while sharing the same ‘metaphysical’ ground, and that these two
rights can each themselves ‘metaphysically’ ground a range of differing
duties (without privileging any special correlative duties whose content
matches the rights). This picture makes it extremely unclear what indi-
viduates one right from another. Their grounds do not do the individ-
uating: we have seen that this would bizarrely imply that my right to my
parking space was the same right as my right to priority on the main
road. But there are no special correlative duties, duties invariably tied
to rights with matching content, by which we can individuate one
right from another. So we cannot individuate my right to my parking
space from my right to priority by attention to the difference between
your duty to let me use the space and your duty to let me use the road:
both duties might well be entailed by the same single right in a way that
gives them an equal status in relation to that right. For the two rights to
remain individuable as “distinct existences”, then, it must be on the basis
of some other characteristic that distinguishes them, but I am not sure
32 Raz stresses the epistemic role of rights as grounds for duties when he describes
them as “intermediate conclusions in arguments from ultimate values to duties”
(Raz 1986, 181). That this role in argument is epistemic – that is, it concerns
the uncovering of the implications of ultimate values, rather than the non-epis-
temic determination of such implications – seems clear from Raz’s discussion of
the epistemic utility of rights’ role as grounds for duties (ibid.).
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what this could be. Perhaps some might point to differing legal sources
for the traffic-related rights on which I have focused but, first, this
would not work for rights that were purely conventional rather than le-
gally instituted and secondly, how can we be confident that the relevant
Acts of Parliament (or similar law-making events) genuinely succeeded
in creating two rights here, rather than (despite what was intended) ac-
tually creating just one right or none? To answer this question, we need
to know already what individuates one right from another; appeal to
what law-making acts say cannot resolve this. Nor, of course, can we
distinguish the rights spatio-temporally.
Things are murkier still for those non-Hohfeldians of types (2) or (3)
– those who allow that rights need not entail directed duties at all, but
only undirected duties or non-duty considerations. For these positions
seem, even more than position (1), to make it difficult to distinguish
rights from their grounding values. To take one example that is some-
times considered to fit (2) or (3), if my right to education does not entail
any duties owed to me (or any other relationship to directed duties)33,
but instead entails perhaps only an undirected duty on my government
to build what schools it can, then what enables us to refer to a right of
mine here, as opposed simply to the value of my being educated or, in-
deed, the value of education as such? What distinguishing feature iden-
tifies what we are faced with as a right? If the duty to build schools is
not directed to me, then it is unclear in what sense my being educated
can be said to be a right, or in what sense not building schools wrongs
me. Positions (2) and (3) cut off what seems most characteristic of rights :
that they involve duties to others whose violation is not just a matter of
doing wrong, but of wronging a particular person who is thereby distin-
guished as a right-holder.34 This problem presses even before we note
that positions (2) and (3) also bear the other difficulties of position
(1): difficulties in distinguishing some primary duty generated by a
right from secondary derived duties, and in individuating different rights
with the same ground.
The Hohfeldian approach avoids these various problems by taking
any (claim-)right to have correlative directed duties – duties that must
exist if the right exists – that are intrinsic to the right’s nature and
hence its individuation from other rights; rights constituted by Hohfel-
33 For let us not forget Hohfeldian privileges, powers and immunities.
34 See Tasioulas 2010, 657–658 and Thompson 2004. Privileges, powers and im-
munities similarly involve relations to directed duties.
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dian privileges, powers and immunities are similarly essentially defined
and individuated by their relationship to directed duties. This approach
makes rights clearly distinct from important values for, first, there is
nothing about the nature of values as such that is tied to directed duties
and secondly, when defined by certain logical relationships to directed
duties (i. e. as what someone holds when owed a duty, or as the ability
to alter directed duties) different rights can clearly be grounded on a
range of varied values. In the traffic example examined earlier, the Hoh-
feldian approach can allow that both my right to my space and my right
to priority on the road are grounded in the same way, but one of the
rights (my right to the parking space) is constituted – at least in part35
– by a certain duty (your duty not to impede me) while the other
(my right to priority on the main road) is constituted by another
(your duty not to pull out in front of me when I am on the main
road). The value of the Hohfeldian approach lies in how it enables us
to individuate rights clearly through the focus on correlative duties,
and thereby to preserve the distinction between a right and its grounds.
For non-individualistically justified rights – that is, on my approach,
rights other than human rights – these considerations are good enough
to settle the matter in favor of Hohfeld. For human rights, things are
more complex. This is because human rights’ individualistic justification
provides an alternative effective means of individuating rights: by their
grounding source in their holder.
Why human rights might nonetheless not be genuine rights
Undirected duties need not, by their very nature, foreground a partic-
ular person in the reasoning of the duty-bearer (although they might,
say, be duties to do something for a particular person, this is not essential
to their character as undirected duties). By contrast, directed duties nec-
essarily foreground a particular person for the duty-bearer: the person to
whom the duty is owed. Similarly, Hohfeldian powers, privileges and
immunities are also intrinsically bipolar, placing someone on a pole op-
posite the relevant liability-, no-right- or disability-bearer. Such a struc-
ture in the determination of how one ought to behave foregrounds
someone in the reasoning of the agent subject to this structure (the di-
rected-duty-, liability-, no-right- or disability-bearer), and the Hohfel-
35 It is also constituted by the Hohfeldian privilege to use the space.
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dian approach maintains that it is to label a person’s status as so fore-
grounded that we use the term “a right”.36 On this approach, genuine
rights are identified as a structural-functional kind in the determination
of what people ought to do: the kind we encounter when we encounter
directed duties – or at least when we encounter them and some further
conditions are fulfilled.37
I have suggested that non-Hohfeldian approaches, which sharply
distinguish rights from any directed duties they entail, struggle to find
some determinate kind for talk of rights to denote, a kind that is distinct
from the values that ground the relevant duties. But the individualistic
approach that I believe defines human rights can, even in its extended
non-Hohfeldian form, arguably sidestep these worries. The extended
approach, as sketched in the final two paragraphs of the section preced-
ing the last one, maintains, in non-Hohfeldian fashion, that human
rights include any case in which some proper feature F of a person P
is of sufficient non-instrumental importance to justify some serious nor-
mative factor (including directed and undirected duties, and other nor-
mative considerations) protecting that feature; no special correlative
duty is attached to each human right, on this view.
This approach, although encompassing positions (2) and (3) as well
as (1), can avoid the particular worry outlined earlier for (2) and (3): the
worry that rights so conceived will fail to involve the foregrounding of
anyone in the reasoning of those encountering them, and hence will
make no sense as things whose violation wrongs right-holders. The in-
dividualistic approach can evade this worry even in its extended non-
Hohfeldian form, for on this approach the presence of a human right
will always involve the foregrounding of a particular person: the P
whose F is the justifying source of the relevant normative factors. Some-
times, on this approach, a human right will entail merely that certain
goals ought to be pursued, and failure to pursue such goals will not qual-
ify as a “violation” but simply as a failure to do all that one ought – or
perhaps even simply as a failure to respond to all the reasons bearing on
36 The term “bipolar” comes from Thompson 2004.
37 For rights involve more than just claims, privileges, powers or immunities. My
power to get myself sent to prison for dangerous driving is not a right, nor is my
claim that you thank me (i. e. your duty to me to thank me) for helping me
cross the road. But rights are a subset of claims, privileges, powers, immunities
and complex mixtures of these things. There is, in my view, no right that fails
to fit the Hohfeldian structure – except, perhaps, human rights, for which read
on.
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one. But even then, there will necessarily be a sense that a particular per-
son has been let down by such failure: the person whose F is the justi-
fying source of the ‘ought’ or reason. So the individualistic approach
generates a form of ‘directedness’ or foregrounding that gives human-
right-holders special status even without the Hohfeldian structure –
and hence even when it does not involve genuine Hohfeldian rights.
Alternative accounts of human rights, such as those which say that it
is essential to human rights only that (ii) they are demandable by anyone
or that (iii) their violation can justify international intervention,38 will, if
extended in the non-Hohfeldian manner I have envisaged for the indi-
vidualistic account, lack the individualistic account’s resources to avoid
the problem considered in the previous paragraph. For such accounts
give human rights no way of foregrounding a particular individual
other than as the terminus of a directed duty. There is nothing about
an undirected duty’s, goal’s or reason’s being demandable by everyone,
or triggering international intervention, that can ensure that this undir-
ected duty, goal or reason foregrounds a particular person in the way
that its being individualistically justified ensures. (Indeed there seem
to be examples of undirected duties, goals and reasons conformity
with which is demandable by anyone but that foreground no particular
person for the duty-, goal- or reason-bearing agent – I would include
here our reasons to promote happiness in general and to respect beauty
in general, to pursue important but instrumentally useless knowledge,
and our undirected duty not to destroy distant barren planets; the latter
also looks like something whose violation could (in situations where
such destruction was possible) legitimately trigger international inter-
vention.) Because individualistic justification, by contrast, necessarily
foregrounds a particular person just as directed duties do,39 it can thereby
necessarily preserve a conception of human rights as having bearers,
bearers who are let down when their human rights are not fulfilled,
even when these ‘rights’ do not entail directed duties. The individual-
istic approach thus seems particularly well-suited to non-Hohfeldian ex-
tensions of human rights language.
38 See p. 135 above.
39 Though this is not, of course, to claim that the two modes of foregrounding are
identical. They are clearly not, for directed duties can be justified on non-indi-
vidualistic grounds. To deny this is to return to Raz’s erroneous general theory
of rights.
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How does the individualistic non-Hohfeldian extended conception
of human rights individuate one human right from another? One quasi-
Hohfeldian option is to say that any given normative factor that is indi-
vidualistically justified – a particular directed duty, undirected duty, goal
etc. – identifies a different human right. This suggestion is very distant
from the spirit of those, like Nickel and Tasioulas, who support a non-
Hohfeldian expansion of human rights; these theorists clearly favor the
view that a given human right could ground a range of changing duties
and (for Nickel) other factors. But the only alternative (unless one can
find some other feature of human rights conceived in this way that en-
ables their differentiation – and as I argued earlier, I do not see what this
could be) is to individuate human rights by their grounds. On the indi-
vidualistic non-Hohfeldian extended account, my human right to edu-
cation will entail both a directed duty to educate me, borne by those
wealthy enough and appropriately related to me so as to be allocated
such a duty,40 and a strong non-duty reason for my impoverished gov-
ernment to work towards educating me insofar as it can, along with var-
ious other normative factors. The individuation of this human right
from other human rights will, on this approach, be done by appeal to
the justifying value it protects: perhaps the value of my being educated.
Alternatively, perhaps two or more fundamentally important features of
me are each sufficient on their own individualistically to justify the same
set of duties, reasons and other normative considerations relating to my
education – such as the value of my gaining knowledge, and the value of
my autonomy (which requires education); if so, we need not say that
there are two human rights here (though we could say that); we can in-
stead see the two grounding values with identical education-related nor-
mative implications as differentiating my human right to education from
other human rights (of mine and others) with different grounding values
that do not have exactly the same implications. The key point is that
even if it entails no directed duty, my human right to education will dif-
fer from my human right to liberty because of their differing justifying
sources, which for each right might be one or many, sources which have
(somewhat) differing implications in terms of duties and other norma-
tive factors.41
40 The appropriate relation here might be specified by a “least-cost”, “contribu-
tion” or some other principle. See p. 141 above.
41 And, of course, the individualism of the approach says that both such justifica-
tory sources will have individualistic justificatory force, where this means that
Human rights as rights 153
Individuating human rights by their ground is not as costly in the
case of human rights, when conceived as individualistically justified,
as it is in the example of my right to park and my right to priority on
the main road. The latter are clearly different rights despite their entirely
shared justificatory source, and denying this seems absurd. But it is not
clear that the blurring into one of what might initially have looked like
several human rights with the same individualistic justificatory source
need be a problem. Nor is it clear that the blurring of such rights
with the value that grounds the duties associated with them is clearly
a problem. Such blurring is, instead, rather natural when discussing
human rights. The first blurring occurs when one slips, as if these
were the same right, from reference to Joe’s human right to education
in general to reference to Joe’s human right to be taught to write. The
second blurring occurs when one slips from reference to either right to
reference to the fundamental importance of Joe’s being educated. Both
slips are very common indeed. If the non-Hohfeldian individualistic ap-
proach is correct, this is to be expected, since the only way to individ-
uate human rights is by the justificatory source of the duties and other
normative factors associated with them. And, importantly, it does not
seem like a big leap to accept this view, even if its details need further
spelling out. (In particular, I have avoided discussing the relationship be-
tween the individuation, the identity and the existence of human rights,
but this needs spelling out before we can fully assess the position.) It pre-
serves the distinction between my human right to be educated and
yours, of course, because the approach sees these as having differing
grounds (the one grounded in features of me, the other in features of
you). And it preserves the distinction between my human right to be
educated and my human rights to liberty, to bodily integrity and so
on. Where the blurring happens is where it feels right anyway – be-
tween things with the very same ground.
The extended non-Hohfeldian individualistic approach can perhaps
also make sense of a form of the distinction between duties and other
factors correlative to a human right and duties less immediately derived
from it. For the approach will allow that the duties and other factors
grounded in one individualistic justificatory source might generate
new duties or other factors when taken in conjunction with the duties
each is a value sufficiently important on its own to ground certain weighty du-
ties, reasons and other normative factors independently of whether these things
(duties, reasons, other factors) would serve other people.
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and other factors grounded in some other individualistic justificatory
source. For example, let us say that Joe’s need for an education grounds
a powerful reason for Joe’s government to do what it can to educate
him, and Jill’s need for an education grounds a similar reason for the
same government; enough individualistically grounded powerful rea-
sons of this type could together entail that the government has a duty
to start a school-building program. On its own, Joe’s human right can-
not generate this duty, but in conjunction with enough others it can.
The powerful reasons (or, perhaps even directed duties to do something
towards Joe’s education) are here analogous to correlative duties in the
Hohfeldian structure, while the duty to build schools is analogous to a
secondary derived duty.
Conclusion
I have suggested that an extended non-Hohfeldian individualistic ac-
count of human rights can avoid some of the difficulties attendant on
abandoning Hohfeld’s conception of rights: even without regarding
every human right as defined by a relation to directed duties, it preserves
the premise that human rights have bearers who are let down (or, in
some sense, ‘violated’) when human rights are not respected, and it
can replicate something like Hohfeld’s distinction between primary cor-
relative duties and secondary derived duties. It threatens to extinguish
the distinction between human rights and their grounds, but this is per-
haps not an enormous cost.
More importantly, something like this approach is maybe what we
should expect if human rights are individualistically justified. For given
that the individualistic justificatory structure allows some mimicking of
Hohfeldian structures, it would probably be no surprise if language users
had begun to extend the concept “human rights” to encompass other
normative phenomena that were individualistically justified but not
rights in the strict Hohfeldian sense. Indeed perhaps we should rather
see two rival notions of foregrounding at work in our use of the lan-
guage of rights: one captured by the Hohfeldian notion of a directed
duty, a notion that can encompass rights that are not individualistically
grounded, including such trivial rights as those in games and regulations,
another captured by my extended Razian notion of the individualistic
source of a serious normative requirement.
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We might wonder, though, why we should bother with this com-
plex new approach rather than sticking to Hohfeld. To my mind, it de-
pends largely on our reaction to the fact that the Hohfeldian approach
will require us – if we are to avoid Nickel’s worry about farcicality –
to say that citizens of impoverished nations hold no human right against
their governments to such goods as education or health care, but only to
their governments working towards education. Human rights to the full
important goods of education and health care might still be held against
wealthy outsiders, but not against the relevant citizens’ own govern-
ments. The individualistic extended non-Hohfeldian approach allows
us to say that there are human rights to the full goods, held against
the poor governments: it is just that such rights do not entail directed
duties with the same content as the rights. (Instead, they can exist
while entailing weaker directed duties or no directed duties at all but
simply other powerful normative factors.) Is the value of saying this
worth the cost of muddying the individuation of different human rights
with the same grounds?42
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and the strength of corresponding duties
Corinna Mieth
The idea that negative duties are stronger than positive ones is wide-
spread. The idea that human-rights-corresponding duties are strong is
also widespread. I will show that both ideas are wrong. Alternatively,
I propose the following three criteria for strong duties: (1) their refer-
ence to basic goods, (2) reasonable demandingness, and (3) determinate-
ness. A duty is strong if and only if all three criteria are fulfilled. Togeth-
er they are necessary and sufficient. The criteria themselves can obvious-
ly be more or less fulfilled. So the strength of duties is a question of de-
gree: the closer the criteria are to being met, the stronger is the duty.
The criteria can also be interpreted in different ways concerning their
content. However, I will not go into detail concerning the interpreta-
tion of the criteria in this paper. Even if we keep the criteria quite for-
mal, it will turn out that there are strong positive duties. And it will turn
out that not all human-rights-corresponding duties are strong, either
based on an individual or on an institutional understanding of human
rights.
In the first part of my paper, I will show that there are strong pos-
itive duties. Furthermore, I will argue that the distinction between pos-
itive duties and negative duties is misleading with regard to their relative
strength. I will discuss two possible ways of differentiating between pos-
itive and negative duties that are both implicit in current debates but do
not lead to the same conclusion concerning the strength of duties. We
can more plausibly explain the strength of duties in terms of the goods
protected by the duty, I will argue, than in terms of their being positive
or negative in the sense of being duties to act or to omit an action. The
second criterion to determine the strength of a duty is reasonable de-
mandingness: if we can only save another person’s life by risking our
own, this would be more than can reasonably be expected. Such a
deed would go beyond duty; it would be supererogatory. The third cri-
terion is determinateness. It must be clear who has to do or omit what in
order to fulfill the duty. Taken the other way round, it must be clear by
which specific action or omission which person violates the duty and
which person’s moral claims or legal rights or human rights are violated
by the action or omission in question. All this means that we are com-
mitting a serious moral or legal wrong if we violate a strong duty.
In the second part of the paper, I will apply this approach to the
human rights discourse, where it is also common to interpret the
strength of human rights in terms of the distinction between positive
rights and negative rights. Onora O’Neill’s thesis is that we can distin-
guish between human rights in a full sense and mere manifesto-rights by
having a look at the corresponding duties. However, closer inspection
reveals that it is not merely being positive or negative that determines
the normative status of rights and of corresponding duties, but rather
the relevance of the protected goods in combination with reasonable
demandingness and the third criterion of determinateness, i. e. the spec-
ification of duty-content and duty-bearer.
In the last part of the paper, I will focus on world poverty as a
human rights violation and the question of how strong human-rights-
corresponding individual duties are in this context. I will again defend
the idea that we should consider the normative relevance of goods pro-
tected by a right, the reasonable demandingness for the duty-bearer and
the determinateness of the corresponding duty as the three decisive fac-
tors for the strength of duties, which means that there may be strong and
weak, or stronger or weaker, human-rights-corresponding duties. It
may, for example, be that a duty that refers to a human right (which im-
plies that the first criterion, reference to basic goods, is met) is still weak
because the other two criteria are not met. Furthermore, I will defend
the idea that the relevance of the protected goods in combination with
the possibility of effective institutional protection is decisive for the sta-
tus of a right as a human right and not the demandingness or determi-
nateness of corresponding duties. The demandingness and determinate-
ness of corresponding duties, whether negative or positive, can vary
with factors independent of the status of the right, so that the right
might remain unfulfilled or violated by unjust structures rather than
being violated by individuals. We can consider institutional arrange-
ments as unjust if an institutional allocation of human-rights-corre-
sponding duties could fulfill the factors of determinateness and reason-
able demandingness. However, if such structures are not in place, indi-
viduals do not have as strong duties as they would have if just institu-
tions were able to guarantee the determinateness of duties. Individuals
might then have other duties, e. g. the duty to support the development
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of better institutions, but these duties are not as strong as institutionally
allocated human-rights-corresponding duties would be. This is partly so
because the reasonable demandingness factor can depend on institution-
al arrangements.
I. Positive and negative duties
In this part of the paper, I give a systematic account of the distinction
between positive and negative duties. I begin with two prejudices con-
cerning positive duties:
(1) There is no such thing as a positive duty. Actions that improve the well-
being of others are not obligatory but supererogatory; they are arbitrary
gifts. They are morally good but not required (the supererogation thesis).
(2) Positive duties are weaker than negative duties. They are wide, imper-
fect, leave latitude concerning their fulfillment, they are mere “duties of
virtue”, cannot be enforced, they are not provided with corresponding
rights (the subordination thesis).
By “positive duty” we usually refer to duties that require actions, in
contrast to “negative duties” that require omissions. According to the
supererogation thesis, there is no such thing as a duty that requires ac-
tion. According to the subordination thesis, there might be duties to act,
but they are only weak. Let us go into some terminological details here.
An action that is supererogatory is morally good but not required. We
don’t owe it to others and we do not violate any duty if we don’t per-
form the act. Weak duties in the Kantian tradition are duties without
corresponding rights. Gewirth explains the weakness of a duty by refer-
ring to a commonly held position towards the duty to help the poor:
“Few would deny that the more affluent should do something to
help the poor. But most well-to-do persons understand this ‘should’
in a weak sense. They see such aid as beyond the call of duty, as super-
erogatory or, at best, as provided pursuant to an ‘imperfect duty’ of
charity, humanity, or solidarity, which leaves it to donors’ discretion
as to how much they give and to whom. It is good to help, but the
poor have no right to be helped” (Gewirth 2007, 219).
A related idea concerning positive duties is that they are duties to
improve the well-being of others whereas negative duties are duties
not to unduly harm others. This shows us the structural resemblance be-
tween supererogatory acts and weak duties: if we don’t perform a super-
erogatory act or fulfill a weak duty, we do not violate anyone’s right.
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Where the stronger supererogation thesis says that there are no positive
duties, the subordination thesis only says that there are weak positive
duties but that there are no corresponding rights that are violated if a
positive duty is not fulfilled. The moral wrong we commit is in both
cases not as serious as the violation of any negative duty. The implicit
assumption is that we improve the well-being of others via positive du-
ties whereas we harm others (violate their rights) if we violate negative
duties. If we talk of a strong duty we mean that we commit a serious
moral wrong if we violate it. Therefore strong duties should have prec-
edence over weak duties. This is plausible, but I will show in the follow-
ing section that it is not plausible to claim that there are no positive du-
ties or to consider positive duties weak. There must be different criteria
for the (relative) strength or weakness of duties apart from their being
positive or negative. Furthermore, in section II we will deal with the
question of what it means to violate another person’s basic rights or
human rights and if all human-rights-corresponding duties really are
strong ones.
Two arguments against the supererogation thesis
and the subordination thesis
The first argument that can be employed against the supererogation the-
sis is the argument from the possibility of harming by omission. The defender
of the supererogation thesis must claim that actions that improve the
well-being of others are morally good but their omission is not morally
or legally prohibited.1 But there are two groups of examples for actions
whose omissions we would morally (and/or legally) blame and sanction.
Firstly, this holds of duties to care: Parents who let their child die of ne-
glect while they are on vacation harm the child by omission. Secondly,
this seems also to hold for professional duties: doctors who are on drugs
while on duty can harm their patients by omitting to fulfill their profes-
sional duties. A lifeguard who does not save a child from drowning in
his area of the beach since he is drinking with his buddies violates his
professional duty to save people from drowning, whereas another per-
son who is not a lifeguard on duty may sit at the beach with his buddies
not paying attention to drowning people. If parents or doctors and life-
1 For this discussion see the classical texts of Urmson 1958, Chisholm 1963,
Feinberg 1961, Heyd 1982.
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guards violate their duties, we would say that they have harmed the ones
they should have saved. Thus obviously not all actions are supereroga-
tory. There are some strong positive duties which will not only morally
but even legally be sanctioned if violated. This is, of course, also an ar-
gument against the subordination thesis.
A second argument against the supererogation thesis can be called
the argument for a duty to help. At first sight this comes from the ability
to render assistance in an emergency and the severe danger for the per-
son to be saved. Someone who lets a small child drown next to his chair
that he could have saved without any real effort can be blamed morally
or even legally for serious wrongdoing. The less the helper has to sac-
rifice and the more can be saved for the endangered person, the stronger
the duty. A failure to render assistance in an emergency is even legally
sanctioned in most European countries. Here we might instantly think
of Peter Singer’s famous drowning child case. The above-mentioned
“should”, which Gewirth observed is often interpreted in a weak or su-
pererogatory sense when it comes to our relationship towards the very
poor, is interpreted in a strong sense in Peter Singer’s drowning child
case. Singer presupposes that there can be harming by omission. The
utilitarian position even goes so far as to say that not to save the child’s
life would be equivalent to killing him or at least to negligent homi-
cide.2 For our purposes here, it makes no difference whether we
speak of harming in the drowning child case or only in the two cases
mentioned above. All three cases are cases of serious moral wrongdoing
by omission, which is all we need to reject the supererogation thesis.
The omissions in question are all morally prohibited since they consti-
tute serious moral wrongdoing. Still, instead of classifying the drowning
child case as harming by omission, I propose to classify only the viola-
tion of the duties of parents, doctors and lifeguards from the examples
above as cases of harm. This is because there is a crucial difference be-
tween the first two and the third kind of positive duties. One could de-
fend the idea that the decisive factor for the normative (and juridical)
strength of parental and professional duties is what we can call their pre-
vious-behavior-dependency.3
2 For a discussion of the similarities or differences between killing and letting die
cf. Birnbacher 1995, ch. 10, Rachels 1989, 258, and Singer 1984.
3 The notion was proposed by Dieter Birnbacher 1995, ch. 8.3. Others, such as
Pogge, would not speak of duties but of positive obligations that come from
duties to keep contracts as far as professional duties are concerned.
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Duties restrict our freedom to act and, therefore, diminish our op-
tions.4 These are their costs. Hence, from a liberal point of view, it
makes sense to distinguish between duties resulting from intentional
previous behavior and duties that are independent of intentional previ-
ous behavior. For example, parental duties are previous-behavior-de-
pendent: parents have to care for their children since they brought
them into existence. So they are the ones that have to bear the costs
that come with the duties to care, and not, say, the neighbors or
some bystanders. The same is true for professional duties. The lifeguard
and the doctor decided to take their jobs; they signed contracts to take
over certain duties during their working hours. So, at first sight, we
seem to accept that there are positive duties that come from a more
or less autonomous decision to behave in a way that implies the duty.
Obviously, in a scenario like Singer’s drowning child case, the pos-
itive duty does not derive from such behavior of the duty-bearer, but
comes simply from his ability to help on the one hand and the neediness
of the person in danger on the other. While the failure to render assis-
tance in an emergency is juridically sanctioned in Germany and most
European countries, it is not in the UK, most US states and Australia.
I suppose that the problem of previous-behavior-independent positive
duties, especially for countries with a liberal tradition, is that the
duty-bearer does not have control over their coming into existence:
as in Singer’s drowning child case, the duty comes from the simple
fact that one person is in need and another one is able to help. What
seems relatively unproblematic in this case has been a source of endless
discussion in the case that Singer considers analogous: If the rich can
save some of the poor from dying by donating money, this is supposed
to be an analogously strong positive duty.5
At this point, we can leave open whether the drowning child case
and the poverty case are really analogous or not.6 If the argument
4 Marcia Baron sees the fact that “moral constraint is at odds with freedom” as a
legitimation of David Heyd’s defense of the category of the supererogatory:
“even if heroic and saintly acts are not beyond the capacity of ordinary people,
it is still vital that there be a category of supererogatory acts because, in his view,
moral constraint is at odds with freedom, and in the interest of expanding (or at
least not contracting) freedom, we want to keep moral constraint to a mini-
mum” (Baron 1998, 58).
5 For discussion see Miller 2007, Kamm 1999a, 1999b and 2000, Mieth 2008.
6 For an analysis that points out morally relevant factors that make the cases dis-
analogous see Mieth 2011.
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from the possibility of harming by omission and the argument for a duty
to help are correct, then positive duties not generally supererogatory. In
the three cases mentioned, the persons in need have a moral or even
legal right to be helped. The boundary between supererogatory actions
and duties is not congruent with the boundary between positive and
negative duties. And obviously this is also an argument against a general
subordination thesis.
Most of us would consider it a serious moral if not juridical wrong if
someone did not render assistance in an emergency even though it
would be possible for him or her at low cost and someone’s life was
at stake. This is even true for cases in which we would have to violate
a negative duty (e. g. to keep a lunch appointment (Kamm 1985, 119 f.)
or not to damage other’s property (Unger 1996, 63 f.)) in order to save a
life. In such cases helping is not considered superogatory, i. e. morally
good to do but not morally prohibited to omit doing. In my view
this goes back to the relevance of the goods involved. The theory of
goods and the differentiation between basic goods and additional
goods7 can give us a twofold borderline between supererogatory actions
and duties.
Supererogation 1 comprises actions that improve the situation of an-
other person concerning a non-necessary good. If such an action is pre-
vious-behavior-independent, no-one is harmed if it is not performed.
We are speaking of small favors here, such as inviting my neighbor
for dinner or, to use Joel Feinberg’s example from a different time, giv-
ing a stranger a match to light his cigarette (Feinberg 1961, 276 f.). Such
acts are friendly and welcome, sometimes they are asked for, but they
cannot be required. Here, the first proposed necessary criterion for a
strong duty, its reference to a basic good, is not met. Some might con-
sider such actions to fall under duties of charity or the weak general duty
to improve other’s well-being in a Kantian sense. For our aim of deter-
mining what makes a duty strong, the difference between those two op-
7 Authors from several different theoretical points of view, e. g. Pogge, Nuss-
baum, Gewirth, Höffe, Shue, come to the conclusion that there are some
basic goods, basic interests or capabilities that are a presupposition to living a
human life worth living. I cannot go into this discussion in any detail here.
Let us start from the goods that are mentioned in the Declaration of Human
Rights (art. 25): food, clothing, housing, medical care, “necessary social serv-
ices” as well as “security” in the face of a “lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond […] control”. What is important for us here is the differentiation be-
tween goods that everyone needs and has a (human) right to and further goods.
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tions, a supererogatory action or a general weak duty of benevolence, is
not relevant here.8 We can even speak of a structural resemblance of the
supererogation model with the Kantian one. Both models try to separate
strong (negative) duties from actions that are supererogatory or from
weak positive duties, the similarity being that not to perform a superer-
ogatory act or not to fulfill a positive duty does not imply a rights-vio-
lation or serious moral wrongdoing. Both models are misleading since
there are strong positive duties, e. g. in the drowning child case.
Supererogation 2 comprises actions that go beyond what is reasonably
demandable in terms of their costs for the potential duty-bearer. Here it
is appropriate to speak of saintly or heroic acts. Someone who jumps
into a dangerous ice-cold river or into a burning house to save another
person’s life puts his own life at risk, and this is beyond what duty can
require. Even Kantians see a general place for the supererogatory here.9
While the hero risks his life, the saint sacrifices his life-plan in order to
help others. If autonomy is also a basic good, the actions of the saint are
supererogatory, too, since by jettisoning his life-plan, he goes beyond
what is reasonably demandable. Here the first criterion for a strong
duty, its reference to basic goods, is met but the second criterion, rea-
sonable demandingness, is not. Saintly and heroic acts go beyond an
otherwise strong duty.
Two additional problems with the subordination thesis
The aim of the last section was to show that there are strong positive
duties. So the supererogation thesis and a general subordination thesis
are wrong. In this section, we will have a closer look at the subordina-
tion thesis with regard to the implied understanding of positive and neg-
ative duties. We will see that there are at least four different possible
ways to differentiate between positive and negative duties. They are
often implicit in positions that accept the subordination thesis. Yet a
closer look shows that they are not compatible with each other and
lead in different directions as far as the question about the normative
strength of duties is concerned.
Let us first have a look at two common ways of distinguishing be-
tween positive and negative duties that were already mentioned above:
8 For a discussion of this see Baron 1998.
9 For this position see Rawls 1971, 117 and O’Neill 1996, 265 ff.
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(1) In terms of the theory of action: Positive duties require actions; negative
duties require omissions (from the perspective of the duty-bearer).
(2) In terms of consequentialism: Positive duties refer to an improvement of
the situation of another person; negative duties refer to a non-deterioration
of the situation of another person (from the perspective of the recipient).
There are two main problems with these distinctions regarding the rel-
ative strength of duties:
(P1) Defenders of the subordination thesis usually think that the dis-
tinctions are congruent. Furthermore, they assume that non-deteriora-
tion has priority over improvement. However, the distinctions are
not congruent. The distinction (1) is underdetermined with regard to
its consequences. Duties to act can refer both to an improvement
(e. g. a duty to rescue) and to a non-deterioration (e. g. the fulfillment
of a treaty). Saving the drowning child is a positive action, not an omis-
sion. So is handing over the car-keys to you if you gave me 1000 Euro
to buy the car. As I have tried to show above, in both cases we would
commit a serious moral wrong or harm someone by omission by not
saving the child or not handing over the car-keys.
Furthermore, the consequentialist distinction is underdetermined as
far as the theory of action is concerned: As the examples above should
have shown, we can, under certain circumstances, deteriorate the situa-
tion of others by omission. A doctor who is on drugs while on duty and
forgets to give his patient a life-saving injection deteriorates the situation
of the patient because he violates a duty that he willingly accepted pre-
viously.
And we can improve the situation of others by omission, e. g. not
insisting on a loan repayment. Therefore the idea that we can improve
and deteriorate the situation of others only by action is wrong.
(P2) These two ways of distinguishing between positive and nega-
tive duties cannot establish a general normative priority of negative du-
ties. As we have seen, there are strong positive duties in the sense of dis-
tinction (1) as well as in the sense of distinction (2).
Nevertheless, there is another way of supporting the subordination
thesis. Brian Orend (2002, 142 ff.) proposes a third distinction between
positive and negative duties that takes negative duties to be duties not to
harm others and positive duties to be duties to further others’ well-
being. We can call this distinction the normative differentiation (cf.
ibid.); it seems to make the subordination thesis plausible.
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(3) Normative/conceptual differentiation: Positive duties are duties to improve
the well-being of others; negative duties are duties not to harm others.
Now, the implication of the prohibition of harming makes a negative
duty stronger than a positive one. However, (3) is only formal. It
lacks an independent criterion for what “harming” means. If harming
by omission exists, there can also be strong positive duties in the
sense of (1) and (2) that would count as negative duties under distinction
(3). Under distinction (3) it would then be a negative duty to be clean if
on duty as a doctor or lifeguard and to care for your children. And it
would also be a negative duty to hand over the car-keys if you have al-
ready given me the 1000 Euro; otherwise I would harm you by keeping
the 1000 Euro without exchanging them for the car. This would be like
stealing the money.
These cases are the counterparts of strong positive duties whose vi-
olation by omission counts as harming. Still, the problem remains that
previous-behavior-dependent duties have a different status from duties
that are previous-behavior-independent. As we saw above, there is a
previous-behavior-independent strong positive duty to save the drown-
ing child. It would be counterintuitive to put this duty together in one
class with those actions that we described as supererogation 1, which im-
prove the well-being of others only concerning minor goods.10
For those who would speak of harming by omission in the drown-
ing child case, it seems plausible to draw the line between harming and
improving the well-being of others according to the relevance of the
goods involved. If harming by omission exists, we can claim that nor-
matively strong duties (called negative according to the normative dif-
ferentiation) refer to the non-destruction, maintenance or provision of
a basic good (which might be realized by fulfilling positive or negative
duties as characterized by the theory of action) while normatively weak-
er duties (called positive according to the normative distinction) refer to
non-basic goods. This leads us to the fourth distinction between positive
10 Pogge 2002, 132 would hold that the subordination thesis should be applied
“other things equal”. The negative duty not to throw the child into the
pond is stronger than the positive duty to save it from drowning. We do not
have to decide here whether this is true. What is important for us here is
that from distinction (3) nothing follows concerning the strength of positive
and negative duties in the sense of (1). Furthermore, if there can be serious
moral wrongdoing without harming in the drowning child case, there is a
strong positive duty that would have priority over other duties, e. g. not to
take away others’ property if the child could only be saved by stealing a boat.
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and negative duties, which draws the baseline for harming from the
theory of goods.
(4) Distinction from the theory of goods: Negative duties refer to the non-de-
struction or providence of basic goods. Positive duties refer to non-basic
goods.
What is really of interest here is of course not the labeling of duties as
positive or negative, but the question of what makes a duty strong or
weak. We need to either suppose a new definition of positive and neg-
ative duties as given in (3) and (4) or keep the intuitive understanding
we gain from (1) and hold that there are strong positive duties. My
first terminological proposal is to keep the intuitive understanding we
gain from the theory of action11 used in the first distinction (1). Accord-
ing to it, a positive duty is a duty to act whereas a negative duty is a duty
to omit certain acts. An act implies a bodily movement whereas an
omission implies that a certain bodily movement does not take place.
However, this does not lead to a criterion for the strength of duties.
By contrast, distinction (3) is already normative. Still, in (3), being pos-
itive or negative cannot be a foundation for the strength or weakness of
the duty. The normative strength or weakness in (3) goes back to the
distinction between harming and improving well-being. However, (3)
is only formal since it does not say what “harming” means. Distinction
(4) can be used as a criterion for the strength of duties. Yet its labeling is
counterintuitive since saving the drowning child would count as a neg-
ative duty. Furthermore, (4) is not sufficient as a criterion for the
strength of duties since it does not say anything concerning reasonable
demandingness and determinateness.
11 Clarke 2010, 161 differentiates between “intentional positive actions” and
“negative acts” or “intentional omissions” as “‘acts of omission’”. In the theory
of action the difference between action and omission lies between bodily
movement and the lack of the bodily movement that the omission refers to
(ibid., 159). Sartori points out the difference between positive actions and
omissions in her drowning child case: Sartori omits to save a child from drown-
ing, eating ice cream instead. “The assumption that omissions are not identical
to actions requires, in particular, that we distinguish an agent’s omission from
anything that the agent might have done instead of the action omitted. For in-
stance in the drowning child scenario, my failing to jump in should be distin-
guished from my eating ice cream on the shore at the time when I could have
been jumping in to save the child […] at least my failing to do something
doesn’t seem to be identical to my doing something” (Sartori 2009, 517).
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I draw the conclusion that we should give up the idea of considering
the description of a duty as positive or negative as a factor that deter-
mines its strength. This leads us back to my alternative proposal to de-
rive the strength of a duty from (1) its reference to a basic good, (2) its
reasonable demandingness and (3) its determinateness.
A question I cannot answer in detail here is why there should be any
flexibility in the normative strength of duties at all. If a duty is some-
thing we must fulfill and, hence, overrides other possibilities of action,
what does it mean for some duties to be weaker than others? It seems
that our everyday notion of duties far more resembles a continuum.
Nevertheless, there seem to be some clear duties. J.O. Urmson called
these duties basic duties as opposed to supererogatory acts. He writes:
“If, then, we are aiming at a moral code that will best serve human
needs, a code that is ideal in the sense that a world in which such a code
is acknowledged, it seems that there are ample grounds why our code
should distinguish between basic rules, summarily set forth simple
rules and binding on all, and the higher flights of morality of which
saintliness and heroism are outstanding examples” (Urmson 1958, 211).
According to the proposal I am working out here, strong basic du-
ties refer to basic goods. Still, this is only the first criterion that they have
to meet in order to qualify as strong. The condition is necessary but not
sufficient. The second criterion already mentioned is reasonable de-
mandingness. The third criterion is determinateness. This means that
it has to be clear who the duty-bearer is : there has to be a clear account-
ability in case of violation. And it has to be clear what the violation con-
sists in, i. e. which concrete actions or omissions should have been per-
formed or omitted in order not to violate the duty.
As we have seen above, there can be strong positive duties that fulfill
these conditions, e. g. rescue-duties in the drowning child case. Further-
more, especially for positive duties, it seems to be of crucial importance
whether they are dependent on intentional previous behavior or not.
Duties resulting from treaties and promises as well as professional duties,
even duties to care for our own children, depend on previous decisions
or at least on our own previous behavior. The same is true for duties to
compensate for harm one has inflicted on others.
The underlying normative factor relevant here seems to be that
wherever we want to assume duties in a strong sense, which means
that their violation will be combined with serious formal or informal
sanctions, we are confronted with the problem of overdemandingness.
As Urmson pointed out 40 years ago, it must lie within the capacity
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of ordinary persons to fulfill their basic duties. The real problem for pos-
itive duties lies in those that are independent of intentional previous be-
havior, since we cannot control how many of them we have merely by
virtue of our ability to help. On the other hand, not all previous-behav-
ior-dependent duties are as strong as the positive duty in the drowning
child case. Of course, as Frances Kamm (1985, 118 ff.) and others have
shown, the duty to save the drowning child would trump the duty to
keep a promise for a lunch-appointment. Also, it would be legitimate
and even obligatory to violate property-rights in order to save the
drowning child, e. g. to steal a boat if there is no other possibility of sav-
ing the child. If it comes to a conflict between duties, the subordination
thesis is not plausible in its ordinary form. Rather, the theory of goods
shows that the strength of duties must somehow be linked to what is
protected by the duty, the importance of the goods in question: not
only for the right-bearer (criterion 1) but also for the one bearing the
corresponding duty (criterion 2). Furthermore, the relationship between
right- and duty-bearer must somehow be qualified: who owes what to
whom. That is criterion 3: determinateness.
Let us draw a little summary at this point. Whether someone has a
strong individual duty to do or omit something depends on three fac-
tors: that the duty refers to a basic good, that the action or omission re-
quired is not too demanding, and that the duty it is determined. This
distinction is not congruent with the distinction between negative du-
ties and positive duties. There are strong positive duties as well as strong
negative duties. What we rejected was the idea of deriving the strength
of duties from their being positive or negative in the sense of distinctions
(1) and (2) as well as the idea of labelling strong duties as negative and
weak duties as positive according to distinction (3). We rejected (4) be-
cause it is underdetermined concerning reasonable demandingness and
determinateness, which must be given in addition to reference to
basic goods for there to be a strong duty.
II. Human rights and the strength of corresponding duties
It is, meanwhile, common in the debate about basic rights or human
rights to refer to the substances of these rights (Henry Shue) or the rele-
vance of the goods that are protected by these rights (Thomas Pogge) in
order to justify their important status. Furthermore, it is notoriously
controversial whether positive rights have a weaker normative status
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than their negative counterparts. The underlying idea is that negative
rights protect the classical liberal goods of life, liberty and property,
while positive rights or social rights refer to subsistence, the goods need-
ed to lead a decent life like home, shelter, education, health etc. (Orend
2002). What is of interest for us here are the positions of Henry Shue
and Onora O’Neill, who have investigated human-rights-correspond-
ing duties. Let us first have a look at Shue’s position.
Shue’s idea is that it is not rights but duties that are positive or neg-
ative. He claims that there is a symmetry between negative as well as
positive rights and corresponding duties to avoid depriving (negative
duties) on a first level. Secondly, there are institutional duties to protect
people from being deprived of their rights or the goods that they protect
(positive duties) on the second level. Thirdly, there are duties to aid the
deprived (positive duties). In Shue’s picture, subsistence rights lead to
the same structure of corresponding duties as security rights. So subsis-
tence rights are not exclusively positive, and security rights not exclu-
sively negative.
Furthermore, Shue claims that honoring subsistence rights can often
involve not transferring commodities to people, but rather preventing
people from being deprived of the commodities or the means to pro-
duce or buy the commodities (Shue 1996, 51). But, as I pointed out
elsewhere (Mieth 2008; Mieth forthcoming), the analogy between se-
curity and subsistence with regard to corresponding duties is not con-
vincing. Shue has the idea that subsistence should not be destroyed
where it is already given. But this is not the only case we have to con-
sider here. If we look at the social human rights as described in Article
25 (1) of the declaration of human rights, it seems that those whose sub-
sistence is not yet or no longer given also have a human right to be pro-
vided with the means to subsist. “Everyone has the right to a standard of
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his fam-
ily, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary so-
cial services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control.”
If we distinguish between the protection of one’s actual power to
control the means of one’s ability to exist against others and the transfer
of money or goods from others in order to establish an adequate standard
of living, we see that in the second case duties of omission do not play a
primary role. The way in which Article 25 is formulated implies not
only that people should not be deprived of their basic social goods
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but also that they have a right to be provided with them where they are
not in place. Here we are back to the problems mentioned in section I.
It seems that to provide someone with goods (which means an improve-
ment of his situation) would be classified as a positive duty whereas
avoiding depriving him (which means not deteriorating his situation)
is a negative one. However, we have also seen that securing someone’s
basic goods can be part of a strong duty, as in the case of the drowning
child. Still, though it is clear in the case of social human rights that al-
though the first criterion for strong duties, reference to a basic good, is
met, it is not per se given that the other criteria for strong duties, rea-
sonable demandingness and determinateness, are also fulfilled. Should
this lead into a skeptical position towards social human rights?
Onora O’Neill is very skeptical of the existence of social human
rights and their normative status because, as she points out, the strength
of a right depends on the existence of institutions that allocate the cor-
responding duties (O’Neill 1996 and 2005). I think that we best under-
stand Onora O’Neill’s skepticism about the universality of social human
rights by starting with the insight that the guarantee of social security
mentioned in Article 25 (1) of the declaration requires the fulfillment
of positive duties right from the start. Referring to the assumed asym-
metry between positive and negative duties, O’Neill claims that there
is an asymmetry between negative and positive human rights: negative
human rights (classical human rights to life, liberty and property) entail
corresponding universal negative duties that we owe every right-holder.
These duties can be fulfilled by all duty-bearers (symmetry between
right-holder and duty-bearer). Positive human rights (e. g. social rights)
entail corresponding special positive duties that have to be fulfilled only
by certain individuals (asymmetry between right-holder and duty-bear-
er). They are special universal rights: everybody has them, but not ev-
erybody has to fulfill corresponding duties. The allocation of corre-
sponding duty-bearers is dependent on institutions, hence so is the ex-
istence of social rights. If our critical interpretation of Shue’s approach is
correct, O’Neill has a strong point. Positive rights seem more demand-
ing right from the start if subsistence must be provided for by others.
Positive human rights understood in this way are dependent on institu-
tional duty allocation right from the start.
O’Neill’s thesis is that we can distinguish between human rights in a
full sense and mere manifesto-rights by the nature of corresponding du-
ties. Negative rights have corresponding doubly universal negative du-
ties (everybody owes their fulfillment to everyone). Furthermore, these
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duties are perfect (which means that their content is determined). Pos-
itive rights are dependent on institutionalization since the content of
corresponding duties and the determination of adequate duty-bearers
presuppose institutional allocation. The counterintuitive point in
O’Neill’s conclusion seems to arise if we conceive of human rights as
moral rights or justified moral claims that arise independent of institu-
tional arrangements and have a critical potential in evaluating their le-
gitimacy. If the foundation for the existence of human rights lies in
their protection of necessary or basic goods or basic interests, to
which all individuals have a right deriving from their moral status
(their dignity), then it seems wrong to maintain that the existence of
some of those rights is dependent on their institutionalization. It
seems that negative and positive human rights can be derived from
the combination of the equal moral status of all human beings (dignity)
and their basic needs or interests for basic goods.
That is where Elizabeth Ashford’s critique of O’Neill’s position sets
in (Ashford 2006). She holds that the determination of duty-bearers is
not a condition for the existence of social human rights. By contrast, Ash-
ford considers the institutional allocation of corresponding duties itself as
a duty that corresponds to social rights. Even so, this notion does not
solve the problem of the determination of corresponding duties. Neg-
ative and positive human rights may exist as moral rights, independent
of their effective institutionalization, but they may nevertheless remain
unfulfilled if their substance or content is not efficiently protected. And
this can best be secured by a determination of corresponding duty-bear-
ers as well as by a determination of the content of the rights-corre-
sponding duties. What remains notoriously difficult in particular is the
determination of rights-corresponding positive duties.
If we say that human rights protect basic goods by adequate institu-
tional arrangements, the decisive question is: what if the institutional al-
location of positive-human-rights-corresponding duties fails? In the
world we live in today, institutions do not effectively secure social
human rights everywhere. Institutions may be unjust or, in many
cases, might not even exist yet. James Griffin’s (Griffin 2008) proposal
is to distinguish between primary duties that have the same content as
human rights and secondary duties to promote human rights. In the
case of negative duties this seems clear: I must not kill or torture others
(primary duty with the same content as the human right not to be killed
or tortured). In the case of social human rights it is, however, not clear
what content corresponding primary duties would have. If there is a
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human right to adequate housing or food or social security, it is not at all
clear how I individually should directly provide for these things con-
cerning poor people worldwide. The difference that Griffin makes be-
tween primary duties and secondary duties seems to blur here.
Again, Ashford’s point would be that there are individual duties to
institutionalization since it is not the existence but the fulfillment of
human rights that is dependent on institutionalization. If human rights
can be efficiently secured only by institutional arrangements and these
are not in place, there are human-rights-corresponding individual duties
to establish these institutions.
The question is: How strong are these individual duties? If they are
the only social-rights-corresponding duties under given circumstances,
they would have to be very strong if we would expect them to guaran-
tee the fulfillment of human rights, just as we suppose that negative
human-rights-corresponding individual duties (not to kill, not to tor-
ture) are very strong and that we commit serious moral wrongs if we
violate these duties. What I am afraid of is this: Social-human-rights-
corresponding individual institutionalization-duties are only weak,
though this is not due to their being positive duties, but because they
are underdetermined and might be overdemanding. It is in most cases
simply unclear what individuals should do in order to establish better in-
stitutions worldwide.
III. World poverty as a human rights violation
Let us now have a look at the philosophical debate about the problem of
world poverty with respect to human rights and the strength of positive
duties.
As we know, Peter Singer starts from the idea that there is a strong
individual positive duty to aid in the drowning child case. By analogy,
Singer claims that there are strong duties to aid the poor, since poverty is
life-threatening and we, the global rich, can help them without serious
danger to ourselves. Now the objective neediness (a threat to life) is sim-
ilar in both cases but they are different with respect to other morally rel-
evant factors.
Firstly, there is a dissimilarity as far as accountability for the failure to
render assistance in an emergency is concerned. For our considered
moral judgments it makes a big difference whether a moral wrong is ac-
countable to a specific person or not.
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Furthermore, there is a dissimilarity concerning the probability of
success. In the drowning child case it is clear what I have to do in
order to save the child and we consider the problem solved if we
give the child back to his parents. On the other hand, it is not at all
clear what I have to do with regard to the problem of world poverty.
If poverty is a social human rights issue, we need adequate institutional
arrangements in order to guarantee that the substance of these rights is
secured.
If our analysis of positive and negative duties in section I is convinc-
ing, the duty to help in the drowning child case is strong since it refers
to an objective good, i. e. the objective neediness or basic interest of the
child (condition one), it can be fulfilled at reasonable cost (condition
two) and is clearly determined since it is clear who has to do what in
order to save the child with a high probability (condition three). In
the poverty case, condition one is fulfilled but conditions two and
three are not. So, with unclear accountability for the failure to render
assistance in an emergency, the content of the duty to help in the second
case is normatively unclear, too. Furthermore, the cases differ concern-
ing the kind of emergency, and this has consequences for the norma-
tively relevant factors mentioned above. The drowning child case is
an acute emergency whereas the poverty case is a structural emergency
that can only be eradicated by institutional change in the long run (cf.
Mieth 2008 and Kuper 2005).
If we have a look at approaches that are not utilitarian, like Singer’s,
but are instead directly human-rights-based, we come to the same con-
clusion. For example, Alan Gewirth holds that there are strong positive
human-rights-corresponding individual duties. His argument is not built
by analogy but leads to the same problem we found in the structure of
Singer’s argument. For Gewirth, human rights protect basic human
goods (autonomy, well-being). Since these goods can be endangered
by harming actions as well as by omissions of helping actions, there
are strong positive individual duties to provide for the goods needed
for well-being. Gewirth denies any decisive normative relevance to
the asymmetry between positive and negative duties: The existence of
positive human rights does not depend on the determinateness of cor-
responding duties (condition three) but solely on their protection of
basic goods (condition one) and reasonable demandingness (condition
two), whereby demandingness is directly considered to be a trade-off
between basic goods and non-basic goods. As long as some have
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more than basic goods and others lack them, those who have more do
not even have a right to their additional property.12
This leads to what Pogge has called a “maximalist interactional un-
derstanding of human rights”: “a human right to X gives you a moral
claim against all others that they each do whatever is in their power
to ensure that you have X” (Pogge 2005, 64). And this is, of course,
problematic if we want to assume a duty to do something, since this
duty might be too demanding. It seems that the problem of manifes-
to-rights diagnosed above has turned into the problem of manifesto-du-
ties. They are proclaimed to be strong since they refer to human rights,
but if strong duties are defined not only by reference to basic goods, but
also by reasonable demandingness and by determinateness, these duties
are not strong, since the other two criteria are not met.
We might now understand better why the classical assumption,
which combines the Kantian with the Aristotelian tradition, was that
the duties holding in the poverty case are only weak duties of virtue
or of charity or benevolence since there is no determinate connection
between a potential right-holder and a duty-bearer. However, from
our analysis in section I it follows that, contrary to the idea that all pos-
itive duties are weak, we can stay with our intuition in the drowning
child case: If a basic good is endangered and there is a determined con-
nection between right-holder and duty-bearer, and aid is not overde-
manding, there are strong positive duties to aid. Even so, this is not ap-
plicable to the poverty problem. As we have seen in section I, we can
think of two factors that render a duty weak: First, it might be its ref-
erence to a minor good. Actions which refer to minor goods seem to be
very good candidates for the category of the supererogatory. Actions
which refer to basic goods but are overdemanding are also supereroga-
tory. Saints sacrifice their own life-plan in order to help others and her-
oes risk their lives in order to save other people’s lives. The interesting
category is the one comprising actions which are underdetermined but
refer to basic goods. The question is whether they are adequately descri-
bed by the category of benevolence or charity.
One decisive assumption for the category of charity seems to be that
the charitable person has not contributed, in any morally inadequate
way, to the distress that charity is meant to alleviate from. Charity is
above all previous-behavior-independent. Thomas Pogge considers
the approaches mentioned up to this point as misleading. His main
12 Gewirth 1987 and 2007, see also Unger 1996.
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point against Singer is that he implicitly suggests that the person helping
in the drowning child case, and by analogy we, the citizens from the
rich and powerful democratic countries, are not involved in the distress
that we want to alleviate in others. By contrast, we, as Pogge claims, are
involved in the existence and persistence of the problem of world pov-
erty since we are contributing to and profiting from unjust institutions.
Against Gewirth’s interactional understanding of human rights, he de-
fends an institutional understanding of human rights. There are, first
of all, human-rights-corresponding institutional duties. Institutions are
only justified if human rights do not remain unfulfilled in any avoidable
way (the institutional account of human rights from § 28 of the
UDHR). In addition, there are also human-rights-corresponding indi-
vidual negative duties which are derived from the institutional under-
standing, “according to which a human right to X gives you a moral
claim against all others that they not harm you by cooperating, without
compensating protection and reform efforts, in imposing upon you an
institutional order under which you lack secure access to X as part of
a foreseeable and avoidable human rights deficit” (Pogge 2005, 67).
The underlying idea is, again, that human-rights-correlative duties
(called negative duties) are (other things being equal) strong or at least
stronger than positive duties (e. g. duties to render assistance in an emer-
gency, duties of charity).
The main question for the current debate is which human-rights-
corresponding duties individuals have under given non-ideal institu-
tional circumstances. There are two main proposals :
A. Individuals have compensatory obligations corresponding to the amount
of their contribution to or profiting from unjust institutional orders
(Pogge).
B. Individuals have duties of institutionalization according to which they
have to establish institutional conditions that secure human rights (Ashford,
Gosepath, Orend).
The underlying idea in both cases is that these duties are strong duties of
justice (or negative duties, understood according to the normative def-
inition) since they refer to human rights that are meant to protect basic
goods. My thesis is: If the criteria of demandingness and determinate-
ness together with the reference to basic goods make a duty strong,
than these duties are not strong since they may refer to basic goods
but they are not determined. Duties to compensate depend on previous
behavior. This behavior must have violated a strong duty, or else we
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lose the idea that a compensatory duty is also strong. Judith Lichtenberg
argues that the “model of harm underlying the classic formulation of the
harm principle – discrete, individual actions with observable and meas-
urable consequences for particular individuals – no longer suffices to ex-
plain the ways our behavior impinges on the interests of other people”
(Lichtenberg 2010, 559). The decisive point is that since the activities
that might have bad consequences for others around the globe “are
seamlessly woven into our normal routines, ceasing to engage in these
‘New Harms’ is not at all easy – not simply a matter of refraining
from things we never would have dreamed of doing in the first place,
like killing and raping and robbing. Not harming people turns out to
be difficult and to require our undivided attention” (ibid., 558). And
this, as Lichtenberg holds, might be overdemanding. The negative ef-
fects of our everyday activities cannot, in classical terms of rights and du-
ties, be described as the violations of strong duties analogous to raping
and robbing. The effects of our everyday behavior on others are,
taken for themselves, too small to constitute harmful actions to specific
individuals (cf. Shei 2005). Furthermore, it is not clear how we could
avoid all problematic actions at a reasonable cost (cf. Lichtenberg
2010). Therefore, it seems impossible to derive strong individual duties
from our involvement in unjust structures.
Duties of institutionalization according to proposal B seem to be
positive duties that are independent of previous behavior and the in-
volvement in unjust structures that produce negative effects on others.
Here the problem is that individual duties to institutionalize human
rights seem hopelessly underdetermined. Their structure resembles du-
ties of benevolence that refer to basic goods but are underdetermined
even if they meet the criterion of reasonable demandingness.
It seems that the price for avoiding a restrictive definition of human
rights by a Kantian or O’Neillian criterion of corresponding individual
doubly universal perfect duties is a multiplication of individual human-
rights-corresponding duties. Unfortunately, some of the most relevant
of them are weak since they are unspecified under the given circum-
stances. Although there are strong positive duties, social-human-
rights-corresponding positive individual duties are much weaker
under given institutional circumstances. From this point of view not
all human-rights-corresponding duties are strong. Reference to
human rights is not a sufficient normative factor for the determination
of the strength of a duty. Hence some positive duties that refer to social
human rights and that can only be secured within an adequate institu-
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tional setting are dependent on institutional allocation. They would gain
strength from such an institutional allocation, which would give them
the determinateness required by the second condition. Therefore it is
not positive human rights that depend on institutional settings but the
strength of the corresponding duties.
The problem with this result is that it seems cynical, since it seems
that the less secured human rights are on the institutional level, the
weaker are the individual duties. On the other hand, my analysis of
the strength of duties also entails that the moral desert of people further-
ing the development of human rights (without having a strong duty to
do so) is very high. It is also fully compatible with this position that peo-
ple who are in influential political or economic positions have stronger
duties to further human rights development than average citizens of
Western democracies; and it is compatible with this position that the
strength of duties changes with the determinacy of what potential
duty-bearers have to do in order to protect other people’s human rights.
Another consequence of my analysis might be that the notion of
duty is inadequate to cope with the problem of world poverty consid-
ered as a problem of institutional failure of human rights protection. In-
stitutional change and human rights development seem to require the
personal dedication of many people beyond what is simply their duty
as conceptualized by common theories in moral philosophy. A duty,
in this sense, is either something that I must categorically fulfill – this
seems true for some duties (not to kill, not to torture, to rescue)
under some conditions (that it is clear what we have to do and towards
whom) – or a duty is something wide, such as some general maxim to
further other people’s well-being in general, leaving open by which ac-
tions one does this. Both these ideas we can take from the Kantian pic-
ture seem inadequate for the problems we are dealing with now. It also
does not feel adequate to describe the rescue duty in the drowning child
case using the category of a general weak duty to further another’s well-
being; nor does it seem adequate to consider human-rights-correspond-
ing duties to contribute to the improvement of human rights in some
way as strong negative duties that harm others if we do not fulfill them.
Furthermore, if we are involved in unjust political and economic
structures and do profit from them, as I think Pogge correctly points
out, it is also inadequate to consider our duties towards the poor as un-
derdetermined duties of charity. Maybe, as I said above, the notion of
duty, as we know it from the Kantian tradition, is no longer too helpful
in this context.
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As we saw, duties that emerge from our involvement in an unjust
global order have the same structure as duties of benevolence in so far
as they refer to basic goods but are underdetermined. The relevant dif-
ference is that duties of benevolence imply that the duty-bearer is not
involved in the injustice she is trying to alleviate. If Pogge is right
and we are involved in the injustice that individual human-rights-cor-
responding institutionalization duties and compensating duties refer
to, these duties are stronger than duties of benevolence, other things
being equal. However, this does not make them strong duties in the
above-mentioned sense, since they are still underdetermined and it is
not clear how we could avoid violating the negative duty in Pogge’s
picture that gives rise to compensating obligations. Pogge’s attempt to
show that what he labels a negative duty is stronger than positive duties
to improve the situation of others is not convincing.13 Ashford, by con-
trast, takes Singer’s side by pointing out that we have simply far more
and far more demanding duties than we want to admit. Still, it seems
clear that the duties in question are not as strong as the duty not to
kill or torture someone or the duty to rescue a toddler in case of emer-
gency without cost to oneself. The point here is that we are facing a di-
lemma. Its first horn is that if we want to use the term “duty” as a trump
in order to say that one really must do X, otherwise one is clearly doing
serious moral wrong to another person, it is hard to apply this notion to
the duties in question. The second horn is that if we weaken the con-
cept of duty in the direction of duties of virtue or benevolence, it does
not seem to adequately describe the fact that we are involved in moral
wrongs as far as the underfulfillment of human rights in our world is
concerned.
It seems no coincidence that recent papers shift the focus from the
notion of duty to that of responsibility, even without explicitly spelling
out why they do so (cf. Kuper 2005, Miller 2007). In closing, I will try
to offer some speculative and unfinished ideas about why this could be
an advantage.
First, the notion of responsibility is wider than that of duty. Duties
in a narrow sense refer to certain actions or omissions that are obligato-
ry. If they are supposed to be strong, they must be determined. Respon-
sibility by contrast can refer to a whole context of actions, e. g. to the
idea of how to fulfill a certain task or how to interpret a certain bundle
of available actions. To try to meet the responsibility one has as a doctor
13 For this discussion see Satz 2005, Patten 2005.
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implies a certain self-understanding that will direct actions and omissions
on certain occasions, hopefully in the right way. This will overlap with
the fulfillment or non-violation of duties, but implies more than that.
Second, the notion of responsibility is more sensitive to the fact that
different persons are in different positions that give them more or less
opportunity to influence other persons’ interests for better or worse.
Here, the notion of responsibility can build a bridge between strong
and weak duties since it refers to the range of our opportunities of in-
tentional behavior that can be realized by acting or omitting. It stands
for the possibility of influencing the world by our conduct and for
the possibility takeoff taking other persons’ interests into account.
This may sound very weak and vague, but I am afraid that it is ap-
propriate for the kind of problems we are facing in our world when we
consider human-rights-corresponding duties on the level of the average
citizens of our countries. Just like moral rights, human rights exist inde-
pendently of institutional realization and independently of a clear im-
putability of all corresponding duties. They provide strong moral rea-
sons to act in their favor that cannot, on every level, easily be spelled
out in terms of duties. The history of improvements in human rights
has already shown this: Some people were doing much more in favor
of human rights than what might have been their duty, while others
did much less. As I understand it, the interesting point in Pogge’s and
Ashford’s reasonings are not their conclusions about our duties and
their strength, but their analyses of the injustice of the global order.
As moral persons we are all responsible for our conduct and must ask
ourselves whether what we do is justified when confronted with the
evils they point out. Whether we consider this our duty or a general
question of our moral self-understanding, then, does not seem so deci-
sive.
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of socioeconomic human rights
Jan-Christoph Heilinger
This paper addresses the question whether excessive demands for moral
agents speak against a moral framework such as socioeconomic human
rights. In other words, is an account of human rights that embraces wel-
fare rights unsound if it turns out to be extremely burdensome for moral
agents? Section 1 of the paper analyses the relationship between human
rights and the corresponding, potentially overdemanding duties and ar-
gues that not only institutions but also individual agents are addressed by
these duties. Section 2 introduces the moral demandingness objection
(MDO) as a meta-theoretical criterion to judge the soundness of a
moral theory and shows the different ways in which a moral theory
might demand more than agents can do or can be reasonably expected
to do, particularly in the context of human rights. In the paper I focus
on the example of the presumed human right to adequate food and its
corresponding duties. I argue that excessive demands mirror the current
circumstances of extreme but in principle preventable world poverty.
Hence extremely burdensome demands should be taken neither as an
argument against the moral theory of human welfare rights nor as a
pre-emptive exculpation for agents failing to live up to the duties cor-
responding to these rights. However, obligations corresponding to wel-
fare rights are not the only type of obligations for moral agents; hence
moral agents should not always and exclusively strive to fulfill them.
1. Positive human rights-corresponding duties
1.1 The human right to basic necessities
Human rights are widely accepted as an attempt to formulate a minimal
moral framework, transcending narrow local settings and time frames, to
govern the living together of humans. Basic human rights protect di-
mensions of human lives that are of special importance since they
touch upon fundamental interests and the welfare of human agents.
Think for example of the right to be free from arbitrary coercion, the
right to participate in society, the right to basic means for survival, or
the right to chose one’s own religion. All these rights protect important
elements of an individual’s life, namely the ability to act autonomously,
to engage in social relationships, to have secure subsistence, and to be
culturally active. Because of the general importance of what they aim
to protect, human rights are said to be held by all human beings; and
as such they are supposed to be binding for agents who potentially
have an impact on someone’s human rights. If human rights protect
fundamental interests and the welfare of individuals, their violation con-
stitutes a severe moral wrong.
Hence because of the nature of human rights and their prescriptive
implications for moral agents, a theory of human rights is fundamentally
a moral framework, setting rules which moral agents – be it individuals
or institutions – must abide by if they want to act morally. Such a wider,
interactional view about the scope of human rights that includes differ-
ent types of moral agents – individuals as well as governments and insti-
tutions – is opposed to a narrower, institutional account of human rights
that excludes individuals and exclusively addresses institutions and their
representatives. While the institutional view dominates the current de-
bate about human rights, later on I will engage with the interactional
view.
According to the “generation account” of the history of human
rights (which should only be seen as describing a historical sequence
and not as providing an evaluative hierarchy), one can differentiate
three generations of human rights (cf. Vasak 1977). The first generation
includes basic liberty rights – freedom of assembly, freedom of expres-
sion, etc. – as well as civil and political rights of participation. The sec-
ond generation stipulates welfare rights, or social, economic, and cultur-
al rights; among them a right to basic necessities, basic education, etc.
Often they are positive rights to assistance, contrasting with the presum-
ably exclusively negative rights of the first generation. The third gener-
ation of human rights provides a diverse list of rights including collective
and group rights, a right to sustainability, to a healthy environment, etc.
In the following, I will focus on the second generation of human rights,
because here my question about the moral demandingness of human
rights becomes particularly salient: it addresses fundamental needs and
interests of human beings which, however, go beyond the apparently
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less controversial negative rights of the first generation without reaching
the even more controversial dimension of the third generation.
One prominent example of a basic human right of the second gen-
eration is the right to an “adequate standard of living” found in article
25 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in article 11
of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR). Article 11 explicitly includes a right to basic neces-
sities such as food. In the words of Jean Ziegler, the former UN Special
Rapporteur on the right to food, this human right means
“to have regular, permanent and free access, either directly or by means of
financial purchases, to quantitatively and qualitatively adequate and suffi-
cient food corresponding to the cultural traditions of the people to
which the consumer belongs, and which ensures a physical and mental, in-
dividual and collective fulfilling and dignified life free of fear.” (Ziegler
2001, 2)
This vision includes elements that are extremely unlikely to be widely
realized any time soon for many people. Furthermore, to demand that
food should match cultural traditions seems secondary given the ex-
treme lack of food that would secure sheer survival. However, while
it may be a challenge to properly define “adequate” food and while
one might want to question certain specifications, “adequate” food un-
disputedly includes there being enough food available to guarantee sur-
vival. There is a strong fundamental interest for human agents to be ad-
equately fed, because this seems to be a precondition for engaging into
any kind of human activity and moreover a precondition for enjoying
the first generation liberty rights. To be free from starvation is hence
a particularly pressing and immediate human right.
In our current world, many human beings live under conditions of
severe poverty. Every year, some 8 million humans die prematurely of
hunger (Sachs 2005, 1) and taken together 18 million die prematurely of
poverty-related causes (Pogge 2007, 51). Since the right to basic neces-
sities is said to be a universal human right, held by all and not only by
some humans or under certain conditions, in each individual case of
hunger the human right to basic necessities is disrespected and a moral
wrong occurs.
It is important to keep in mind that it is far from impossible to erad-
icate world poverty and world hunger (cf. e. g. Sachs 2005), given the
amount of food available and both the organizational capacities of mod-
ern societies and their existing financial means. It would certainly in-
volve financial commitment, intense preventive action and a long-
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term engagement to be successful. Yet world poverty is not an un-
changeable fact that has to be taken for granted, even if the demands
and the challenges of eradicating it would be high.
1.2 Rights and corresponding duties
One prominent problem with declaring universal human rights is that it
is often unclear who has to do what to secure these rights or who can be
held responsible for preventing human rights violations from happening.
Griffin argues in a straightforward way that there is a clear match be-
tween rights and obligations, though specifying exactly the content of
a human right may be difficult:
“The content of a human right is also the content of the corresponding
duty. What one party may demand, as of human right, another party has
some sort of obligation to supply. We have only to know the content of
human rights. But deciding that, of course, is not always easy.” (Griffin
2008, 97)
Yet even if we agree that there is, e. g., a human right to adequate food,
the answer to the question about the corresponding obligation is more
complicated than Griffin seems to suggest. After the initial intuitive re-
action that someone should be doing something about world hunger, the
difficulties begin. Often it is impossible to identify a human rights vio-
lator who directly causes the moral wrong in question. Think of struc-
tural human rights violations such as world hunger. While in some cases
bad governance or financial speculations with basic food might be
thought to have a substantial impact on food shortage, in most cases sim-
ple causal attributions of responsibility fail. Who has which obligation in
these cases? This question is crucial, since without counterpart obliga-
tions, basic human rights seem to become futile.
If we stipulate human rights without being specific about corre-
sponding duties, they turn out to be sheer manifesto rights, describing
some ideal without attributing responsibility for how to realize this
ideal (cf. Feinberg 1980). O’Neill, for example, is very critical of such
manifesto rights and hence makes the determination of rights-corre-
sponding duties and their holders a condition for a meaningful concept
of universal rights. She argues that unless we are able to specify counter-
part obligations, all talk of universal rights should be avoided (O’Neill
2005, 432–433).
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To be as specific as possible about determining rights-corresponding
duties, we have to inquire into the relationship between rights and du-
ties. However, given the complexity of the web of human interaction in
which human rights are located – and respected or violated – and given
the generality of basic human rights, the answer to the question of who
has which duty will certainly not be simple. There might be several lay-
ers of obligations, organized according to different potential agents.
After all, human rights do not result from a precise contract made be-
tween two individuals about, say, purchasing something, which
would be specifically about the parties involved and their rights and du-
ties explicitly agreed upon. So it might be that only a basic degree of
specificity is possible when it comes to defining the human rights-cor-
responding duties and the duty bearers.
So, how to further enquire into the duties that correspond to human
rights? One influential general definition of a right has been offered by
Joseph Raz:
“‘X has a right’ if and only if X can have rights and, other things being
equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for
holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.” (Raz 1986, 166)
Following Raz, the legitimate interests of an individual justify rights
which in consequence justify the corresponding duties. “Typically
rights are established by arguments about the value of having them.
Their existence depends on there being interests whose existence war-
rants holding others subject to duties to protect and promote them.”
(Raz 2007, 17). For Raz the right is prior and consequently gives rise
to a corresponding duty. Such a hierarchical account however is more
specific about rights than it can be about the derived duties. An alterna-
tive account that puts rights and duties on the same level would instead
stress their “correspondence”, and take rights and duties to refer to dif-
ferent aspects of a single normative relation existing between human
agents. Here one could say that rights and duties are correlative or cor-
responding conclusions of one moral argument made about a relation
between a potential agent and a potential right (cf. Holmgren 1985).
So far, I have spoken about rights generally; talking about human
rights specifically touches upon a somewhat different debate. Raz’s
own understanding of human rights, for example, is more specific
than his general account of rights.1 However, following a moral under-
1 According to his “political” view Raz “regards human rights as rights which are
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standing of human rights, I claim that in the case of human rights as well
the correspondence relationship between rights and duties should be
understood as them being correlative conclusions of moral judgments
about the legitimate interests of human agents.
But how to be specific about the corresponding duties, if one has
already made the moral argument that some dimension of human
lives is sufficiently important to justify a human right to it? Think for
example about the right to the physical integrity of one’s body. Here
clearly no one is allowed to disrespect this right and, say, torture some-
one. Hence all agents have a clearly identifiable duty to refrain from
doing something. No one whatsoever is allowed to interfere with this
fundamental right to physical integrity, because the interest in physical
integrity – as a precondition and an essential element of human lives
– is seen as a sufficient reason to urge others to omit certain types of ac-
tion.
Things are more complicated in the case of second generation
human rights such as the right to adequate food. Here too the interest
in being adequately fed is legitimate because not suffering from hunger
constitutes a fundamental element of human well-being, but the iden-
tification of a corresponding duty bearer is less obvious. In some cases
it is possible to identify someone directly causing the hunger of others
– say through stealing or directly withholding available resources. How-
ever, only some cases are of this relatively simple form. Under the cur-
rent global conditions of huge inequalities in access to food, the basic
rights of some are clearly being violated while it is not so easy to deter-
mine whether someone has directly caused this shortage. Assuming that
we are not able to identify anyone causally responsible for some people’s
shortage of food, what does the basic human right refer to in these cases?
Does it point to nothing?
Following O’Neill, I start from the assumption that rights without
corresponding duties are empty. So we should strive to identify duties
in these cases as well where negative duties of omitting certain types
of action will not suffice to stop the violation of a right from taking
place.2 What is needed here is positive action on the part of some
to be given institutional recognition, rights which transcend private morality”
(Raz 2007, 17). This is a specific understanding of human rights, distinguished
from other types of rights.
2 That negative duties alone may not be sufficient for ending problems is an im-
portant reason not to exclusively follow Pogge’s important insight that indeed
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other agents. If human rights were to exclude any such positive corre-
sponding duties from their scope they would immediately become inef-
fective and futile.
The demand to include positive duties among the rights-corre-
sponding duties is necessary not only for the welfare rights, but equally
for first generation liberty rights. Although some have argued that lib-
erty rights only correspond to duties of omission, in my view they
also constitute positive duties. Securing freedom of assembly and speech
demands in many cases positive action like providing a police force and
a juridical system to guarantee that no one is unduly coerced (cf. Griffin
2008, 96). Relying on negative duties alone will fail.3 Shue argues in the
same direction when he suggests that generally “three types of duties
correlate” with “every basic right”, including liberty as well as subsis-
tence rights like the right to food: “I. Duties to avoid depriving. II. Du-
ties to protect from deprivation. III. Duties to aid the deprived.” (Shue
1996, 52).
Nevertheless it is especially difficult to identify duty holders for sec-
ond generation human rights. O’Neill has rightly argued: “It is plausible
to think that rights not to be killed or to speak freely are matched by and
require universal obligations not to kill or not to obstruct free speech;
but a universal right to food cannot be simply matched by a universal
obligation to provide an aliquot morsel of food” (O’Neill 2000, 135).
With this she certainly stresses an important point, but no one has claim-
ed that it would be a simple task to precisely identify the matching ob-
ligation for a given right. If one accepts O’Neill’s criticism of sheer
“manifesto” rights – well-meant formulations of admirable aspirations
rather than claimable rights – and allows talk about basic rights only
under the condition that we can specify counterpart obligations, the
task of precisely identifying the holders of rights-corresponding duties
and the exact extent of these duties only becomes even more urgent.
we can identify many of the duties that correspond to rights violations as neg-
ative (Pogge 2008).
3 In fact, given the conditions of massive inequality of human beings – some are
less privileged than others in potentially different ways – liberty taken alone will
often turn out to be suppressive and only rights and entitlements will be liber-
ating.
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1.3 Duty bearers
One answer to the question of who bears the human rights-correspond-
ing duties is given by the official human rights documents themselves.
Article 11 of the CESCR claims that there is a positive duty to provide
enough food and stipulates that the holders of this positive duty are the
states who signed the covenant:
“The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental
right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and
through international cooperation, the measures, including specific pro-
grams, which are needed: (a) To improve methods of production, conser-
vation and distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific
knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and
by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the
most efficient development and utilization of natural resources; (b) Taking
into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting
countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in re-
lation to need.”
So here, the states declaring the human right to adequate food take
themselves to be responsible for positive measures that meet the needs
of those suffering from hunger and lack of adequate food. However,
are states the sole holders of human rights-corresponding duties? Are in-
dividuals only indirectly involved in securing these basic rights, e. g. by
paying taxes to or working directly for governments who then consti-
tute the international covenant? Or are there some rights-corresponding
moral duties that affect individuals independent of institutional agree-
ments?
Some argue indeed that only official institutions bear human rights-
corresponding duties. Such a political or official view of human rights
has been defended e. g. by Charles Beitz, who understands human rights
as “standards for domestic institutions whose satisfaction is a matter of
international concern” (Beitz 2009, 128). From this point of view
both negative and positive duties are held by institutions and, generally,
there is no personal or individual human rights-corresponding duty to
care for the needy or to guarantee fair trials for everyone. If a human
rights violation takes place the responsibility to act lies with an official
institution. “Nonofficial” individuals may – at best – have a secondary
or indirect duty to support institutions in meeting their human rights-
corresponding duty, e. g. through paying taxes or through exerting pres-
sure on governments, or to help create institutions that in consequence
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will be able to meet rights-corresponding duties.4 However, the primary
duty lies with the institution.
Others argue that – besides official institutions – individuals also have
a human rights-corresponding duty for positive action. To talk of uni-
versal human rights means on this view that they are, as Griffin has it,
“doubly universal”, that they are claims “of all human agents against
all other human agents” (Griffin 2008, 177). The difference between
such an “interpersonal” or “interactional” view and the “political” or
“institutional” view already mentioned is the disputed duty of individ-
uals, while both views agree on the duty of institutions. Such a wider,
interactional view that would allocate duties to both individuals and of-
ficials is also acknowledged, for example, in Nickel’s definition of
human rights. Generally a defender of the institutional view, he argues
that human rights “are political norms dealing mainly with how people
should be treated by their governments and institutions. They are not
ordinary moral norms applying mainly to interpersonal conduct.” (Nick-
el 2010, my italics). With this he stresses the primary focus of human
rights and corresponding duties on states and institutions. However,
the possibility that individuals might have human rights-corresponding
duties too is not ruled out, even if it will be only in a non-ordinary way.
Also Thomas Pogge, generally an adherent to the political view that
imposes duties on institutions, has prominently argued for individuals
having indirectly negative duties of omission in the context of human
rights violations (Pogge 2008, 67). In the following, I will take this a
step further and engage with the not undisputed assumption that
human rights also have corresponding individual positive duties.
I defend an interactional understanding of human rights, mainly be-
cause, even if they have a special status as codified rights, they ultimately
strive to express a basic morality that is to be protected by legal arrange-
ments. Another reason why individuals should also be seen as bearers of
rights-dependent negative and positive obligations, especially in the
context of the right to adequate food, is the following: Given the
utter urgency of the matter – according to the frequent, ongoing, ex-
4 This is how argue e. g. Pogge 2008 or Caney 2007. “All persons have a duty to
bring about and maintain institutions that ensure that persons can enjoy their
human rights.” (Caney 2007, 287). – Of course beyond human rights-depend-
ent duties individuals also have moral duties e. g. not to kill or to help those in
need, but the political account strictly differentiates between moral and political
rights and duties.
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treme violating of fundamental rights – the fact that one can do some-
thing to stop a severe moral wrong from going on may prima facie suffice
to create a corresponding duty to do so. Ashford argues in a similar way
that the responsibility for fulfilling both positive and negative obliga-
tions towards both compatriots and foreigners ultimately lies with
every agent who is able to do so (Ashford 2007). In other words:
sheer ability to stop moral wrongs from taking place generates under
certain circumstances moral reasons that ultimately might take the
shape of duties.5 Another reason to see individuals as bearers of
human rights-corresponding duties is that institutions are ultimately
shaped by or constituted by individuals. They are never independent
of the individuals who made and run them. From this perspective the
difference between institutions and individuals would become a ques-
tion of degree.
Against this, one might argue that an account of individuals bearing
human rights-corresponding duties relies on an undue confusion of
moral duties and human rights-corresponding duties; the first one sim-
ply being the result of some general moral theory directed at individual
behavior, the second simply stemming from the particular human rights
framework focusing on institutional obligations. However, this objec-
tion only makes sense within the narrower political view, where
human rights are defined exclusively as a political instrument obligating
institutions and their representatives. If alongside their undisputed polit-
ical function one also wants to attribute to human rights a degree of uni-
versality that goes beyond the realm of codified statements, one has to
allow for their extension to include individual agents as bearers of
human rights-corresponding duties.6
5 Cf. Griffin, who argues for ability being one among several reason-generating
considerations (Griffin 2009, 102) or Sen who claims: “Human rights generate
reasons for action for agents who are in a position to help in the promoting or
safeguarding of the underlying freedoms. […] In particular, the acceptance of
imperfect obligations goes beyond volunteered charity or elective virtues.”
(Sen 2004, 319). Taking up insights from Young, one could also argue that
being able to help and have a positive impact on someone’s life already consti-
tutes a sufficient degree of social connection, i. e. a relationship including moral
obligations and responsibility (cf. Young 2006).
6 While I defend the interactional view about human rights, I do not claim that
there is more truth in one view than the other. But if the ultimate measure for
moral and human rights theories consists in improving our living together in-
sofar as fundamental interests are respected and the well-being of human beings
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However, if there are universal duties for individuals who are in a
position to do something to prevent a violation of human rights from
happening, and if the current violation of human rights is extreme, is
the moral burden posed on the agents not too high? Can we, the rela-
tively well-off in the affluent countries, – on the grounds of a doubly
universal, interactional account of human rights that allows all agents
to make claims on all other agents – reasonably be said to be the bearers
of corresponding duties to the rights of the 30,000 people who die every
day7 from poverty-related causes? Would an account of human rights
that puts such a high burden on individual agents not be overly demand-
ing and hence unsound?
2. Overdemandingness and welfare-rights
When we seek to determine the exact extent of rights-corresponding
obligations, one major concern in the background is the fear that a
moral theory that poses unreasonably excessive demands may become
itself unreasonable and hence unsustainable. Call this the Moral De-
mandingness Objection (MDO) against a moral theory. This objection,
as a meta-theoretical criterion that evaluates the soundness of a theory
according to its degree of demandingness, can also be put forward
against a theory of welfare rights. In the following I will analyze the dif-
ferent ways in which a moral theory may demand “too much” from
moral agents and ask what might result from this diagnosis for a moral
theory like an account of socioeconomic rights.
The idea that it is unreasonable to demand more from a moral agent
than she can possibly fulfill or can be reasonably expected to fulfill is a
widely accepted principle in moral reasoning from antiquity – “ultra
posse nemo obligatur” – to modern time – “ought implies can.” The
core idea of this principle is that it is a necessary condition of being mo-
rally obliged to do something that we are able to do it or can be reason-
ably expected to do it.
Most often, the MDO is discussed as an argument against conse-
quentialism. Exclusively following an algorithm to maximize the good
is promoted, a too narrow political view does not exhaust all the possibilities for
improvement.
7 And even more die under conditions of an acute famine like the one currently
happening in Somalia and the neighboring countries.
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is said to be no plausible and appropriate way (Williams 1981, 14–19;
O’Neill 2009, 62–63)8 of moral reasoning for human agents who live
their lives embedded in complex and ambiguous social settings full of
special relations of concern and particular obligations towards some
(cf. also Scheffler 2010). Ultimately a maximizing consequentialism
will result in implausibly high demands that even motivated agents
will necessarily fail to fulfill. While the MDO has been mainly discussed
in this consequentialist context,9 it also proves important for evaluating
the soundness of rights-corresponding duties in rights-based moral the-
ories such as the one in question here.
2.1 Three types of the moral demandingness objection (MDO)
What does it mean to say that a moral theory is too demanding? The
MDO can appear in different forms. A moral theory can be (1) techni-
cally overdemanding, (2) motivationally or psychologically overde-
manding or (3) theoretically overdemanding.
Technical overdemandingness can result first from the epistemic chal-
lenge that our knowledge and understanding of a given complex situa-
tion or setting in which we have to act is insufficient to make a proper
decision. The uncertainty resulting from indeterminate, complex real
world scenarios makes moral obligations potentially overdemanding. If
I just didn’t know that I could have done something or if I am merely
incapable of determining the proper moral action, a theory that asks me
to perform the morally correct action can be said to be unreasonably de-
manding. Griffin for example argues that there are “limits […] to human
understanding” and continues:
“Sometimes we are able to calculate fairly reliable the good and bad con-
sequences of large-scale, long-term social arrangements, but sometimes we
are not. And our failures in understanding are often not peripheral to mor-
ality but at its centre and great enough to leave us with no belief upon
which we should be willing to base our lives.” (Griffin 2008, 98).
8 O’Neills position on the demands of maximizing consequentialism is even
more radical, since she claims that the resulting demands in the end only appear
to be overdemanding, while ultimately they are not demanding enough, since
they are nothing but empty formalism (O’Neill 2009, 62).
9 For a critical discussion of this see Sobel 2007.
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A second form of technical overdemandingness obtains when different
actions that have been simultaneously identified as morally demanded
are mutually exclusive and for this reason impossible to perform. Such
contradictory demands could result from equally urgent moral claims
made by several individuals e. g. to help them in severe distress in a sit-
uation where it is unfeasible for the agent to meet all of these claims si-
multaneously. If there were a moral obligation to help them all, this
would place an excessive burden on moral agents that they would not
be able to meet.
This second form of technical overdemandingness can also take the
form of identifying an incommensurate task for an individual – such as
saving the world from poverty. Here the overdemandingness consists in
the setting of a goal that is incongruent with the abilities of an individual
agent such that it seems to be unreasonable to place this moral demand
on an individual.
A second type of moral overdemandingness is motivational or psycho-
logical. One form of this motivational or psychological overdemanding-
ness can obtain if, for example, meeting some obligations would be ex-
tremely costly for moral agents and require huge sacrifices. To help peo-
ple in severe distress we would have to abandon our private projects or
some relationships of special concern to people nearer and dearer who
happen to be much better off than those in severe distress. Yet as Schef-
fler has argued, there are several forms of “reasonable partiality”, such as
obligations resulting from personal relationships, membership in com-
munities or personal projects (Scheffler 2010). It might be inappropriate
and overdemanding to ask moral agents to jettison these reasonable
forms of partiality to meet some moral obligation.10
Moral agents who did neglect special relationships in order to follow
the duties stipulated by a given theory might become impersonal duty
performers or utility maximizers (Williams 1981, 14). A moral theory
requiring inhumane, machine-like agents would clearly not fit human
psychology or human nature, because it would be motivationally in-
commensurate. It cannot reasonably be expected of a moral agent, so
the argument goes, to give up all personal relationships and private proj-
ects simply in order to meet the demands of morality.
10 Another form of this argument might stress the marginal utility that is given in
cases where an agent has to invest many resources or has to make huge sacrifices
in order to realize a relatively small improvement for others.
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Furthermore, it might be said to be psychologically overdemanding
for an agent if she particularly should feel obligated to perform some kind
of moral action that millions of other agents – who might be equally ob-
ligated – fail to perform. Under the conditions of general non-compli-
ance with moral obligations the general obligations of individuals could
become weaker and it might appear to be unreasonable to demand that
individuals fully comply with moral duties under conditions of general
non-compliance. Consider the following example: If many or most rel-
atively affluent individuals do not donate (or do not donate enough),
the general duty of helping the needy will certainly not be fulfilled. It
would, from the point of view presented here, be motivationally over-
demanding to ask moral agents to do more than their due share (in order
to avoid overall failure); and it would be motivationally overdemanding
for them to engage into the activity in the first place in order to do their
share, since failure is certain.11
Moral theories can also be theoretically overdemanding, that is, self-
defeating within the boundaries of the given theory. If by following
the moral demands of a given theory the moral agent will experience
or bring about consequences that contradict the presupposed values of
this theory, the theory itself demands something of someone to avoid
the same thing for someone else. If a right to adequate food asks all
moral agents to engage in fighting hunger, a theory demanding actions
that bring the agents themselves into severe poverty would be overde-
manding because self-defeating. Another example of this pattern can be
found in the above-mentioned cases of psychological overdemanding-
ness, where agents might be asked to sacrifice their valuable relationships
in order to meet moral duties. If the moral theory also attributes value to
relationships (and not exclusively to brute survival) then sacrificing all
relationships in order to dedicate one’s life exclusively to fighting
world poverty is at odds with the declared values of the theory.
Generally, the possibility of iteration of moral demands can point to
another theoretical challenge for a moral theory. If an agent is obligated
to perform some kind of action that can be reasonably expected from
her such as donating 10 Euros to charity, why should she not be obliged
to do so repeatedly? Once one duty has been fulfilled, the next one
11 Such claims have been discussed e. g. by Ashford, who argues that non-compli-
ance with moral rules on the part of some make the obligations for others even
more onerous (Ashford 2007, 211). See also the discussion in Murphy 2000 and
in Miller 2011.
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looms. In these cases the continuous application of a moral theory ulti-
mately places very different and potentially excessive demands on
agents.
2.2 The impact of the moral demandingness objection
on socioeconomic rights
Do the different forms of the MDO speak against welfare rights and cor-
responding duties? Initially, one has to accept that much speaks in favor
of the soundness of the MDO. If the existing moral duties are either im-
possible to determine or impossible to realize (technically overdemand-
ing), alien to human lives (psychologically overdemanding), or self-de-
feating (theoretically overdemanding), this proves to be a problem for a
moral theory like the account of welfare rights and corresponding du-
ties. A theory generating excessive and unrealistic obligations might
turn out to be empty insofar as it is little more than wishful thinking,
a well-meant but futile formulation of remote and potentially even con-
tradictory goals.
Indeed the different forms of potential overdemandingness seem to
apply to welfare rights and corresponding duties. They all point to prob-
lems that regularly come up whenever one attempts to identify the du-
ties corresponding to socioeconomic rights. It might be difficult to fully
understand the complex connections that lead to human rights viola-
tions so that it becomes unclear exactly which relation of duty exists.
The resulting responsibilities might exclude one another or simply go
beyond what is realistically feasible for agents. The sacrifices demanded
may be inconvenient or even excessive. The duties may have a negative
impact on the range of “innocent” choices available, that is they may
significantly restrict the options for acting in a morally acceptable
way. They even may endanger other dimensions of our lives that we
cherish or hold in high, potentially even moral esteem. All this shows
why we do indeed have reason to say that the demands generated by
socioeconomic rights are excessively demanding, at least prima facie.
If one thinks that excessive demands have to be avoided because
they are fatal for a moral theory, there are different ways to respond
to this diagnosis. I will mention several of them before showing
which problems are connected with each of them. In conclusion I
will argue for the claim that it does not necessarily speak against a theory
that it generates certain forms of excessive demands.
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First, one could restrict oneself exclusively to talking about rights.
One would then simply stay agnostic and silent on the question of
whether agents have any rights-corresponding duties. A second option
consists in restricting the rights to such a degree that any corresponding
duties do not lead to the MDO. If fighting world poverty would be too
demanding for moral agents, this would exclude the existence of a
human right to adequate food. A third possibility consists in granting
the existence of rights while restricting the corresponding obligations
to an acceptable degree. This would give human rights the status of
goals, ideals or remote ends to be achieved – or perhaps not – at
some later point in the future. In these cases the corresponding duties
would be trimmed down to a technically, motivationally, and theoret-
ically acceptable degree.
In all three cases – agnosticism about duties, restricting rights, re-
stricting obligations – the MDO provides a pre-emptive exculpation of
moral agents who are thus exempted from many moral obligations.
But should we endorse such a practice of pre-emptive exculpation?
Or does it generate problems we should wish to avoid by accepting
the overdemandingness of welfare rights?
2.3 Challenging the moral demandingness objection
In my view, the three possible responses to taking the MDO as a serious
argument against the soundness of a moral theory lead to unacceptable
consequences. Agnosticism about corresponding duties makes human
rights claims nothing but empty talk. If we do not say a word about
who might have which corresponding obligations, any talk about
human rights would be empty and nobody who could potentially do
something about it would feel “a call of moral duty”. In looking exclu-
sively at the rights-side of the two-sided relationship, we risk losing half
of the picture. Hence agnosticism simply neglects an admittedly difficult
but crucial element of the task of securing the legitimate interests of
human agents. This, as a consequence, also makes the talk of rights idle.
Restricting the rights to make them fit an acceptable or convenient de-
gree of obligations would be a revisionary approach. Imagine the fol-
lowing argument: “Striving to secure survival for all would place too
extreme a burden on some. Hence there cannot be such a human
right.” This response introduces a hierarchy where instead we should
show a correspondence between matching elements. It would be epis-
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temically questionable to reduce rights in accordance with an external
standard – external to the relation of correspondence between rights
and duties – of what agents can do or can be reasonably be expected
to do. The reason for accepting a right and a corresponding duty is
the basic interest of a human individual in her fundamental well-
being that has been accepted as legitimate, and not the convenience
for a corresponding duty bearer nor the determination of how much
can be reasonably asked of someone.
Of course, one has to enquire whether there are good reasons to
change the understanding of human rights based on the interests and
welfare of human agents and not on the convenience or realizability
of corresponding obligations. One way out of this dilemma seems to
be to focus on first generation human rights exclusively, which appear
to be much less burdensome, and leave out any second generation
human rights that call for more positive action. But, as already men-
tioned above, the seemingly undisputed set of liberty rights might also
give rise to duties for individuals that go beyond duties of omission.
Think for example of the duty to stop first generation human rights vi-
olations through humanitarian interventions or to secure a functional
legal system in a country to guarantee individuals their right to a fair
trial. If we were to avoid potentially excessive demands resulting from
positive duties, then for the same reasons we would also have to object
to first generation liberty-rights and not just second generation welfare-
rights. Therefore we see that if we restrict rights for reasons of overde-
mandingness it potentially calls into question all human rights, inde-
pendently of their generation, because a potentially overdemanding
positive moral duty might correspond to all human rights.
The third approach to moderate rights-corresponding obligations also
seems problematic. Trimming down the obligations to an acceptable de-
gree would weaken the basic rights significantly and diminish them to
the degree that they become incapable of securing basic elements of
human welfare. If in cases where we think that it is overdemanding
for potential agents to save someone in severe distress the right of the
suffering person simply has no addressee or corresponding duty bearer,
the right as such degenerates. The understanding of rights and duties as
corresponding to one another means we cannot modify one without
impacting the other.
Again, it is important to identify the epistemic standard we would
be using if we were to cut down the degree of an obligation. The stan-
dard of convenience would again be external to the bipolar relation of
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rights and duties. Hence a loosening of the correspondence between
rights and obligations endangers the entire human rights project.
So in all three responses to the MDO we face the severe problem
that human rights talk per se might become empty or vain if trimmed
down to the degree at which it is not too demanding for moral agents.
However, the degree of demandingness for a rights-corresponding duty
holder might seem to be a secondary or even external standard com-
pared to the initial goal of human rights talk, which consists in securing
the welfare and basic interests of individuals that have been accepted as
significant and important. Hence the adequate standard of judgment
about human rights is not the degree of the resulting demandingness,
but rather the importance of the protected dimension of a human life.
From the perspective of a welfare- or interest-based approach to
human rights, the response to the MDO is twofold. On the one hand
we have to accept that the demands of welfare rights can turn out to
be excessive; on the other hand we cannot find a way to restrict the
rights-corresponding duties without endangering the basic interests.
That is why the challenge lies instead in finding an appropriate way
of dealing with overdemandingness.
A general observation may be in order here. Evidently, moral the-
ories essentially become extremely demanding under non-ideal condi-
tions and under conditions of acute crisis.12 In these circumstances over-
demandingness might even be an inherent feature of morality: it could
simply be “part of the game” that to act morally is an extremely de-
manding undertaking. Hence the reproach of being extremely demand-
ing, and potentially too demanding, will be naturally raised against most
types of moral theories. Maybe this is why in the history of ethics many
proponents of different moral theories seemed to agree on the impor-
tance of the “ought implies can” principle. Restricting the demanding-
ness of morality seems appropriate and important for most moral theo-
ries, as – in face of non-ideal conditions – all of them are in need of
some moderating element if they are to avoid the consequence that
even well-intentioned moral agents continuously fail.
12 Pogge has argued that the individual burden to fight world poverty, if distrib-
uted fairly among all possible agents, would be non-excessive (Pogge 2008).
Whether this estimation is true is difficult to determine. However, under con-
ditions of non-compliance the burden for the individual will surely be exces-
sive.
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The question, however, is what we should reasonably expect from a
moral theory, e. g. from a theory of human rights, and whether the con-
tinuous moral failure of agents under non-ideal conditions really is a
flaw of a theory. If the main task of a moral theory consists in defining
what moral agents can be reasonably expected to do, the MDO might
apply and an overdemanding theory might be said to be unsound. After
all, the limits of human knowledge and human psychological and phys-
ical ability are somewhat fixed.13 But if a moral theory is about protect-
ing legitimate interests and needs of individuals and securing their wel-
fare, the primary focus of concern lies not on what moral agents can be
reasonably expected to do but on what moral agents should do. This view
can be called an “ethics-first” approach, because it places the focus of
concern on what should be done instead of on what human agents
can be realistically expected to do.14 In such an ethics-first account
the MDO only comes up at a much later point, to a subordinate degree
and in a different form.
In my view the ethics-first approach properly describes the primary
task of a moral theory. I have argued that the moral demands for agents
are somewhat independent of the given concrete abilities or reasonable
expectations for the moral agent. The demands of morality are extreme-
ly high, often even unreasonably high. This however seems to be the
result of the existence of distress in the world and not a result of
flaws in a moral theory. I would rather put it the other way round: If
the degree of moral obligations in a world like ours were convenient,
or easy to meet, that would be all the worse for the theory. Hence over-
demandingness in moral matters has to be accepted.
Perhaps others will have different feelings about this case. But if one
were to accept the overdemandingness of moral theories, then the
soundness of moral theories could be secured even if they were overde-
13 Nevertheless one should not underestimate the influence of e. g. education on
the motivational capacities of individuals. Cf. Scheffler: “What morality de-
mands depends on the state of the world in morally relevant respects, and
what people are motivated to do depends on how they have been educated
and socialized; and these factors in turn are dependent, in obvious ways, on
the structure and functioning of society.” (Scheffler 1994, 4).
14 The term “ethics first” is from Raymond Geuss, who is critical of such an ideal
theory approach (Geuss 2008, 8). My position is somewhat different from his:
While I agree with much in his critical diagnosis of ideal theory, I am never-
theless convinced that legitimate moral claims and rights are independent
from the question of their realizability.
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manding. The only price to pay is the perhaps undesirable but probably
apt insight that even engaged and well-intentioned moral agents are not
perfect and continuously fail in moral regards. Yet, should this be a
problem for a moral theory? For several reasons – that go back to my
prior arguments about the different dimensions of the MDO – I do
not think so.
Some say that motivational or psychological overdemandingness and
the corresponding bad conscience of moral agents make morality unat-
tractive and scare away potential moral agents from following the de-
mands of morality. This seems to be a debatable empirical question
about the motivational attitude of agents towards an extremely challeng-
ing task.15 One could also argue – quite contrary to this claim – that
lowering the standards of demandingness impedes existing motivations
to act. However, as an empirical question this is not of prior theoretical
concern for moral philosophy, which tries to identify demands of mor-
ality not primarily according to the motivational capacities of given
agents but according to what one reasonably identifies as the morally
right or wrong action.
Others would argue that permanent psychological and motivational
overdemandingness shows how a given moral theory is not fit for
human agents. Again, I would say that this does not provide a substantial
problem. Overdemandingness only shows how much need for moral
action currently exists in the world. Hence, instead of claiming that
such a moral theory would not be fit to human beings, one could
argue that an overdemanding theory fits the state of affairs in our current
world particularly well. After all, under current conditions of world
poverty, e. g., we cannot expect a moral theory to be convenient.
This however might change in a different world. So motivational over-
demandingness can be seen as an acceptable because appropriate feature
of a moral theory in the face of the moral wrongs in our world.
How about technical overdemandingness? Do conditions of uncer-
tainty or the problem of unfeasibility really speak against a moral obli-
gation to do something? This of course depends upon what you under-
stand a moral obligation to be. According to my view, the question
“Who should do what?” is reasonable even if it cannot be answered
with perfect accuracy. In many cases there may be insurmountable epis-
temic difficulties in determining the right action, but the idea that there
15 Psychological research about external influences on motivation and decision-
making will be necessary here. Cf. e. g. Ryan/Deci 2000.
Jan-Christoph Heilinger204
is only one morally right action is generally misleading. Instead, there
may be different sets of morally demanded actions that – while being
mutually exclusive – nevertheless are morally demanded, maybe even
to the same degree. However, I cannot see why this form of epistemic
uncertainty should speak against a moral theory as such. For the subject
matter of ethics, only a lower degree of precision and unambiguousness
can be reasonably expected, as Aristotle had already argued. Further-
more, if one is incapable of performing some of the demanded actions,
this does not affect whether they should be done. Incapability only gives
a moral agent a reason or an explanation for not doing them. In these
cases the agent would fail to perform a morally demanded action; how-
ever, she might not fail – or fail again – concerning another morally de-
manded action. If one takes a moral obligation to be a moral judgment
about the moral quality of an action in question, then the actual unfea-
sibility of this action does not affect this quality. The unfeasibility – as
the uncertainty mentioned before – does not provide a substantial argu-
ment against the soundness of a moral theory.
Now what about theoretical overdemandingness? Can a moral theory
reasonably demand that people sacrifice things of equal moral value in
their own lives in order to fight a moral wrong somewhere else? This
objection has to be carefully scrutinized. No moral theory I am familiar
with explicitly demands something like this. Even Peter Singer’s ex-
tremely demanding suggestion about moral obligations in face of
world poverty does not say that a moral agent should cause himself to
sink below the level of well-being that he is attempting to remedy.
The underlying distinction to be made here is between a moral obliga-
tion on the one hand and actually doing something on the other. Being
morally obligated to do something is having a moral reason for perform-
ing some action. Certainly we have good reasons to act in order, say, to
fight world poverty, and this obligation is extremely demanding, given
the extreme suffering of others. Regarding the theoretical overdemand-
ingness it is important to see that the moral obligation to help, that is,
the existence of a moral reason to help, persists even in cases where
we would have to sacrifice our own lives and well-being or neglect
our other obligations. But it will be one reason among many that is gen-
erated by the (human-rights-secured) needs of others, not the only reason
we have to guide our lives. And it has not been claimed that we should
always follow each of the moral obligations we identify in the complex
lives we lead, even if each of them constitutes a strong reason for doing
so. Theoretical overdemandingness may be an acceptable, even a neces-
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sary feature of a moral theory that is based in a world of severe, prevent-
able suffering in which moral agents nevertheless are engaged in many
different relations and activities. What we have to avoid is focusing all
our moral concern and reasoning on only one dimension of our multi-
dimensional, active human lives.
3. The demandingness of morality
I have argued that some obligations resulting from a moral theory of
welfare rights are extremely or even unreasonably demanding.
Rights-corresponding duties can be technically, psychologically, and
theoretically overdemanding. I take such overdemandingness of welfare
rights to be rather a result of the state of the world in which massive
violations of human rights take place and cause hunger, poverty, and
suffering. Overdemandingness under these conditions matches the ex-
cessive distress and should not be seen as a flaw of a theory of human
rights. Hence the options of being silent on rights-corresponding duties,
restricting these duties or even restricting the rights are not sufficiently
supported by the MDO.
Yet, accepting these extreme, even unreasonable obligations is only
one element in the general undertaking of moral reasoning in order to
allow for considered moral action. These obligations are reasons that
speak in favor of some action. However, different obligations arise in
complex human lives and will have to be weighed against one another.
That is why even under the condition that my argument is sound and
that excessive human rights-corresponding obligations are justified, I
have not argued that moral agents should always and exclusively follow
this call of duty or jettison all other obligations, plans and activities in
their lives in order to dedicate all energy exclusively to fighting hunger,
poverty, and suffering. While we have to make our reasoned moral
choices, the moral obligations corresponding to ongoing human rights
violations persist and are neither diminished nor eliminated by the
fact that they may be extremely or unreasonably demanding.
All restrictions of human rights-corresponding obligations to a more
convenient or more “reasonable” degree disrespect the legitimate claims
of those whose important basic interests are violated and question the
status of these interests as protected by a human right. Hence the appro-
priate response to a diagnosis of overdemandingness is to listen to the
multiple obligations one may have and deal with them as well as possi-
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ble. It is certainly not appropriate to deafen oneself or, in calling it a flaw
of a theory, to pre-emptively exculpate oneself for failing to live up to
them. Being incapable of fulfilling all duties does not disburden us from
trying, even if in the end even well-intentioned moral agents will nec-
essarily have to accept their at least partial, ongoing failure.
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Common humanity as a justification
for human rights claims
Simon Hope
I
Anyone familiar with the modern language of human rights will have
heard the phrase human rights are held in virtue of our common humanity.
In this chapter, I want to examine this phrase further; or rather, one
sense thereof, for the claim under consideration is ambiguous – in virtue
of the “in virtue of” clause – and this ambiguity must be cleared up. The
claim might be deployed in a descriptive sense: human rights track certain
features of our common humanity, but are justified on entirely different
grounds (by, say, appeal to what would be chosen under certain con-
straints in an idealized thought experiment.)1 However, the claim that
human rights are held in virtue of our common humanity has appealed
to many defenders of human rights as a justificatory claim: we can iden-
tify features of our common humanity that count as reasons for some
conception of human rights. It is the justificatory claim that I consider
here.
More precisely, my target is the following thought, basic to many
philosophical conceptions of human rights: that, by appealing to the
moral significance of features of human nature that all of us – of course
– share, human rights can be justified by a conception of the human
good that is accessible to all. My complaint will be that these bold invo-
cations of common humanity idealize away the depth and breadth of
moral diversity, and so cannot give a satisfactory account of the intelli-
gibility of moral reasons in the face of this diversity. My argument pro-
ceeds as follows. In section II, I highlight the constraint on ordinary
moral reasoning that applies when the domain of agents to whom
moral reasons must be offered is an unbounded one. Then, in sections
1 For an excellent and far more thorough discussion of the various ambiguities in
the phrase see Gardner (2008).
III and IV, I discuss two versions of the bold appeal to common human-
ity, and argue that neither can account for the constraint on moral rea-
soning. Finally, in section V, I argue that reasons for human rights claims
can be grounded in common problems humans face: in particular, prob-
lems stemming from our vulnerabilities.
Two further preliminary points are in order. Firstly, the claim human
rights are justified in virtue of our common humanity raises more philosoph-
ical questions than those I am asking here.2 I hope the reader will allow
me one simplifying assumption. I shall assume that the claim “human
rights are held in virtue of our common humanity” implies that
human rights are held equally by all human beings. That need not be
the case, as §57 of Nietzsche’s Antichrist reminds us. One could say
that which rights one holds depends very much on the sort of person
one is: “a right is a privilege. The privilege of each is determined by
the very nature of his being” (Nietzsche 1968, §57). The question of
whether anyone has given good reasons for a Nietzschean-inspired
view will not, however, concern me here.
Secondly, my argument takes place at one remove from the main
philosophical battlefields in the current human rights literature: on
the one hand, the debate over the concept of a right (are rights neces-
sarily claimable, for example); and, on the other, the debate between
natural rights theorists and Rawlsian-inspired ‘political’ conceptions of
human rights over the broader philosophical approach within which
the concept of a right should be embedded.3 This chapter will make
no contribution to the debate over the concept of a right. The questions
“In what sense are human rights held in virtue of our common human-
ity?” and “In what sense are human rights rights?” are too complex for
me to address both adequately here; accordingly, I focus only on the
issue of justification by appeal to some feature of common humanity,
i. e. on the “human” rather than the “rights” aspect of human rights.
Nor shall I comment directly on the debate between defenders of
natural rights and “political” conceptions of human rights, although
my conclusion has implications for that debate. The strongest argument
offered in defense of a ‘political’ conception of rights is that moral rea-
soning breaks down within a sufficiently broad domain of agents, so that
human rights must be seen as artifacts of various United Nations decla-
rations, and their justification rests on nothing more than the way in
2 For discussion of some of these other questions, see ibid.
3 For an excellent overview see John Tasioulas’s chapter in this volume.
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which the UN declarations function as a widely recognized and effec-
tive mode of legitimation in international and domestic politics (Beitz
2009, ch. 3 and 4).4 Against this, defenders of natural rights conceptions,
such as John Tasioulas, have argued that “ordinary moral reasoning”
about morally important features of human beings can provide a philo-
sophically robust justification for a conception of human rights.5 As will
become clear, I do not disagree with Tasioulas’s claim; what I shall
argue is that ordinary moral reasoning must take a specific form if it is
to be intelligible to the domain of agents to which human rights claims
must be justified.
II
John Dunn once splendidly remarked that “no adequate political philos-
ophy can simply take the form of a theory of what is intrinsically desir-
able”. Dunn explains the point as follows:
At the very least any such theory must also offer an account of what sort of
claims in the face of what sort of costs the intrinsically desirable can ration-
ally levy upon individual historical agents or groups of such agents. If these
claims constitute at all a heavy burden, it must add at least a sketch of the
reasons why such agents would themselves be epistemically well-advised to
regard the claims as valid (Dunn 1985, 38).
The first point Dunn registers, which for my purposes addresses the de-
mandingness of a conception of human rights, will not concern me
here. My focus is on the second point – the sketch of a justification –
and the difficulties one faces in giving one for human rights.
Salient to any plausible justificatory argument must, I think, be the
fact that reasons are among the many things people exchange with one
another. If we go in for moral argument at all, we must go in for the
claim that we must justify our moral principles to all agents we expect
to comply with those principles – to insist on compliance without ad-
ducing moral considerations that count in favor of compliance is to
enter an amoralist’s worldview, where reasons are grounded in force
or deception. At the core of a plausible justificatory argument, there-
fore, will be an appeal to considerations that all agents the argument ad-
4 See also Rawls 1993, 54ff, for the terminology “political”.
5 Tasioulas, “On the Nature of Human Rights”, in this volume.
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dresses can find intelligible as points in favor of the principles one is try-
ing to justify.6
What makes it difficult to sketch out a justification for a conception
of human rights is that the content of that conception – like any univer-
sal moral principle – applies to, and thus must be justified to, an inclusive
domain of agents. The practical activity of justifying oneself to others
typically operates well within the confines of a set of safe assumptions
– we justify propositions to friends and fellow citizens whose own en-
semble of convictions we (often, but not always, rightly) take to vary
little from our own, and we construct reasons accordingly. But when
the domain of agents to whom principles apply is not exclusive – is
not limited to the holders of a specific worldview or set of worldviews
– it becomes much harder to determine the contours of a shared ensem-
ble of convictions, should any even exist.
One is dealing, rather, with a limit case where philosophical ques-
tions of objectivity in ethics coincide with questions about the limits
of interpretation (Williams 1995). Our respective standpoints for under-
standing the world and evaluating actions are constructed out of the re-
sources made available to us by the web of concepts and beliefs that con-
stitutes a cultural worldview (or conceptual scheme or, in a Wittgenstei-
nian frame of mind, a “form of life”). As Clifford Geertz once splendidly
put it, “no one lives in the world in general” (Geertz 1999, 62). One
upshot of this fact is that we should see an inclusive domain of agents
– the domain to which justifications of human rights must be addressed
– as an indefinitely varied domain of agents; and we are, accordingly, en-
titled to make as few assumptions as possible about settled agreement on
moral claims within that domain. The broader the domain of agents in
question, the more assumptions about shared values or intuitions appear
as unjustified and unhelpful idealizations. Philosophically, this makes
things harder, but not impossible. It all depends precisely how human
rights are taken to be justified in virtue of our common humanity.
My target is the following feature of many philosophical concep-
tions of human rights: the appeal to common humanity is intended
to justify, to an inclusive domain of agents, obligations that we owe
to others in virtue of some features of our common humanity that
bear absolute moral value (couched in terms of status or interest). Two
well-known examples illustrate this tendency. Martha Nussbaum has
6 I say more about intelligibility below. The basic idea of a reason as a point in
favor of something is taken from Scanlon 1998, ch. 1.
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sought to justify a rich account of human rights by appealing to proper-
ties of human beings that confer rights-bearing status on individuals – in
particular, to our “architectonic functionings” of practical reason (work-
ing out one’s own life plan) and affiliation (our various social ties to oth-
ers). These “architectonic functionings” confer on all human lives a
sense of dignity and worth.7 To treat people with appropriate dignity
just is, on Nussbaum’s view, to see them as holding a rich conception
of human rights (Nussbaum 2006, 174). Jim Griffin, by contrast, claims
that human rights are grounded in ‘personhood’; in particular, the three
aspects of normative agency: autonomy (choosing one’s path through
life), liberty (freedom from interference), and minimal provision (sufficient
information and resources to be able to enact one’s chosen path) (Griffin
2008, 32–33).8 The morally weighty interests embedded in human
powers of rational agency provide the substantive core to a conception
of human rights. Nussbaum’s and Griffin’s positions are fundamentally
similar: both appeal to a rich conception of human nature that takes
into account the rational structure of human life, and both ground
the justification for human rights in the our common powers of ration-
ality and sociability (Griffin’s notion of “normative agency’” seems of a
kind with Nussbaum’s “archtectonic functionings”).
I want to question whether these conceptions of human dignity and
personhood can indeed be justified to an inclusive domain of agents.
Nussbaum’s and Griffin’s appeals to the moral significance of human
powers of rationality and sociability differ, primarily, in the following
respect. Nussbaum appeals to the value of those properties themselves:
the fact that the architectonic functionings are part of human nature
confers dignity and worth on all human beings, regardless of their actual
powers of reasoning and sociability (Nussbaum 2006, 285 and, further,
ch. 3 passim). This intuitive “species norm”, as Nussbaum calls it, in-
vokes a range property claim about equality: although humans differ in
degree of both rationality and sociability, all humans are nevertheless
equal with respect to these powers.9 Griffin’s features of personhood
7 I take the phrase “architectonic functionings” from Nussbaum 2006, 162.
8 Griffin does not, it must be noted, solely appeal to the powers of personhood.
Part of what makes any particular human right “determinate enough in sense
[…] to be an effective, socially manageable claim on others” will typically
come from “practicalities” concerning social structures, psychology, and the
natural world. See Griffin 2008, 37–39.
9 See, for more detail on range property claims and their logic, Waldron 2002,
44–82.
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are scalar in the same way (Griffin 2008, 45). But for Griffin, the moral
importance of our rationality and sociability is grounded in a set of basic
human interests. The threshold above which a being is within the cat-
egory “person” is defined by the plausible recognition of that being’s
basic interests in autonomy, liberty, and minimal provision.10 We cannot,
for various reasons, plausibly attribute an interest in all three interests
to infants, the severely disabled, and persistent coma victims, and so
they fall below the threshold of personhood (although the common in-
terests they do have still create duties towards them) (ibid., 92–95).
These three interests are not to be understood as merely preferences pres-
ent in agents’ psychological states (which may wax and wane by degree).
One either has the interest or one does not. And it is these interests,
rather than powers of rationality and sociability, that ground human
rights claims.
III
Do Nussbaum’s and Griffin’s positions denote routes by which ordinary
moral reasoning about valuable features of human beings can justify
human rights claims? I shall consider Nussbaum’s appeal to intuition
first. Nussbaum asserts that we all intuitively value complex organisms,
and intuitively respond differently to different degrees of complexity, so
the moral importance of our rationality and sociability just is clear.11
That is to say, ordinary moral reasoning is guided by intuitions about
human dignity that reasonable agents will simply not find controversial ;
and it reveals a substantive form of ethical life shared by human beings.
Yet to say something is intuitive is to say nothing unless a robust ac-
count of intuitive warrant is given. That account of intuitive warrant
cannot take the form of a simple appeal to recognition of our common
humanity. Now, of course agents with very different classificatory
schemes for natural kinds can and do mutually recognize common hu-
manity (on some level). It would be as implausible to deny that as it
would be to deny that reasoning cannot take place between the bearers
10 Here I am reading between the lines somewhat, but see Griffin 2008, 116 for
the link between common human interests and the elements of personhood.
11 See, especially, Nussbaum 2006, ch. 6. Note that Nussbaum actually asserts that
her position “has” the intuition in question. I am not sure what this means (the-
ories are not possessors of intuitions), other than that the position assumes an
intuition that is commonly (universally? It seems so) shared.
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of historically distinct cultural worldviews. Indeed, these two points are
connected. As Donald Davidson pointed out long ago, if a conceptual
scheme really were radically different to mine, it could not be recogniz-
able by me as a conceptual scheme, and so differences between concep-
tual schemes must be intelligible differences (Davidson 2001, 183–198).
For me to be in a position to judge that you bear a different conceptual
scheme to mine is for me to be in a position to accurately (to a degree)
interpret the content of your scheme (or enough thereof) such that
points of difference between your scheme and mine can be accurately
(again, to a degree) registered. There has to be common ground for in-
terpretation to take place. And this, as Clifford Geertz has remarked in
turn, invokes in some way a common humanity: “to see others as shar-
ing a nature with ourselves is the merest decency” (Geertz 1983, 16),
essential to seeing others as they themselves see themselves. But very lit-
tle, in moral terms, hangs on this. At best, in doing so we identify others
as agents who could conform to moral principles, and thus identify oth-
ers to whom we need to justify the principles we think they should con-
form to.
Recognition of common humanity does not, itself, constitute any
substantive agreement on the limits or moral salience of human ration-
ality and sociability. A prima facie more promising account of intuitive
warrant for intuitions about human dignity could take the following
form: substantive moral claims are universally intuitive in the sense
that they constitute grounds for the successful interpretation of differing
ethical outlooks. Nussbaum and Michael Walzer have offered arguments
on this score: in order for us to recognize different ethical outlooks at
all, there must be a common substantive set of “moral facts” that are
“immediately available to our understanding”, against which moral dis-
agreement is intelligible (Walzer 1987, 23–29; cf. Nussbaum 1993,
242–269). If this view is plausible, we cannot deny the existence of a
common ‘framework’, as Walzer puts it, of moral intuitions that are
only fully substantiated in historically contingent cultural ways of
going on.
This line of argument appears to have good Davidsonian roots. Da-
vidson’s basic point – that “the more basic a norm is to our making sense
of an agent, the less content we can give to the idea that we disagree
with respect to the norm” (Davidson 2004, 50) – is surely correct.
One might then conclude that some values must be shared if we are
to identify moral disagreements at all. Davidson himself claims that
“since the objects of your beliefs and values are what cause them, the
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only way for me to determine what those objects are is to identify ob-
jects common to us both, and take what you are caused to think and
want as basically similar to what I am caused to think and want by
the same objects” (ibid., 36). Everything depends here on how the
phrase “basically similar”, and the related notion of what it is to share
a value, are understood. Nussbaum and Walzer understand this in
terms of substantive agreement among all reasonable agents. Yet that
understanding is hard to sustain. Although I do not have room to review
it here, suffice to say that the anthropological evidence concerning
depth and breadth of ethical diversity across cultural conceptual schemes
forecloses the possibility of any existing agreement that is both substan-
tive and universal. In addition, while the concept “human being” de-
notes a natural kind, the limits of that natural kind are contested within
the broad array of spiritual, totemic, genealogical, animistic, or scientific
classificatory schemes that exist (Prinz 2009, 167–189).12
Just as the anthropological evidence does not support the existence
of globally shared substantive moral intuitions, nor do Davidsonian con-
siderations. Arguments of the sort deployed by Nussbaum and Walzer
depend on an overly demanding notion of “sharing” a value. For me
to accurately interpret your ethical outlook, I need to locate the con-
cepts that, for you, are integrally bound up with specific evaluative at-
titudes such that they provide immediate moral reasons for action
(“Don’t do that because it is unfaithful”, etc.), within the context of
your wider worldview (Geertz 1973, ch. 1). But first I have to be
able to recognize those concepts as concepts that are integrally bound
up with evaluative attitudes. Thus, inevitably, I have to “match up”
(Davidson) your ethical concepts with ethical concepts familiar to me
(Davidson 2004, 36); to see your concepts as directed, in part, to the
same objects (psychological kinds, natural events, basic human needs)
that some ethical concepts familiar to me are directed to. But none of
this implies any substantive agreement on values.
Why not? There is no reason that the concepts and values available
to me are limited to those I consider well-justified. (I’d guess that a fairly
reliable foothold into any culture’s scheme of value is to examine the
social advantages men have over women). And furthermore, even
when the matching up involves concepts and values I consider well-jus-
tified, the similarities typically remain schematic. To observe that your
12 See also Descola 1996, 82–102, for further evidence on disagreement about
classificatory schemes for natural kinds.
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concept X is directed in part to the same objects (natural events such as
birth and death, etc.) as my concept “dignity” is in part directed to, is
enough to get some grip on the evaluative nature of your concept X.
But I cannot move from that observation to the conclusion that you
and I share any substantive view of the value of the dignity of human
life – the differences between our concepts also have significant bearing
here.
Davidsonian considerations thus give us no warrant to generalize
across, rather than within, cases; and so give us no warrant to conclude
that global substantive values must exist. The common ground necessary
for the recognition of different conceptual schemes is not constituted by
any substantive moral agreement; including agreement on the range
properties that constitute morally important features of human beings.
Nussbaum’s and Walzer’s appeals to globally shared intuitions elide
the crucial justificatory step. By idealizing away moral disagreement,
it remains unclear how reasons in favor of according humans equal dig-
nity can be made intelligible to the bearers of diverse cultural conceptual
schemes.
IV
One need not, however, hold that the justification for human rights is
grounded in common human intuitions, or a commonly human form of
ethical life. Jim Griffin’s position is an exemplary instance of an alterna-
tive approach, where the justification of the range property in question
is not grounded in features of the property itself. For Griffin, as for
Nussbaum, the justification is still firmly located in a rich picture of
the rational structure of human life. This picture reveals certain basic
human interests that carry moral weight. Some of these interests, such
as an interest in avoiding pain, are attributable to human beings in virtue
of biological nature. Other, more esoteric interests, such as an interest in
“achievement”, are embedded in the rational side of human nature
(Griffin 2008, 117). It is the moral weight of three such basic interests
– our interests in autonomy, liberty, and minimal provision – that justifies
the ascription of human rights to persons.
The question now arises whether these three morally weighty inter-
ests can be intelligibly justified as such to an inclusive domain of agents;
and the answer, again, comes in Davidsonian terms. “Certain values”,
Griffin writes, are “inevitable features of our conceptual framework”
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(ibid., 113; 125). Yet these values are rough and formal only. They are
grounded in a list of basic human interests that we can read off from the
rational structure of human life; interests the recognition of which is
thick with a corresponding set of value judgments.13 But – crucially –
there is no suggestion of agreement on the moral weight of these inter-
ests. Seeing someone else as a human being is, in part, to see them as a
rational being bearing a conceptual scheme that shares some basic formal
evaluative concepts – such as quality of life – with one’s own conceptual
scheme. The recognition of the interests, and the fact that lives are
thought to go worse when the interests are unmet, gives us a grip on
the prudential weight of these interests, and so a grip on a shared concept
of quality of life. The moral weight of such interests is justified by a fur-
ther move. Griffin insists that we do not grasp these primitive evaluative
concepts in a first-person way: we grasp that “pain is bad” or “autono-
my is valuable”; and not “my pain is bad” or “my autonomy is valuable”.
This, Griffin says, is part of “our grasp on how ‘autonomy’ [and so on]
works as a reason for action”: to see something worthwhile is to see it as
worthwhile for all normal human beings to pursue (ibid., 134–135; see
also 115 and 125).
One might think an element of stipulation enters into this last point
– can I not see something worthwhile for some specified in-group only?
Griffin would, I imagine, reply that the interests which ground human
rights are not those limited to a specific in-group, so it is the elitist who,
unless the restricted scope is justifiable, is guilty of stipulation. Further-
more, Griffin’s claim that the common ground on which interpretation
is built does not constitute substantive moral agreement, but can under-
write the intelligibility of certain moral reasons, seems to me the right
way to take Davidson’s point. For Griffin, what is common is, in the
first instance, the recognition of certain prudential values; and, via
these, the intelligibility of how such values are deployed as reasons in
moral argument. The moral weight of the three interests that underpin
the range property of personhood can be intelligible to others in virtue
of how lives go worse when the interests are not met.
Yet I think a doubt should remain about Griffin’s identification of
the sort of values that are intelligible to all. In order to bring out this
doubt, it is necessary to say something more about criteria for intelligi-
bility of moral reasons. In light of the constraint on ordinary moral rea-
13 For example, my grasp of the concept “pain” gives me reason to think a life
goes worse the more pain is in it. See Griffin 2008, 123.
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soning I am concerned with, what is at issue is the intelligibility of rea-
sons to the domain of agents we offer such reasons to (questions about
the existence of reasons in the abstract can be bypassed). The concern
here is with a practical function of reasoning: norms of reasoning pur-
port to coordinate behavior among a plurality of agents (in the sense that
they explain why certain action-guiding principles are ones we should
identify with and act upon), and (where categorical, as with human
rights) across different spheres of life.14 This is complex. Take, first,
the case of coordination within an ethical outlook. Different considera-
tions bear normative weight within different spheres of life, such that
some norms of practical reasoning agents use will be parochial to distinct
spheres. The intelligibility of norms of reasoning that coordinate action
across spheres of life turns on their establishing connections between
considerations within the distinct spheres that are followable in thought
as points in favor of action-guiding maxims of appropriately wide appli-
cation.15
Inclusive norms of reasoning aim, further, to coordinate action
among the bearers of different outlooks. Again, such norms must iden-
tify considerations that are followable in thought, by the bearers of dif-
ferent outlooks, as moral points in favor of action. The intelligibility of a
reason, here, depends upon establishing a connection between the con-
siderations the reason picks out and considerations that are already in
view as possible considerations with moral weight. At this level of ab-
straction the points I am making may seem trivial, but they rule out
any view where the reasons that justify human rights claims are not in
view to all agents one expects to conform to human rights, where “in
view” denotes that, within an agent’s conceptual range, the considera-
tions appealed to can be conceived as constituting a moral reason. (Here
“in view” is modal: it is not the case that the consideration must be con-
genial or convincing or motivating). A norm is capable of coordinating be-
havior if it is one that the bearers of different outlooks can intelligibly
accept: the considerations the norm identifies as points in favor of action
14 Talk of “coordination” here is not intended in the sense of a solution to specific
collective action problems (e. g. those modeled by various sorts of prisoner’s di-
lemma), but rather in a much more garden-variety sense: a moral principle or
requirement picks out an act type which is prohibited/permissible/mandatory,
and the justification of that principle aims to coordinate behavior by providing
agents with a reason to act in the appropriate way.
15 O’Neill 1996, 57–59. I believe I dissent from O’Neill in how I expand upon
the immediately following point, however.
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are followable in thought by agents as moral points in favor of action, in
virtue of the connection between these considerations and considera-
tions already in view as morally significant. Failure to act in accordance
with a norm of reasoning is not necessarily evidence of unintelligibility.
To rephrase Griffin’s position in these terms, the appeal to the basic
human interests that constitute personhood allows human rights to be
justified to an inclusive domain; with the relevance of such interests
to the shared concept of quality of life providing the intelligible connec-
tion. My doubt about Griffin’s position is whether basic interests are the
sorts of consideration that can plausibly play a coordinating role. I see no
difficulty in locating certain basic interests in a rich conception of the
rational structure of human nature. But what must be kept squarely
in view is that the notion of ‘rational structure’ denotes a diverse
array of inherited conceptions of the world that constitute cultural
forms of life. The specification of a list of basic human interests must
take place at a level of considerable abstraction if it is to capture morally
weighty features of human life across the diversity of ethical outlooks.
What an agent identifies with, however, is a specific substantive under-
standing of what “autonomy” or “achievement” (for example) involves;
an understanding shaped in each case by the cluster of concepts that sur-
rounds the concept of the relevant interest in whichever historically
contingent outlook the agent in question bears.16 This surrounding clus-
ter of concepts will not only include thick moral concepts, but also el-
ements of the classificatory scheme that delimits a specific understanding
of personhood or humanness and so shapes the nature of the relevant
powers of rational agency.
Given these observations, it is quite unclear what reason an agent has
for seeing, in the specification of a morally weighty human interest, any-
thing other than a consideration that tells in favor of a right that protects
their own substantive understanding of the interest in question. The ab-
stract specification of an interest in “achievement” or “autonomy” is
rendered unhelpfully schematic and shapeless, and unable to provide
reasons for action, when detached from the cluster of concepts that sur-
rounds it and determines both its extensions and moral relevance in any
particular form of ethical life.
The objection I am pressing reaches further than Griffin’s interest-
based conception of human rights to include other welfarist justifica-
tions. John Tasioulas has, for example, urged that:
16 See further Geertz 1973, 52.
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we need to go back, beyond the Enlightenment to an Aristotelian tradition
of thought about the human good and the special protection it merits. In
other words, what is standardly thought of as the distinctly ‘modernist’ doc-
trine of human rights needs to be nurtured by roots that are, as a matter of
intellectual history, pre-modern (Tasioulas 2007, 100).
Again, such a conception of the good will consist of a list of abstract act-
types (e. g. “pleasure”; “religion”), which allow us to assimilate different
outlooks’ goods onto one list. But what actual individuals identify with
are substantive understandings of these goods – understandings in which
the concept in question (e. g. “pleasure”) is shaped by a cluster of sur-
rounding concepts particular to a given historical outlook. That some-
one identifies with one particular substantive understanding of a good
does not at all entail that they see the effective attainment of other
types of the same item on an abstract list as in any way worthy of pro-
tection.
To summarize, then, a serious difficulty plagues justifications for
human rights that appeal to features of human beings (powers of rational
agency; morally significant interests), embedded in a rich picture of the
rational structure of human nature. We must reject the thought that the
idea of a human form of life gives us anything very useful: there are, to
quote Geertz, only “examples of the forms human life has locally taken”
(Geertz 1983, 16). Our ability to locate points of difference in this array
does not entitle us to the conclusion that certain substantive values are
shared by all. In addition, a conception of human powers of rational
agency is always deeply embedded in the practices and conceptual
schemes of particular cultures, and thus these powers register very differ-
ently in the different schemes of value those cultures contain.17 A wel-
farist conception of reasons, such as Griffin’s, thus fares little better than
an intuitive conception of reasons. As I’ve argued, the intuitive concep-
tion implausibly idealizes away the breadth and depth of moral diversity.
A welfarist conception, by contrast, make the intelligibility of moral rea-
sons conditional on the common recognition of the value of certain
goods; and yet, at the same time, must operate with an extremely ab-
stract specification of those goods. It is not clear how such an abstract
17 To again quote Geertz: “the Western conception of the person as a bounded,
unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic
centre of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive
whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social
and natural background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather pe-
culiar idea within the context of the world’s cultures”. Geertz 1983, 59.
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specification avoids being too schematic to provide intelligible reasons
for action.
V
The argument I have pressed against Nussbaum and Griffin may seem to
support what I earlier referred to as the “political” conception of human
rights: human rights are artifacts of various United Nations declarations,
and their justification must be grounded in aspects of the mode of legit-
imation created by those declarations. Recall that the key justification
for the “political conception” is the claim that ordinary moral reasoning
breaks down among an inclusive domain of agents. It may seem, from
what I have argued so far, that I also endorse that claim. Yet all I
have argued so far is that welfarist and intuitive conceptions of moral rea-
soning break down among an inclusive domain of agents. I now want to
suggest that, contra defenders of the political conception, at least some
aspects of ordinary moral reasoning do not break down at the global
level.
The picture of ordinary moral reasoning I want to briefly outline has
two levels: firstly, the specification of a set of duties that can be intelli-
gibly justified to an inclusive domain of agents; and secondly, the spec-
ification of which of these duties support corresponding rights. I shall
focus only on the first level here.
Ordinary moral reasoning, I have said, aims to coordinate action
among a plurality of agents. And it aims to do so in a reasonable way
– the moral criteria proposed as action-guiding are proposed as princi-
ples/demands agents could and should on reflection endorse.18
“Could”, here, denotes what is intelligible: the considerations appealed
to in favor of the principles/demands in question are followable in
thought, within an agent’s conceptual range, as considerations that
bear moral weight. (This does not mean that thought is congenial or
convincing.) To propose a principle/demand as one that agents could
and should reflectively endorse is, among other things, to propose a
principle/demand that agents can identify with – one that they can
make their own, and deploy in practical reasoning. It strikes me that a
18 I take this to be true even of outlooks involving revealed divine commands:
while one must obey the stipulation unquestioningly, the revealed existence
of the deity constitutes a rationally compelling point in favor of obedience.
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promising way to arrive at an account of intelligible moral reasons is,
therefore, to investigate the grounds on which an agent could intelligi-
bly refuse to make a principle their own.
To make a principle one’s own is to identify with it, and “identifi-
cation”, here, must involve some substantive sense of self, with an asso-
ciated set of needs and vulnerabilities. This conception of self will, of
course, be culturally and historically peculiar, and the reasons one
might find within one’s ethical outlook to refuse to identify oneself
with a proposed moral principle/demand will typically be intelligible
only within the worldview of which this peculiar conception of self
is an aspect. However, the material circumstances of that self’s existence
will be determined, in part, by certain basic features of a common
human condition: the basic needs which we cannot help but have,
and the way in which conventions of social interaction impact upon
these basic needs.19 These, too, could intelligibly enter in as considera-
tions one can appeal to when refusing to identify with a proposed prin-
ciple; and, as the existence of such considerations is presupposed by any
culturally peculiar conception of self-hood, intelligibility holds for an
inclusive domain of agents.
More precisely, ordinary moral reasoning can appeal to a set of basic
vulnerabilities embedded in the human condition: vulnerabilities con-
cerning an agent’s capability for effective action. I take effective action
to be determined by both a set of basic human needs, which we cannot
help but have, and a degree of influence over the shape of the social institutions
and conventions under which action to meet these needs must occur.20
Any agent, faced with a purported justification for adopting some prin-
ciple of action (or belief), will judge whether to adopt it (identify with
it) in light of the commitments, conceptual bundles, and modes of ex-
planation that constitute their sense of self. One reason they could offer
in rejecting the principle is that, if the principle was one that coordinat-
ed action among an inclusive domain, our agent’s vulnerability with re-
spect to basic human needs would be exacerbated or exploited (or ren-
dered more easily exploited), or the tenuousness of the agent’s provision
19 As John McDowell puts it, “the innate endowment of human beings must put
limits on the shapings of second nature that are possible for them… [as] part of
what reflection takes into account”. McDowell 1998, 190. See also Wiggins
1998, 31–36, for an expanded argument on the same point.
20 For reasons of space, I can only stipulate this here: the full argument will appear
in forthcoming work.
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of basic needs would not be reduced, by modes of interaction or institu-
tional arrangements required by the principle. What makes this reason a
strong one is that any practical reasoner – anyone reasoning about how
to act – cannot overlook the scope they have for effective action ; and that scope
is determined in part by how they must meet the needs they cannot help
but have.
As a reason to reject the principle, this appeal to vulnerability is in-
telligible, to an inclusive domain of agents, in a way that that claims
about the good or morally significant features of human beings cannot
be assumed to be. As ethical outlooks purport to coordinate behavior in
a reasonable way, each must leave some criteria by which an agent can
claim that certain ways of pursuing the common good do them an in-
justice (Wiggins 1998, 31–32). These criteria, I suggest, will be con-
nected to what an agent, within that ethical outlook, can reasonably
identify with. And whatever culturally peculiar conception of self is
in play, it will imply a set of basic vulnerabilities that determine, in
part, an agent’s scope for effective action. Earlier I claimed that a con-
sideration will be intelligible as a moral reason when there is a connec-
tion that is followable in thought between the consideration in question
and considerations already in view as morally significant. Here, the
“considerations already in view” is the conception of self, and the con-
nection to basic vulnerabilities is the fact that any conception of self im-
plies the existence of these vulnerabilities. The appeal to vulnerabilities
is not, therefore, intelligible only at the prudential level – we can estab-
lish a connection to explicitly moral considerations.
Here, the reader might object that, surely, some conception of
flourishing underwrites the moral significance of basic vulnerabilities
and effective action.21 Yet this need not be the case. Note that evalua-
tions of vulnerability can be both individuated (the degree to which
someone is vulnerable to this or that agent with respect to x) and holistic
(how vulnerable all-things-considered an agent is). There need be no
question of choosing between these two types of evaluation: individu-
ation is necessary to quantify an all-things-considered assessment of vul-
nerability, and an all-things-considered assessment is capable of deliver-
ing criteria for assessing the qualitative nature of individuated vulnera-
bilities. That is to say, individuated vulnerabilities can be ranked in
terms of how seriously they impact on all-things-considered vulnerabil-
ity – there is no need to appeal to considerations independent of the
21 Thanks to John Tasioulas for pressing this objection.
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concept of vulnerability itself. In this way, the conception of vulnerabil-
ity I am advancing is unmediated by any conception of the good.
It is true that the conception of vulnerability I appeal to is shaped by
an account of basic human needs. So one might then ask why the appeal
should not simply be to the moral salience of basic needs? Emphasizing
the importance of vulnerability rather than need has the advantage of a
sharper focus. Vulnerabilities, when individuated, are relational – I am
vulnerable to this or that agent with respect to x (cf. Goodin 1984,
112) – whereas claims of need, when individuated, are not typically
so.22 Claims of vulnerability therefore allow, to a greater extent, an ab-
stract claim of right to be related to specific institutional structures: one
is not simply identifying a genuine lack, but identifying specific rela-
tionships of dependence embedded in specific institutional structures
that create that lack. This seems to me an advantage when considering
rights claims – it allows one to give a more precise formulation of the
duties that correspond to rights.
If all this is plausible, ordinary moral reasoning can be intelligibly ad-
dressed to an inclusive domain of agents, provided the reasoning takes a
specific form. The principles that can be justified to an inclusive domain
will be a set of prohibitions on permissible modes of interaction. Certain prin-
ciples of action can be intelligibly rejected as principles that coordinate
action among an inclusive domain of agents, when those principles, for
any member of that domain, exacerbate, exploit, or fail to reduce the
tenuousness of basic vulnerabilities with respect to effective action.
Consequently, corresponding principles that prohibit the exacerbation
(exploitation, etc.), of basic vulnerabilities can be intelligibly justified
as creating moral duties that apply to an inclusive domain of agents.
Principles that prohibit the exacerbation or exploitation or the failure
to reduce basic vulnerabilities are principles that are capable of reason-
ably coordinating action among an inclusive domain of agents.
Precisely which of these duties support the existence of correspond-
ing rights is a further, and complex, question. As noted at the outset,
considerations of space prevent me from addressing the question
22 The exceptions being needs that are embedded in certain relationships. It might
be possible, appealing to background institutional conditions, to see all basic
needs as relational (the satisfaction of all requires the existence of an institutional
scheme). But this is simply to establish the necessity of institutions in general, and
not the necessity of specific institutional structures to which duties can be target-
ed.
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“What is a right?” here. I have assumed that human rights claims are
claims made in moral argument, and therefore – if we take them to
be justified by ordinary moral reasoning – that we can get at least
some grip on what a justified conception of human rights would be
by considering how ordinary moral reasoning can be capable of coordi-
nating action among an inclusive domain of agents. In concluding that
ordinary moral reasoning can only play this coordinating role when it
takes the form of a set of constraints on permissible modes of interac-
tion, rather than of a welfarist conception of interests or the good, I
do not mean to suggest that the only human rights are negative rights.
What the principles that reject forms of exacerbation (etc.) of basic vul-
nerabilities give us is a complex set of moral duties, some of which will
in Kantian terms be perfect and some of which will be imperfect (the
reduction of vulnerabilities which leave effective action tenuous may re-
quire duties of care, concern, and vigilance that each can do for some,
but not for all) (O’Neill 1996, 148). Whether these duties can support
rights to positive assistance is not something that can be settled simply by
the fact that the principles in question take the form of constraints.
Which of these duties correspond to human rights is a further issue;
but if any conception of human rights is to be well-justified by ordinary moral
reasoning, it will be one that is centered around protecting the vulnerable.
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Universal human rights and moral diversity
Gerhard Ernst
1. Introduction1
A main feature of human rights, as they are usually conceived, is that
they are universal rights. You don’t have them in virtue of being a Chris-
tian or a Jew, an Englishwoman or an Inuit. You don’t even have them
in virtue of being a decent member of society or a morally respectable
person. Rather, you are endowed with these rights simply in virtue of
being human. So, everyone, if she or he is a human being, has these
rights.
Human rights are not universal as legal rights, although in word they
are almost universally accepted. Many human beings are subject to legal
systems which do not contain effective legislation and regulations to
protect even basic human rights. Neither are human rights universal
in the form of actually shared norms of human societies, which means
that even if everyone behaved according to the accepted norms of his
or her society not everyone would honor all human rights. But taken
as moral rights human rights seem to be universal :2 Even if you are
not protected in your human rights by an adequate legal system, you
still should be so protected; even if the society you live in does not
honor human rights properly, it still should honor them. It is this
moral point of view I shall adopt throughout this paper when I speak
of “human rights”.
In my opinion there are three pivotal tasks for the philosophy of
human rights in this sense. The first is answering questions like these:
How are human rights to be conceived exactly? Which rights are
human rights? Maybe: What does the term “human rights” really
mean? This is what I will call the issue of content. The second task centers
1 The present paper is based on Ernst 2010. I would like to thank the Kohlham-
mer Verlag for the permission to draw on that material.
2 Jack Donnelly calls this the “moral universality of human rights”. Cf. Donnelly
2003, 1.
around another group of questions which might include the following:
How are human rights to be justified? Can they be justified at all? Or
might there be several mutually exclusive ways to justify them? I will
call this the issue of justification. I don’t mean to say that these two issues
are independent of each other. They are not, as will become apparent in
due course.
Although these two issues constitute the fundamental tasks of a phi-
losophy of human rights, there is a third issue of hardly less importance.
I will call it the issue of universality. What I have in mind is this: Human
rights are, as I said, usually thought of as universal rights. They apply to
all human beings. Nevertheless, the shared norms of some, or maybe
even many, actual human moralities do not include these rights, at
least not all of them or not as rights or not as fundamental rights anyway.
This is a problem because we seem to be confronted with two equally
vexing options here: Either all these moralities are seriously misguided
or human rights are not universal in the relevant sense after all.
I will comment briefly on the first two issues, the issue of content
and the issue of justification, in the next section. But the main topic
of my paper will be the issue of universality.3 I want to describe the
quandary generated by the conflict between universal human rights
and diverse human moralities in more detail and then suggest a way
out of it. In order to explain my suggestion I will also have to say some-
thing about the nature of moral relativism.
2. The issue of content and the issue of justification
Both, the issue of content and the issue of justification, are large issues,
and I don’t want to settle any disputes in these domains within the con-
fines of the present paper. Nonetheless, I have to register some convic-
tions of mine concerning these issues in order to make my account of
the issue of universality intelligible. Let me start then with the issue of
content.
3 One might think that there is a fourth project worth pursuing in the philosophy
of human rights: the project of clarifying the status, i. e. the objectivity or oth-
erwise, of human rights. But since the status of all norms and values needs clar-
ification this project, in my opinion, is not specific to the philosophy of human
rights. It is rather a project within general metaethics. For my own metaethical
position cf. Ernst 2008.
Gerhard Ernst232
Like many other philosophers I don’t think that conceptual analysis
will help us much when it comes to answering the question of what
human rights are. Probably it is part of the concept of a human right
that it is a right you have in virtue of being human. But this does not
get us anywhere. Maybe the concept of human rights even includes
the concepts of certain more specific rights. For a policeman, it might
be conceptually confused to say things like: “Yes, I know that Peter
has human rights (in the moral sense), but there is no reason whatsoever
not to torture him just for the fun of it.” Still, this, at most, gives us a
small list of more specific rights. Almost any dispute about the content
of human rights, for example the dispute about whether social or group
rights are human rights, cannot be answered with conceptual means
alone. Someone who claims that it is not a human right to be protected
against severe poverty might be wrong, but I very much doubt that he is
subject to conceptual confusion.
What we have here is a phenomenon quite familiar from other
moral concepts. Maybe it is part of the concept of social justice that ev-
eryone should be given her due. But that is neither here nor there when
it comes to disputes about the nature of justice because what is at issue in
these disputes is precisely what everyone’s due might be. And this is a
normative rather than a conceptual question. Or rather: This is a nor-
mative as well as a conceptual question. What is called for here, I
think, is a conception of justice that is suited to figure in our best nor-
mative theories. The question is therefore simultaneously what the best
normative theory is and what concepts we need in order to construct it.
I can’t argue for this claim in detail here, but the picture I have in
mind is this: In science we mould our concepts so that they are well-
suited to figure in the best scientific theories we have. To give a trivial
example: It is a good idea not to count whales among the fish because
this would make a mess of zoology. We find an adequate conception of
fish not by conceptual analysis, but by formulating biological classifica-
tions and by developing concepts fit for the task. Something very sim-
ilar, I think, is or should be our method in ethics. We formulate norma-
tive theories and we specify the concepts we need for this. What justice
is and what human rights are is only partially determined by the con-
cepts we have in virtue of being competent speakers of the English lan-
guage. It is rather within the framework of a normative theory that these
concepts get their adequate specification.4
4 Compare Carnap’s “Begriffsexplikation” (Carnap 1959, 15) and Rawls’s meth-
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What would be an adequate specification of the concept of human
rights? I don’t venture to say. The only thing I will assume in what fol-
lows is that it is a bad idea to use the term “human rights” more or less
synonymously with the term “moral rights”. If the concept of a human
right can do any work in a normative theory at all it should be more
specific than that. It must not comprise the whole of morality or
even the whole of ethics. Jack Donnelly, for example, is right when
he says: “Most good things are not the objects of human rights” (Don-
nelly 2003, 11).
James Griffin, for instance, tries to specify human rights as rights
which protect human agency (Griffin 2008). This is an important but
not the only function of moral rights, and so human rights claims are
a proper subset of all moral claims for him. In my opinion, this is as it
should be. Maybe Griffin’s conception of human rights is still too inclu-
sive. He includes some moral claims on a private level as human rights
claims. Many philosophers reserve the term “human rights” for the
moral sphere generated by the relation between an individual and a po-
litical authority. They think that the concept of human rights belongs
not so much to a moral theory for individuals but rather to normative
political philosophy. There is an “official” dimension to human rights
(cf. Pogge 1995). I don’t want to take sides in this dispute. I simply
want to say that both parties are right in not making human rights iden-
tical with moral rights.
On the other hand, there is a tendency to make the concept of
human rights all-inclusive. The reason for this, I think, is obvious.
Human rights talk is not only important for normative ethicists. The
concept of human rights is a political and legal concept as well – and
a very powerful concept at that. Nobody within the international com-
munity can afford to simply neglect human rights claims. Therefore,
whatever you manage to include among these claims has a very strong
standing. If you can convince everybody that social justice is related to
human rights, it might be much easier to enforce social justice on a legal
level. Still, enforcing rights is not the task of a philosopher. From a the-
oretical point of view it is always better not to mix up different things.
“Nothing is gained by confusing human rights with justice, fairness,
limited government, or any other values and practices” (Donnelly
2003, 87). Indeed, conceptual clarity is lost. Hence, in moral philoso-
od of “reflective equilibrium” (Rawls 1973, 20). For a more detailed account of
my moral epistemology cf. Ernst 2008, ch. 3.4.
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phy, we should reserve the term “human rights” to designate a proper
subset of moral rights. And, of course, we should emphasize that there
might be other moral rights which deserve to be taken seriously, maybe
just as seriously as human rights when it comes to designing political or
legal systems. This point will be important later on.
Let me turn briefly to the issue of justification. I want to say even
less concerning this issue than concerning the issue of content. The
only thing that is important for what is to follow is that human rights
claims are usually considered to be very fundamental moral claims.
Therefore, there isn’t much leeway for justification. Justification can
only proceed from the more fundamental to the less fundamental. Ac-
tually, I doubt that there is any leeway at all to give a proper justification
of human rights. As soon as the basic content of human rights is made
clear, for example as rights the purpose of which is to protect human
agency or as rights the purpose of which is to preserve human dignity,
you will hardly find anything more fundamental to justify those rights.
Why is it a good thing to protect human agency or to preserve human
dignity? It just is. That is where the spade turns. Of course, if you don’t
think that human rights are basic moral rights, you can justify them,
maybe by pointing to their utility for advancing the greatest happiness
for the greatest number. But I don’t think that this will do justice to
the content of human rights. As usually conceived these rights have
moral authority in their own right and not just as means for some pur-
pose or other. Hence, there is a dilemma concerning the justification of
human rights: Either these rights are basic moral rights or they are not. If
they are, you cannot justify them with something more fundamental.
The only thing you can do is to clarify or rather specify their content.
If, on the other hand, they are not basic, it might be possible to justify
them. But then it will be difficult to maintain that human rights have
moral authority in their own right. And this seems to be part of their
content.
Nonetheless, I don’t want to put too much emphasis on this. As I
said already, specifying the content of human rights and building a nor-
mative theory go hand in hand. Therefore, the issue of content and the
issue of justification are deeply intertwined. What I would call specify-
ing the content of human rights, some philosophers may want to call a
justification of human rights.5 Nothing important hinges on this.
5 And they might point to the possibility of anti-foundationalist, coherentist
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The upshot of this first section, then, is this: I take human rights not
to exhaust the whole of morality but to be fundamental moral rights the
specific content of which depends on the normative theory in which
they figure. This sets the stage for the issue of universality to which I
shall now turn.
3. The issue of universality
The purpose of a normative theory is to give a systematic account of
what to do. It tells us not only what to do but also why we should do
what we should do. It states the norms which should guide our actions,
and it makes perspicuous which of these norms are basic and which are
derived from more fundamental norms. It is the philosopher’s task to
formulate normative theories. But something very similar to a norma-
tive theory exists even before the philosopher sets to work. We all
have a more or less considered opinion about what is and what is not
important when it comes to deciding what to do. That is to say:
Each of us has what I will call a moral code. The difference between a
normative theory and a moral code is that the former is, while the latter
is not, explicit, well thought through, consistent, comprehensive, etc.
Nonetheless, it seems to me to be justified to say that in having moral
codes we all possess something approaching a normative theory.
Moral codes are proto-theories, as it were, and they provide the starting
point for the (hopefully) more sophisticated normative accounts of the
philosopher.
It is much more problematic to say that a society as a whole or a cul-
ture, whatever that might be, has something like a normative theory as
well. Whose moral opinions, for example, are relevant in determining
what the moral code of a society looks like (cf. Moody-Adams
1997)? Still, there seem to be differences in moral opinion that tran-
scend differences in moral opinion among individuals. It has often
been said that there is a difference between Western and Asian values,
and this difference seems to be more than a difference between some
members of Western societies and some members of Asian societies.
There seems to be a difference in the way the individual moral codes
of people are structured in different societies. It is the task of empirical
forms of justification. Thanks to Jan-Christoph Heilinger for reminding me of
this.
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sciences to investigate these differences, and I think there are indeed sig-
nificant results available from empirical psychology which show that
there are fundamental differences in the way people organize their
moral codes (cf. Schwartz 2004).
If human rights do get their content from the normative theory they
figure in, and if different societies accept different normative theories (or
something near enough), different societies have more or less different
conceptions of human rights. It might even be the case that what we
call “human rights” does not figure in the moral codes of some societies
at all. Of course, it is very unlikely that there is any society in which
there are no norms whatsoever concerned with the goods protected
by human rights. But it might very well be the case that these goods
are not protected by subjective rights in the way they are according
to our moral code (cf. Donnelly 2003, ch. 5).
For example, to torture the innocent seems to be prohibited by any
moral code. So there probably is an “overlapping consensus”, as Rawls
has called it, and this consensus is the reason why almost anyone can ac-
cept and does accept the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. From
the politician’s point of view this might even be good enough. When it
comes to enforcing human rights as legal rights it may not matter much
if there are differences in the justification of those legal rights. Different
moral codes with different conceptions of human rights, or maybe even
without a recognizable conception of human rights, might be suitable to
justify similar legal systems. But from the normative ethicist’s point of
view a problem remains: Not everyone can be right about the proper
justification of those legal rights. Pointing to shared legal norms or
even to a middle level of moral norms everyone can accept does not
make the conflict between moral codes disappear: The shared legal
norms might be accepted for very different reasons within different so-
cieties. The “overlapping consensus” is a political rather than a moral
consensus. In fact, diversity begins at home. There are considerable dif-
ferences in the way a communitarian, a social democratic liberal and a
libertarian conceives of human rights. Even if they reach similar results
concerning adequate legal prescriptions (which they often do not) there
is a very real conflict on the level of moral theory. The farther you stray
from home the deeper this conflict becomes.
So from the point of view of the normative ethicist we are con-
fronted with two options. Either the moral codes of some, maybe
many, societies are seriously defective (because they don’t give pride
of place to human rights as conceived by us), or human rights in our
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sense are not universal after all. Neither option seems to be particularly
attractive. It seems to be implausible to assume that our Western culture
has a privileged access to moral truth. On the other hand, it seems to be
morally repulsive to assume that human rights are not universal. We are
in a quandary here.
There are several strategies available to deal with this issue of univer-
sality. Some philosophers just bite the bullet and maintain that some or
even many societies are seriously wrong about the essential nature of
human rights (even if they accept them as legal rights). As moral claims
human rights may have been discovered by members of Western soci-
eties. But now that they have been discovered, everyone should accept
them. The situation is similar to that in the sciences. Quantum theory
was developed mainly by European physicists. Nevertheless, it is not a
European theory or a Western theory. It is just part of the best physical
theory we – that is : mankind – have today. Every rational scientist
should therefore take it as the starting point of further investigations.
Likewise with human rights: Maybe someday we will even have a better
normative theory than we do today. But for the time being human
rights figure in the best normative theory there is. Therefore, every ra-
tional philosopher should accept these claims as a starting point for fur-
ther investigations. Even if it sounds arrogant, concerning the moral
codes of other societies we have to say: “Sorry! We are right and you
are wrong.”
This would be an extreme strategy. I don’t want to deny that there is
progress in moral theory. I am even quite sympathetic to the idea of
moral discoveries. But what could justify the claim that the moral
code of Western societies is or approaches the best normative theory
we have today? What reason is there to think that Western normative
thinking is more advanced than, say, Asian normative thinking? Surely,
the case for claiming privileged access to moral truth would be a very
difficult one to make.
But what is the alternative to saying that the moral codes of other
cultures are seriously misguided? Moral relativism seems to be the an-
swer. Before I turn to arguing that it is indeed the correct answer, I
have to explain in a bit more detail what moral relativism is.
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4. Moral relativism6
In my opinion the discussion about moral relativism has been befuddled
by the fact that at least three different kinds of positions are called “moral
relativism”.7 Although many philosophers accept the distinction be-
tween descriptive, metaethical and normative moral relativism, when
it comes to arguing against moral relativism people tend to run the argu-
ments for and against each form of relativism together. So let me start by
stating as clearly as possible what moral relativism is and what it is not.
Descriptive moral relativism is relatively easy to characterize. A de-
scriptive moral relativist holds that different societies, different cultures
and/or different social groups, etc. accept fundamentally different
moral codes. It is important to emphasize that the conflict between
these moral codes really has to be fundamental. Of course, different cir-
cumstances demand different norms of conduct. (It would be cruel for
me to put out my parents on an ice floe; it might not be cruel for Nano-
uk to do so.) The only interesting difference between normative systems
is a difference in the very roots. If descriptive moral relativism is true,
there is a difference in basic values or norms. As soon as this is pointed
out, it becomes far from obvious that descriptive moral relativism is a
tenable position. It takes sophisticated empirical research to prove the
point. Nonetheless, most people seem to accept descriptive moral rela-
tivism in a more or less extreme form, and so shall I.
What is metaethical relativism? The metaethical relativist provides
answers to the four main metaethical questions. These are: Firstly, are
there moral truths or facts, and if so what is their nature? (This is the
metaphysical dimension of metaethics.) Secondly, what is the nature
of moral beliefs? (This is the dimension of philosophy of mind and
the theory of action.) Thirdly, is there moral knowledge, and if so
what is its nature? (This is the epistemological dimension of metaethics.)
Fourthly and finally, how can we analyze the meaning of moral senten-
ces? (That is what philosophers of language ask.) The most straightfor-
ward form of metaethical relativism – there are more sophisticated forms
like truth relativism (cf. Kölbel 2004) – can be characterized by a seman-
6 This section partly coincides with Ernst 2011.
7 In the context of the human rights debate not only foes but even friends of
moral relativism often don’t bother much with a differentiated characterization
of this position; cf., e. g., Rorty 1993. There are, of course, praiseworthy ex-
ceptions; cf. Tesón 1985.
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tic thesis. From this semantic thesis it is then easy to derive answers to
the four metaethical questions (cf. Ernst 2006). A typical metaethical rel-
ativist could endorse the following thesis :
The sentence “Everyone should have a fair trial” has the same (context-de-
pendent) semantic content as the sentence “According to the moral code of
my society everyone should have a fair trial”.
The semantic content of the second sentence is context-dependent for
obvious reasons: It contains the indexical expression “my”. Therefore,
its semantic content is speaker-relative (cf. Streiffer 2003, 3–6). Accord-
ingly, this kind of relativism is often called “indexical relativism”. In my
example moral claims are relative to the moral code of the speaker’s so-
ciety. Different forms of relativism ensue if we consider the moral code
of the speaker’s culture, tribe, social class, etc. as relevant. Answers to
the other three fundamental metaethical questions immediately follow
from the semantic thesis of the metaethical relativist. This need not con-
cern us here. Let us turn to normative relativism instead.
It is not at all easy to characterize the position of a normative rela-
tivist. Often the only claims that are considered as pertinent here are ei-
ther truistic (and therefore not worth discussing) or clearly false (and
therefore not worth discussing either). I will try to do a little better.
Just like any other normative ethicist, the normative relativist tells us
what to do, i. e. which kind of action is right or wrong. And, of course,
he wants to answer the question what to do for every person and for every
situation in which it might arise. At least in this respect he makes a uni-
versal claim, and you can hardly blame him for that because making a
universal claim in this sense is what proposing a normative theory
amounts to. If you want to say that normative relativism is inconsistent
because there is a universal claim at its heart, in my opinion this only
shows that your terminology is defective.
As a normative relativist one adheres to the principle that the con-
text of an action determines whether that action is right or wrong. It is
difficult, though, to say precisely which aspects of the context are rele-
vant here. That there are aspects of the context which make an action
right or wrong is quite uncontroversial, and not a relativistic thesis at
all. Obviously, it is, for example, only right to guide a blind man across
the street if the blind man wants to cross the street, at least ceteris par-
ibus. What he wants to do is a crucial part of the context in this case.
The thesis, on the other hand, that every aspect of the context is relevant
for the rightness or otherwise of an action is not a relativistic thesis ei-
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ther. No-one wants to say that. So, the normative relativist claims that
aspects of the context that the universalist takes to be irrelevant make an
action right or wrong.
It is quite tempting at this point only to consider forms of normative
relativism that are obviously untenable. An extreme normative relativist,
for example, might claim that it is always right to do what is right ac-
cording to the moral code of the society one lives in. This is cavemen
relativism, as it were. A universalist would surely deny such a claim, but
any sensible normative relativist should do likewise. He has to make
room, for example, for criticism of one’s own society. But as soon as
the relativist improves his moral theory the universalist might claim
that he has given up on relativism. So the crucial question is this:
What is the specific point the normative relativist wants to make? I
can only make a tentative suggestion here: In my opinion, the impor-
tant insight of normative relativism is that there is a deeply contingent
element in every acceptable normative system. What is and what is
not important and valuable in our lives depends on decisions we
make (and sometimes even on decisions which are made for us, by cir-
cumstances or other people), and these decisions are not forced upon us
by reason alone. Such decisions, I take it, provide a context which is rel-
evant according to the relativist but not according to the universalist.
According to the utilitarian, for instance, what is valuable in life is max-
imizing utility, let’s say: pleasure. This does not depend on what we de-
cide. The relativist, by contrast, takes our decisions to be decisive when
it comes to determining what is valuable for us. I will try to make this
idea clearer in section 6.
Let me finish this section on moral relativism with an important cor-
ollary: Normative relativism is independent of metaethical relativism.8
One can even be an adherent of cavemen normative relativism while
being a metaethical objectivist. The normative relativist need not be-
lieve that the sentence “Everyone should have a fair trial” means “Ev-
eryone should have a fair trial according to the moral code of my soci-
ety” (although he can do so). In particular he can take his own main
thesis to be a totally objective moral truth. In what follows I will assume
that the normative relativist by default is a moral objectivist in this sense.
8 I have argued for this independency thesis in detail in Ernst 2011.
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5. The relativist’s solution to the problem of universality
Let us return to our quandary concerning the universality of human
rights: On the one hand, different societies have different and mutually
incompatible moral codes. On the other hand, there is no reason to as-
sume that one society – our own – has privileged access to moral truth.
So, concerning human rights claims we have a problem: If there are
universal human rights in our sense many moral codes are defective,
i. e. we do have privileged access to moral truth in this. Or human rights
are not universal after all. Prima facie, both options are unattractive.
Given our description of moral relativism we can see that the meta-
ethical relativist suggests one way out of that quandary, while the nor-
mative relativist suggests another. The metaethical relativist basically re-
jects the first premise of our argument. He maintains that, contrary to
first appearances, different conceptions of human rights (or even the
lack of such conceptions) in different societies are not really incompat-
ible when properly analyzed. When we say that human rights claims are
universal, according to the metaethical relativist we say something like:
“Human rights claims are universal according to the moral code of our
society.” And this is true. When some member of a different society says
that there are no human rights, at least not in the Western sense of the
term, she might be equally right because what she is really saying is
something like “There are no human rights according to the moral
code of my society.” Everyone can be right. Hence, we need not as-
sume that anyone has privileged access to moral truth.
Unfortunately, the price we have to pay for this solution to our
problem is exceedingly high. Everyone, indeed, can be right. But no-
one is right about what she thought she was right about. It may be
true that human rights are universal according to the moral code of
our society. But this, I think, was not what we wanted to say. We want-
ed to say that human rights are universal – full stop. Or, to put it differ-
ently: We wanted to say that human rights are universal according to
our moral code and that our moral code is the right moral code. Accord-
ing to the metaethical relativist all of this does not even make sense. If
we want to say that human rights are universal – full stop – we are like
someone who wants to say that Big Ben is on the right hand side of the
river Thames – full stop. There is no such thing as being on the right
hand side of the river Thames without any perspective being specified.
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And according to the metaethical relativist, there is no such thing as a
moral truth without any moral code being specified either.9 In my opin-
ion the metaethical relativist throws out the baby with the bath water.
In trying to make everyone right in moral matters he really abandons the
idea of being right in moral matters.10
The normative relativist pursues an altogether different strategy. He
takes the different moral codes of different societies at face value (at least
if he is an objectivist, which I have assumed). There really is conflict,
then, and therefore not everyone can be right. But everyone, of course,
can be wrong. When the member of a Western society claims that ev-
eryone should honor the human rights of everyone and a member of an
alien society claims that no-one should honor the human rights of any-
body (because there are no such rights), both can be wrong. And that’s
basically what the normative relativist claims. But, again, this looks like
throwing out the baby with the bath water. We wanted to deny that
one society has privileged access to moral truth. And what we have
now is that no society at all has access to moral truth. But the normative
relativist not only sees everyone at fault. He also thinks that everyone is
right about something essential as well: According to him, everyone is
seriously wrong about the scope of his own moral code although every-
one could be right about its content.
I think this is the basic idea behind even the form of normative rel-
ativism I dubbed “cavemen relativism”. Our cavemen relativist claims
that it is right to do what the moral code of your own society demands.
That is to say: The moral code of every society is right but it applies
only to the members of that very society and not to everyone else.
This is a very crude position because it fails to make room for criticizing
the moral code of your own society, it might not even be fully consis-
tent because it might lead to contradictory prescriptions when it comes
to actions affecting different societies, and so on. All of this has to be
kept in mind when formulating a decent form of normative relativism.
9 What about the moral code itself ? Can it be true or false? – According to the
metaethical relativist a moral code cannot be a system of moral truths (or false-
hoods) because there are no such. So, surely, it has to be given in non-norma-
tive terms, as a system of sanctions for example.
10 I discuss more problems for the metaethical relativist in Ernst 2006 and 2008,
103–114.
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And I cannot do so now.11 But still, I think basically normative relativ-
ism is on the right track, and I now want to indicate why.
6. Moral diversity
The normative idea behind normative relativism is, or at least should be,
the claim that every society, just like every individual person, is entitled
to pursue a moral project, as I will call it, and this involves a genuine
decision about what is valuable and what is not. Let me explain this
idea by way of an example.
Consider the following question: Is friendship more important than
intellectual achievements? I don’t think that there is an answer to this
question. You can decide to live a life in which spending time with
your friends is much more important than developing your intellectual
skills. But you might just as well decide to live a scholarly life which
does not allow you to have an extensive social live and to maintain
many friendships. (Of course your talents might speak in favor of one
option rather than the other, but maybe you are equally well-suited
for both kinds of life.) It might be that a life without friends or a life
without intellectual achievements is a poor life. But, to a certain degree,
you can make up for the loss of one good by realizing another. Not ev-
erything that is worth pursuing in a life can be pursued. Life is short.
And so we have to make a choice. What is important in our life depends
of which life we choose. And we can do so within a wide range of op-
tions without being irrational. To be sure, if you choose a life of watch-
ing daytime TV over a life of friendship or intellectual achievements,
you are making a mistake. But there are also many rational options avail-
able for anyone. – I would like to emhasize two points here. The first
one is this: What is and what is not important in our life depends, to a
certain degree, on our decision. The second point worth noting is that
these decisions are not themselves determined by reason alone. They
can be (partially) a-rational, as it were, without being irrational.
I think that pretty much the same considerations apply to whole so-
cieties. There are many values we can realize only in society. We are
social animals after all. But just like in individual life, each society can
and has to decide which values it wants to realize and to what degree.
11 But cf. Ernst 2009. See also Scanlon’s benign relativism (Scanlon 2000, ch. 8)
and Wong’s relativism (Wong 2006).
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And there is leeway for different decisions. To provide a simple exam-
ple: Personal security and personal liberty are both valuable things to
have in a society. But they are, to a certain degree, mutually exclusive.
In order to maximize personal security you often have to limit personal
liberty, and vice versa. A society without personal security or without
personal liberty is not worth living in, but again, within certain limits,
you can make up for a loss of one value by realizing the other. And
just like in the individual case there might not be any compelling reason
to choose one way rather than the other. What is important in a society
nevertheless depends on such a-rational decisions. These decisions de-
fine a moral project for a society. More often than not these decisions
are not made as the result of extended social deliberation. Rather
they may be implicitly established by contingent historical events. Nei-
ther a moral project in a society nor our plan of life are totally under our
control.
The normative moral relativist can capitalize on these thoughts. He
should not maintain that it is right to do whatever is considered right by
the society one lives in. But he can maintain that it is right to participate
in the moral project of one’s own society (or, if that is an option, to
change societies) if the moral project is itself morally acceptable. And
there might very well be different and mutually exclusive but still mo-
rally acceptable moral projects for a society, just as there are different and
mutually exclusive but still morally acceptable ways to live one’s life. A
society can choose among those projects without being irrational (or
immoral). Just as in the individual case, what it is right to do depends
on such choices. There is, therefore, a deeply contingent element in
the moral code that should govern our behavior, and this is what the
normative relativist wants to emphasize.
If this is plausible, and I think it is, there might be some relativity
even with respect to human rights. To honor human rights can be
and is part of the moral projects of most human societies.12 But it
may not be part of the moral project of every human society. And, at
least in principle, this might not be a sign of the moral depravity of
that society. If there are things worth realizing that balance out the
12 Cf. Donnelly 2003, ch. 6. This, of course, is not to say that human rights are in
fact honored properly in most human societies. But this, I think, is due to the
fact that most people (individually and collectively) are not living up to their
own moral code. In violating human rights, a corrupt regime, for the most
part, is not acting in accordance with the moral code of any society!
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lack of human rights, a society without human rights in our sense might
be acceptable. It is, of course, hardly imaginable that the main goods
protected by human rights do not form part of the moral project of a
morally acceptable society. But it is imaginable that these goods are
not protected, for example, by subjective rights but rather by other
moral norms. And there might even be leeway for a trade-off between
those goods which are and those which are not protected by human
rights in our society. Human rights, as James Griffin puts it, are resistant
to trade-offs, but not too resistant (Griffin 2008, ch. 3). And if there is
room for trade-offs, there is room for different moral projects with re-
spect to human rights. One should contribute to the moral project of a
society because this is the only way to realize some goods. But if there
are different and mutually exclusive moral projects, this does not entail
that everyone has to honor human rights in the same way.
I have to admit that my way of dealing with the issue of universality
is highly theoretical. There might be morally acceptable moral projects
which do not honor human rights in the way we do. Whether there
really are such projects depends on the results of a comparison between
different moral projects. This kind of comparison is very difficult in-
deed. It is so hard even to understand the moral projects of alien soci-
eties, let alone evaluate them. But trying to do so is the only way to
honor human rights and moral diversity at the same time.13
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